This article contributes to the historiography of scientific objectivity as well as to the broader attempt to historicize basic epistemic categories by examining the case of empirical psychology in eighteenth-century Germany. From the time when the philosopher Christian Wolff first presented empirical psychology in the late 1720s until Kantian philosophers elaborated on the topic towards the end of the century, the discourse hinged on discussions of how to obtain scientific knowledge of the soul. Whereas the work of Wolff and his (...) followers reflected established epistemic techniques for accomplishing this, from the early 1770s philosophers highlighted a new category of difficulties connected to the development of a systematic method of psychological self-observations. These difficulties, I argue, both complement and complicate the picture of how the subject became an obstacle to knowledge first in the mid-nineteenth century. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The historical context of early post-Kantian debates on politics reveals the emergence of a new type of perfectionist ethics no longer based on the state-sponsored promotion of happiness, as the dominant German tendency in the eighteenth century had been, but on individual freedom. Post-Kantian perfectionism focused on maintaining and enhancing the conditions for rightful interaction among self-defining individuals. Rather than isolating and alienating, Kantian negative freedom enabled a new conception of social interaction based on the idea of right and (...) the progressive extension of rightful relations. Humboldt, Schiller, Fichte, and Marx exemplified this new approach, despite their differences. (shrink)

A historical and philosophical reassessment of the impact of Aristotle and early-modern Aristotelianism on the development of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant and Aristotle reassesses the prevailing understanding of Kant as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher. Taking epistemology, logic, and methodology to be the key disciplines through which Kant’s transcendental philosophy stood as an independent form of philosophy, Marco Sgarbi shows that Kant drew important elements of his logic and metaphysical doctrines from Aristotelian ideas that were absent in other philosophical traditions, such as (...) the distinction of matter and form of knowledge, the division of transcendental logic into analytic and dialectic, the theory of categories and schema, and the methodological issues of the architectonic. Drawing from unpublished documents including lectures, catalogues, academic programs, and the Aristotelian-Scholastic handbooks that were officially adopted at Königsberg University where Kant taught, Sgarbi further demonstrates the historical and philosophical importance of Aristotle and Aristotelianism to these disciplines from the late sixteenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

A popular story about Kant's relation to Leibniz presents Kant as a Leibniz-Wolffian by education who, inspired by his encounter with the teachings of Newton and Hume, took on the project of reconciling Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics with Newtonian science and of responding to epistemological skepticism, a project that led him further and further away from his Leibniz-Wolffian roots and culminated in the total rejection of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this essay, four shortcomings of the popular (...) story are identified and several suggestions are made about how to amend and expand the story in order to overcome these shortcomings. Furthermore, some of the most important Leibnizian doctrines that influenced Kant are collected and their role in Kant's philosophy is discussed. (shrink)

This article aims to make further progress in revising the standard account of Wolff’s philosophy as a popularisation and systematisation of Leibniz’s doctrines. It focuses on the topic of the communication among substances and the metaphysics of simples and activity underlying it. It is argued that Wolff does not accept the pre-established harmony in its orthodox Leibnizian version. The article explains Wolff’s departure from Leibniz’s PEH as stemming from his rejection of Leibniz’s construal of the activity of every simple as (...) representational power and of the metaphysics of unity and activity in which that construal is rooted. (shrink)

Christian Wolff’s view regarding sensory perception – which is formed on a Leibnizian framework – forms the base of his aesthetics. He explains the concept of perfection and pleasure according to the clear but disordered essence of sensory perception that is present in this framework and through this very path guides towards the definition of beauty. Thus, according to him, perfection is the consistency or accordance of diversity or the abundance of things or their parts; pleasure is the result of (...) the intuition of the perfection present in things; and beauty is the perfection of a thing from the aspect of it being suitable in creating pleasure in us. Therefore, in this article we intend to explore the essence of sensory perception according to him and the relation between it, perfection and pleasure with beauty in his aesthetics so that it becomes clear how aesthetics emerges from the heart of epistemological discussions in general and from the depths of sensory perception in particular. Finally, while keeping in mind the important fact that he did not directly claim to have an independent theory in the field of aesthetics, we will critique and give our views in regards to the requisites connected to his aesthetics so that the limits of his extreme rationalist views in dealing with issues such as the extent that beauty covers, the levels of beauty and the difference of views in relation to taste and liking become clear. (shrink)

دیدگاه کریستین وُلف دربارۀ ‌‌ادراک حسی که چارچوبی لایب‌‌‌نیتسی دارد، اساس استتیک او را برمی‌‌‌سازد. او با توجه به ماهیت واضح ولی مغشوشِ ‌‌ادراک حسی در این چارچوب، مفهوم کمال و لذت را تبیین می‌‌‌کند و از همین معبر ره به تعریف زیبایی می‌‌‌برد. به این ترتیب، از نظر او، کمال همانا توافق یا هماهنگی کثرات یا انبوهی از اشیاء یا اجزای آن‌هاست؛ لذت، حاصل شهود کمال در اشیاء است؛ و زیبایی هم عبارت است از کمال شیْ‏ء از آن حیث (...) که برای ایجاد لذت در ما مناسب است. با این اوصاف، در این مقاله قصد داریم ماهیت ‌‌ادراک حسی نزد او و رابطۀ ادراک حسی، کمال و لذت را با زیبایی در استتیک او بکاویم تا مشخص شود چگونه علم استتیک به‌‌‌طور عام از دل مباحث معرفت‌‌‌شناختی و به‌‌‌طور خاص از بطن ‌‌ادراک حسی بیرون می‌‌‌آید. در نهایت‌‌، با در نظر داشتن این مهم که خود او مستقیماً داعیۀ نظریۀ مستقلی در حوزۀ استتیک نداشته، نقد و نظری بر لوازم مربوط به استتیک او خواهیم داشت تا حدود و ثغور نظریۀ عقل‌‌‌گرایانۀ مفرط او در برخورد با مسائلی چون دایرۀ شمول زیبایی، مراتب زیبایی و اختلاف‌‌‌نظرهای ذوقی مشخص شود. (shrink)

