Are there laws in evolutionary biology? Stephen J. Gould has argued that there are factors unique to biological theorizing which prevent the formulation of laws in biology, in contradistinction to the case in physics and chemistry. Gould offers the problem of complexity as just such a fundamental barrier to biological laws in general, and to Dollos Law in particular. But I argue that Gould fails to demonstrate: (1) that Dollos Law is not law-like, (2) that the alleged failure of Dollos (...) Law demonstrates why there cannot be laws in biological science, and (3) that complexity is a fundamental barrier to nomologicality. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of explanation in biology which does not involve appeal to laws of nature, at least as traditionally conceived. Explanatory generalizations in biology must satisfy a requirement that I call invariance, but need not satisfy most of the other standard criteria for lawfulness. Once this point is recognized, there is little motivation for regarding such generalizations as laws of nature. Some of the differences between invariance and the related notions of stability and resiliency, due respectively to (...) Sandra Mitchell and Brian Skyrms, are explored. (shrink)

Models provide scientists with knowledge about target systems. An important group of models are those that are called general. However, what exactly is meant by generality in this context is somewhat unclear. The aim of this paper is to draw out a distinction between two notions of generality that has implications for scientific practice. Some models are general in the sense that they apply to many systems in the world and have many particular targets. Another sense is captured by models (...) that are aimed at understanding the fundamental or underlying dynamics of a phenomenon, as opposed to how it manifests in each particular case. They have non-specific, i.e. generic targets. While both notions of generality and genericness are legitimate and correspond to different aspects of scientific practice, they must be distinguished. Failing to do so obscures the danger of overgeneralisation faced by general models and facilitates the illegitimate use of generic models as general models. This can lead to a reduction of the explanatory and predictive power of both. (shrink)

Empirical adaptationism is often said to be an empirical claim about nature, which concerns the overall relative causal importance of natural selection in evolution compared with other evolutionary factors. Philosophers and biologists who have tried to clarify the meaning of empirical adaptationism usually share, explicitly or implicitly, two assumptions: (1) Empirical adaptationism is an empirical claim that is scientifically testable; (2) testing empirical adaptationism is scientifically valuable. In this article, I challenge these two assumptions and argue that both are unwarranted (...) given how empirical adaptationism is currently formulated. I identify a series of conceptual and methodological difficulties that makes testing empirical adaptationism in a biologically non-arbitrary way virtually impossible. Moreover, I show that those in favor of testing empirical adaptationism have yet to demonstrate the distinctive value and necessity of conducing such a test. My analysis of the case of empirical adaptationism also provides reasons for scientists to reconsider the value and necessity of engaging in scientific debates involving the notion of overall relative causal importance. (shrink)

Three metascientific concepts that have been object of philosophical analysis are the concepts oflaw, model and theory. The aim ofthis article is to present the explication of these concepts, and of their relationships, made within the framework of Sneedean or Metatheoretical Structuralism (Balzer et al. 1987), and of their application to a case from the realm of biology: Population Dynamics. The analysis carried out will make it possible to support, contrary to what some philosophers of science in general and of (...) biology in particular hold, the following claims: a) there are "laws" in biological sciences, b) many of the heterogeneous and different "models" of biology can be accommodated under some "theory", and c) this is exactly what confers great unifying power to biological theories. (shrink)

The question of whether there are laws of nature in ecology has developed substantially in the last 20 years. Many have attempted to rehabilitate ecology’s lawlike status through establishing that ecology possesses laws that robustly appear across many different ecological systems. I argue that there is still something missing, which explains why so many have been skeptical of ecology’s lawlike status. Community ecology has struggled to establish what I call a General Unificatory Theory. The lack of a GUT causes problems (...) for explanation as there are no guidelines for how to integrate the lower-level mathematical and causal models into a larger theory of how ecological assemblages are formed. I turn to a promising modern attempt to provide a unified higher-level explanation in ecology, presented by ecologist Mark Vellend, and advocate for philosophical engagement with its prospects for aiding ecological explanation. (shrink)

The applied discipline of agroecological design provides a useful case study for examining broader philosophical questions about the existence and importance of ecological generalizations or “laws.” Recent developments in the availability and use of formal meta-analyses have led to the discovery of many resilient generalizations in ecology (Linquist et al. 2016). However, these “laws” face numerous challenges when it comes to their practical application. Concerns about their reliability and scope might stem from unclear logical and epistemic connections to more foundational (...) or “unifying” generalizations (Lean in Philos Top 47(1), 2019) which, in ecology, tend to be derived from first principles and in association with highly abstract models. This raises questions about the nature of those foundational generalizations themselves. In particular, how resilient are they compared to the generalizations uncovered by empirically driven methods? Here we propose a procedure for evaluating the resilience of generalizations across five ecologically relevant dimensions. This procedure was applied to seven well known foundational generalizations in ecology. Surprisingly, it turned out to be impossible to estimate the resilience of these foundational generalizations based on the available literature. This points to the need for a more centralized repository of information about ecological generalizations, created with the explicit aim of evaluating such important dimensions as causal mechanism and predictive power. (shrink)

