Drawing inspiration from the notion of evocation employed in inferential erotetic logic, we defend an ‘evoked questions norm’ on inquiring attitudes. According to this norm, it is rational to have an inquiring attitude concerning a question only if that question is evoked by your background information. We offer two arguments for this norm. First, we develop an argument from convergence. Insights from several independent literatures (20th-century ordinary-language philosophy, inferential erotetic logic, inquisitive epistemic logic, and contemporary zetetic epistemology) all converge on (...) the evoked questions norm. Second, we show that suitably interpreted, the evoked questions norm correctly predicts several underappreciated kinds of bad questions. It does this, in part, by recovering versions of previously defended ignorance and knowledge norms. Some of those bad questions cannot be predicted by either norm singly, but only when corporately taken to reflect a common normative category. We identify this category as evocation. (shrink)

The question of how to arrive at questions is ambiguous. I will concentrate on two readings: (i) How should one set up a formal syntax that accomodates questions? (ii) How does one, while working in a suitable formal language, arrive at a situation where one is allowed to or even must ask a certain question? In other words: How is the asking of questions regulated within a given formal language? I will propose an answer to question (i) and consider the (...) field of possibilities of answering (ii). (shrink)

I consider two cognitive phenomena: inquiring and justifying, as complementary processes running in opposite directions. I explain on an example that the former process is driven by questions and the latter is a codification of the results of the first one. Traditionally, proof theory focuses on the latter process, and thus describes the former, at best, as an example of a backward proof search. I argue that this is not the best way to analyze cognitive processes driven by questions, and (...) that proof-theoretical analysis of questions can bring mutual benefits for both proof theory and erotetic logic. In the second part of my paper (sect. 6.3) I introduce the structural rules of weakening and contraction. Results concerning their admissibility are discussed. I also sketch an erotetic interpretation of the rule of weakening as reducing information noise, and that of contraction as securing information. (shrink)

By and large, Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL, for short) is an approach to the logic of questions which puts in the centre of attention inferential aspects of questioning. IEL is not an enterprise of the last few years only. The idea originates from the late 1980s. It evolved through time. Initially, the stress was put on the phenomenon of question raising. This changed gradually, as some forms of reasoning that involve questions have appeared to be analyzable by means of the (...) conceptual apparatus developed. In this essay I present the basics of IEL and comment on them. Most, though not all, of the ideas discussed here have been scattered across my earlier publications. The invitation from the organizers of the Asking and Answering workshop (Greifswald, September 2020) resulted in an attempt of presenting the themes of IEL in a concise but, as I hope, also comprehensible way. (shrink)