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How Might I Have Been?

Rachel Cooper

Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):495-514 (2015)

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Reasons to Genome Edit and Metaphysical Essentialism about Human Identity.Tomasz Żuradzki & Vilius Dranseika - 2022 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (9):34-36.details In this commentary paper, we are taking one step further in questioning the central assumptions in the bioethical debates about reproductive technologies. We argue that the very distinction between “person affecting” and “identity affecting” interventions is based on a questionable form of material-origin essentialism. Questioning of this form of essentialist approach to human identity allows treating genome editing and genetic selection as more similar than they are taken to be in the standard approaches. It would also challenge the idea that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Anti-essentialism, modal relativity, and alternative material-origin counterfactuals.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8379-8398.details In ordinary language, in the medical sciences, and in the overlap between them, we frequently make claims which imply that we might have had different gametic origins from the ones we actually have. Such statements seem intuitively true and coherent. But they counterfactually ascribe different DNA to their referents and therefore contradict material-origin essentialism, which Kripke and his followers argue is intuitively obvious. In this paper I argue, using examples from ordinary language and from philosophy of medicine and bioethics, that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Epistemic Possibility and the Necessity of Origin.Hane Htut Maung - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (5):685-701.details The necessity of origin suggests that a person’s identity is determined by the particular pair of gametes from which the person originated. An implication is that speculative scenarios concerning how we might otherwise have been had our gametic origins been different are dismissed as being metaphysically impossible. Given, however, that many of these speculations are intelligible and commonplace in the discourses of competent speakers, it is overhasty to dismiss them as mistakes. This paper offers a way of understanding these speculations (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Morality, Modality, and Humans with Deep Cognitive Impairments.William Gildea - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):546-568.details Philosophers struggle to explain why human beings with deep cognitive impairments have a higher moral status than certain non-human animals. Modal personism promises to solve this problem. It claims that humans who lack the capacities of “personhood” and the potential to develop them nonetheless could have been persons. I argue that modal personism has poor prospects because it's hard to see how we could offer a plausible account of modal personhood. I search for an adequate understanding of modal personhood by (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The nonidentity problem.Melinda Roberts - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details Download Export citation Bookmark 26 citations

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