This essay examines Locke’s chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” (Essay 2.27) in the context of the series of chapters on ideas of relations (Essay 2.25–28) that precede and follow it. I begin by introducing Locke’s account of how we acquire ideas of relations. Next, I consider Locke’s general approach to individuation and identity over time before I show how he applies his general account of identity over time to persons and personal identity. I draw attention to Locke’s claim that “person” (...) is a forensic term and analyse his arguments for why the sameness of a human being and the sameness of a substance or soul are neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity. Instead, Locke argues that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness. Locke regards persons as moral agents who are accountable for their actions. If a person now is held accountable for a past action it is important that the person now is the same person as the person who did the action. This means that moral accountability presupposes personal identity. Additionally, it will be important to consider whether the person deserves reward or punishment for the action. Locke’s account of moral relations, which he develops in Essay 2.28, addresses this issue and I show how it supplements his account of persons and personal identity. (shrink)

This paper studies Robert Boyle's account of kinds and classification. A number of commentators have argued that, for Boyle, classifications are inevitably the product of conventions. Others have challenged this reading, arguing that, according to Boyle, the corpuscular makeup of bodies gives rise to hard-edged natural kinds and classes. We argue that Boyle's position is more complicated than the available realist and conventionalist readings acknowledge. We argue that, according to Boyle, the individuation of kinds was to some degree the result (...) of convention. At the same time, however, Boyle held that our classificatory practices are subject to constraints. We identify some of these constraints by turning to Boyle's discussion of the late scholastic debate about the plurality of forms, in particular the contributions of Jacopo Zabarella and Daniel Sennert. In this way, we clarify how Boyle strikes a balance between realist and conventionalist elements in his treatment of kinds. (shrink)

According to Locke’s Principle, material objects are identical if and only if they are of the same kind and once occupy the same place at the same time. There is disagreement about whether this principle is true, but what is seldom disputed is that, even if true, the principle fails to constitute an applicable criterion of identity. In this paper, I take issue with two arguments that have been offered in support of this claim by arguing (i) that we can (...) have knowledge of past whereabouts, and so verify the right hand side of Locke’s Principle, without having to assess concrete identity claims first; (ii) that even under conditions of incomplete knowledge of past whereabouts we can use Locke’s Principle to decide concrete identity problems. (shrink)

La teoría de la identidad personal, añadida por Locke a la segunda edición de su Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano, presenta una caracterización ontológica ambigua de la naturaleza de las personas. Por un lado, pareciera que las personas no pueden ser caracterizadas como sustancias. Por otro, sin embargo, la única alternativa disponible -es decir, la que las caracteriza como modos- no es totalmente satisfactoria. Se podría considerar a las personas como correspondientes a una simple actitud pragmática de los hombres en (...) relación con ellos mismos, pero esta alternativa tampoco está exenta de problemas. Este artículo propone que el mejor abordaje del texto no es intentar determinar lo que Locke realmente quiso decir, corrigiendo de alguna manera lo que escribió, sino considerar estas ambigüedades como un índice de una posición filosófica positiva. The theory on personal identity, added by Locke in the second edition of his Essay on Human Understanding, displays a dubious characterization on the nature of persons. In the one hand, it seems that persons can not be characterized as substances. But, on the other hand, the only available alternative - viz., to characterize them as modes - is not entirely satisfactory either. One could say that there is a possibility left, that of considering persons as the correspondents of a mere pragmatic attitude men take in relation to themselves, but unfortunately this alternative is also subjected to some serious problems. Taking into consideration these difficulties, this paper proposes that the best account of the text is not to undertake a determination of what Locke really wanted to say, emending in some way his writing, but rather to consider these ambiguities as the sign of a positive philosophical position. (shrink)