ABSTRACTI suggest that Kierkegaard proves a helpful interlocutor in the debate about Analects 13.18 and the meaning of yin 隱. After surveying the contemporary debate, I argue that Kierkegaard and the Confucians agree on three important points. First, they both present relational selves. Second, both believe certain relationships are integral for moral knowledge. Third, both present a differentiated account of love where our obligations are highest to those with whom we are closest. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s ‘covering’ in the deliberation ‘Love covers (...) a multitude of sins’ in Works of Love of ‘covering’ suggests innovative meanings for yin 隱 that are compatible with Confucian philosophy. Finally, I argue that sagely discretion in covering on the Confucian account is like the teleological suspension of the ethical. (shrink)

This thesis aims to establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture to address the theoretical problems of modern East Asian philosophy of culture, particularly Chinese New Confucianism and the Kyoto School who try to formulate their cultural subjectivities for the sake of cultural modernisation. Both schools adopt Hegelian philosophy of culture and therefore inherit the problems of Hegelian dialectics which Kierkegaard criticises. While Kierkegaard himself does not develop a philosophy of culture, this thesis argues that his concepts of culture in terms (...) of the manifestations of passions, community and contemporaneity are useful resources for the formulation of East Asian cultural selves. Firstly, in chapter 1, I argue that there are two tasks of modern East Asian philosophers of culture: how to understand a culture and how to establish a cultural self. Secondly, in chapter 2, I argue that there are three theoretical problems in Mou’s and Watsuji’s Hegelian philosophies of culture, namely, the impossibility of change in cultural value, the lack of empirical method and the neglect of openness of interpretation. Thirdly, in chapter 3, I argue that Kierkegaard’s definition of culture in terms of the manifestations of passions explain East Asian cultural development more consistently than Hegelian dialectics. Fourthly, in chapter 4, I establish a Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture and argue that a cultural self is formulated by the concepts of community and contemporaneity where individuals express their passions according to their free wills. Finally, I argue that Kierkegaardian philosophy of culture fulfils both the ontological and epistemic tasks of East Asian philosophers and solves the theoretical problems they encounter when they adopt Hegelian dialectics. (shrink)

Whether Confucianism is a religion or not has been a controversial issue for many years. Recently, along with the “national revitalization” movement in China, Confucianism has been valued and advocated again in China at both official and civil levels. This trend sometimes has been perceived by some observers as a kind of religious revival movement. This paper analysis some key components in the thought of Confucius, such as his idea and attitude towards “Gods”, “Tian” and other divine or supernatural beings, (...) in order to prove that, although Confucius does not exclude religious faith, and has accepted some traditional religious rituals, the basic Confucian doctrines are not constructed on any religious foundation. The essence of Confucianism is humanism and rationalism characterized with the practical reason of “zhongdaology”. It provides a rational base for constructing the secular ideology in ancient China. In today’s Chinese society, Confucianism can still play a role in constructing the modern secular ideology, which may accommodate cultural diversity yet maintain a harmonious social political environment. (shrink)