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Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases

In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 165--178 (2013)

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  1. Is Epistemic Safety Threatened by Frankfurt Cases? A Reply to Kelp.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Diametros 17 (66):66-71.
    I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa and Pritchard, among others, and can be formulated as follows: If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that the safety condition, (...)
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  • Knowledge and Conditionals of (Dis)Connection.Danilo Šuster - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):267-294.
    The gist of modal epistemology is expressed in the idea that you fail to know if you do believe truly but it is seriously possible for you to believe falsely. According to subjunctivism, this idea is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One formulation invokes a safety condition—“If S had believed P, then P would have been the case,” while the other invokes a sensitivity condition—“If P had been false, S would not have believed that P.” According to simple subjunctivism, such (...)
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  • Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.
    The aim of this paper is to defend a novel characterization of epistemic luck. Helping myself to the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation, I propose that a true belief suffers from epistemic luck iff an adequate explanation of the fact that the belief acquired is true must appeal to propositions to which the subject herself is not epistemically entitled. The burden of the argument is to show that there is a plausible construal of the notions of epistemic entitlement (...)
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