The purpose of this article is to offer analysis of the passage on evil in the Theaetetus 176a4-8. I submit that it stands in anticipatory relation to Plato’s mature theory of evil, as it can be deduced from the Timaeus. My assumption is that in the Theaetetus passage two contrary principles are postulated, one of which is the cause of good, while the other is the cause of evil. In order to support that assumption, I shall argue that a) Plato’s (...) doctrine of the Forms is present in the Theaetetus Digression; b) the word ‘good’ at 176a6 refers to Plato’s highest entity – αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν; c) τὰ κακά of 176a5 are not to be identified with the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν mentioned in the same line; d) the ὑπεναντίον of 176a6, the subordinated opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν, and the second ἀνάγκη in the passage could denote the same entity, i.e. the Timaean Necessity. (shrink)

In this paper, I will look at two passages from the discussion of education in Book VII of Plato’s Republic: 523b-524d and 537e-539d. These passages, when taken together, present a puzzle for the coherency of the educational programme Socrates describes. Both discuss contradiction. One says that contradiction is educationally edifying, the other, that it is corrupting. This sounds like a contradiction about contradiction. As far as I know, no one has noticed this puzzle before. By the end of this paper, (...) I hope to have not only provided a solution to the apparent contradiction about contradiction that is compelling, but also one that shows that this puzzle, which might at first have seemed restricted to a textual issue about the educational programme in the Republic, is in fact one that has far reaching implications for a range of Plato’s theories across several dialogues. Along with education, corruption, and contradiction, I will discuss Plato’s theory of psychology, and his theory of forms. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to examine the cognitive limits of aisthêsis in 184-6 of Plato’s Theaetetus. The options are: aisthêsis as ‘bare sensation’ and aisthêsis as ‘perceptual judgment’. I argue that Plato ignores the tension between these two alternatives because he is describing the whole process of perception as containing both. My focus is the text at 184-5, but first I make some preliminary comments, from a synoptic perspective, about what Plato is doing in the context of the (...) argument. After that, I move on the text, offering translations and interpretations of the relevant parts. I also discuss some of Cornford and Cooper’s ideas about Theaetetus 184-6. (shrink)