Ecology is the study of the interactions of organisms and their environments. The methods of ecology fall roughly into three categories: descriptive surveys of patterns of species and resource distribution and abundance, theoretical modeling, and experimental manipulations. Ecological systems are “open” systems, and patterns and processes are products of a huge number of interacting forces. Ecology and the environmental sciences have made enormous advances since the mid-twentieth century in the understanding of ecological systems, as well as in the human impact (...) on the environment. Theory in ecology usually centers on the development of models. Environmental outcomes are uncertain and when making decisions under uncertainty, there are a variety of options available. One option is to carry out a cost benefit analysis based upon expected utilities and other is to adopt the precautionary principle. Uncertainty and under determination of theory by evidence is a fact of life in science. (shrink)

A hallmark of ecological research is dealing with complexity in the systems under investigation. One strategy is to diminish this complexity by constructing models and theories that are general. Alternatively, ecologists can constrain the scope of their generalizations to particular phenomena or types of systems. However, research employing the second strategy is often met with scathing criticism. I offer a theoretical argument in support of moderate generalizations in ecological research, based on the notions of interdependence and causal heterogeneity and their (...) effect on the trade-off between generality and realism. (shrink)

Invasion biology is a relatively young discipline which is important, interesting and currently in turmoil. Biological invaders can threaten native ecosystems and global biodiversity; they can incur massive economic costs and even introduce diseases. Invasion biologists generally agree that being able to predict when and where an invasion will occur is essential for progress in their field. However, successful predictions of this type remain elusive. This has caused a rift, as some researchers are pessimistic and believe that invasion biology has (...) no future, whereas others are more optimistic and believe that the key to successful prediction is the creation of a general, unified theoretical framework which encompasses all invasion events. Although I agree that there is a future for invasion biology, extensive synthesis is not the way to better predictions. I argue that the causes of invasion phenomena are exceedingly complex and heterogeneous, hence it is impossible to make generalizations over particular events without sacrificing causal detail. However, this causal detail is just what is needed for the specific predictions which the scientists wish to produce. Instead, I show that a limited type of synthesis is a more useful tool for generating successful predictions. An important implication of my view is that it points to a more pluralistic approach to invasion biology, where generalization and prediction are treated as important yet distinct research goals. (shrink)

There appear to be no biological regularities that have the properties traditionally associated with laws, such as an unlimited scope or holding in all or many possible background conditions. Mitchell, Lange, and others have therefore suggested redefining laws to redeem the lawlike status of biological regularities. These authors suggest that biological regularities are lawlike because they are pragmatically or paradigmatically similar to laws or stable regularities. I will review these re-definitions by arguing both that there are difficulties in applying their (...) accounts to biology and difficulties in the accounts themselves, which suggests that the accounts are not adequate to redeem the lawlike status of biological regularities. Finally, I will suggest a new account of laws that also shows how non-laws might function in some of the roles of laws. (shrink)

Ecology has had a lower profile in Biology & Philosophy than one might expect on the basis of the attention ecology is given in public discussions in relation to environmental issues. Our tentative explanation is that ecology appears theoretically redundant within biology and, consequently, philosophically challenging problemsrelated to biology are commonly supposed to be somewhere else, particularly in the molecular sphere. Richard Levins has recognized the genuine challenges posed by ecology for theoretical and philosophical thinking in biology. This essay sets (...) the stage for appreciating his work; it was preceded by four articles published in Biology & Philosophy 15(2),and is followed by a personal reminiscent. (shrink)

The balance of nature concept is an old idea that manifests itself in anumber of forms in population and community ecology. This paper focuseson population ecology, where controversy surrounding the balance ofnature takes the form of perennial debates over the significance ofdensity dependence, population regulation, and species interactions suchas competition. One of the most striking features of these debates, overthe course of the previous century in ecology, is the tendency to arguethe case on largely conceptual grounds. This paper explores twoquestions. (...) Why this tendency to settle on conceptual grounds what is soobviously an empirical issue? Are there any good conceptual arguments tobe had in this area? (shrink)