As far as treatments of causation are concerned, the pre-Kantian 18th century German context has long been dismissed as a period of uniform and unrepentant Leibnizian dogmatism. While there is no question that discussions of issues relating to causation in this period inevitably took Leibniz as their point of departure, it is certainly not the case that the resulting positions were in most cases dogmatically, or in some cases even recognizably, Leibnizian. Instead, German theorists explored a range of positions regarding (...) the nature of causal powers, the appropriate systems to explain the observed agreement between the states of substances, and the ground of free actions, or so I will argue in this chapter. Focusing on these three issues, I will here sketch the development of the debates relating to causation and trace the evolution of positions among the philosophers within the so-called Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy as well as among its many opponents. (shrink)

This paper examines the origin, range and meaning of the Principle of Action and Reaction in Kant’s mechanics. On the received view, it is a version of Newton’s Third Law. I argue that Kant meant his principle as foundation for a Leibnizian mechanics. To find a ‘Newtonian’ law of action and reaction, we must look to Kant’s ‘dynamics,’ or theory of matter. I begin, in part I, by noting marked differences between Newton’s and Kant’s laws of action and reaction. I (...) argue that these are explainable by Kant’s allegiance to a Leibnizian mechanics. I show (in part II) that Leibniz too had a model of action and reaction, at odds with Newton’s. Then I reconstruct how Jakob Hermann and Christian Wolff received Leibniz’s model. I present (in Part III) Kant’s early law of action and reaction for mechanics. I show that he devised it so as to solve extant problems in the Hermann-Wolff account. I reconstruct Kant’s views on ‘mechanical’ action and reaction in the 1780s, and highlight strong continuities with his earlier, pre-Critical stance. I use these continuities, and Kant’s earlier engagement with post-Leibnizians, to explain the un-Newtonian features of his law of action and reaction. (shrink)

This paper examines the young Kant’s claim that all motion is relative, and argues that it is the core of a metaphysical dynamics of impact inspired by Leibniz and Wolff. I start with some background to Kant’s early dynamics, and show that he rejects Newton’s absolute space as a foundation for it. Then I reconstruct the exact meaning of Kant’s relativity, and the model of impact he wants it to support. I detail (in Section II and III) his polemic engagement (...) with Wolffian predecessors, and how he grounds collisions in a priori dynamics. I conclude that, for the young Kant, the philosophical problematic of Newton’s science takes a back seat to an agenda set by the Leibniz-Wolff tradition of rationalist dynamics. This results matters, because Kant’s views on motion survive well into the 1780s. In addition, his doctrine attests to the richness of early modern views of the relativity of motion. (shrink)

This paper compares Kant’s and Leibniz’s views on the relation between knowing subjects and known objects. Kant discusses Leibniz’s philosophy in the ‘Amphiboly’ section of the first Critique. According to Kant, Leibniz’s main error is mistaking objects in space and time for mind-independent things in themselves, that is, for monads. The paper argues that, pace Kant, Leibniz regards objects in space and time as mind-dependent. A deeper divergence between the two philosophers concerns knowing subjects. For Leibniz, they are substances. For (...) Kant, we cannot know whether they are substances. Kant conceives of knowing subjects as complex systems of cognitive capacities. (shrink)

Kant’s teleology as presented in the Critique of Judgment is commonly interpreted in relation to the late eighteenth-century biological research of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. In the present paper, I show that this interpretative perspective is incomplete. Understanding Kant’s views on teleology and biology requires a consideration of the teleological and biological views of Christian Wolff and his rationalist successors. By reconstructing the Wolffian roots of Kant’s teleology, I identify several little known sources of Kant’s views on biology. I argue that (...) one of Kant’s main contributions to eighteenth-century debates on biology consisted in demarcating biology from metaphysics. Kant rejected Wolffian views on the hierarchy of sciences, according to which propositions specifying the functions of organisms are derived from theological truths. In addition, Kant argued that organic self-organization necessitates a teleological description in order to show that self-organization does not support materialism. By demarcating biology and metaphysics, Kant made a small yet important contribution to establishing biology as a science. (shrink)

This thesis presents an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s theoretical philosophy in which the notion of ‘force’ is of central importance. My analysis encompasses the full span of Kant’s theoretical and natural-scientific writings, from the first publication to the drafts of an unfinished final work. With a close focus on Kant’s texts, I explicate their explicit references to force, providing a narrative of the philosophical role and significance of force in the various periods of the Kantian oeuvre. This represents an intervention (...) into Kant scholarship that seeks to correct the marginal role accorded to ‘force’. The central problem that emerges through the thesis’ attention to force is: how to interpret the simultaneous separation and connection of physical and psychological forces in Kant’s mature, critical philosophy? Physical and psychological forces are strictly separated, and yet a common, ontological conception of force underpins these two domains. I show that this issue has its basis in a tradition of philosophical ‘dynamics’ stemming from Leibniz, which is examined in part one. The three parts of the thesis proceed chronologically through the Kantian oeuvre. Part one reconstructs the historical context of Leibnizian and Newtonian conceptions of force, and presents a narrative of the employment of force in Kant’s pre-critical writings, in their relation to the broad problematic of Leibniz’s dynamics. Part two explores the account of physical and psychological forces, and the common, ontological notion of force, in the major critical-period discussions. Part three presents the late works, namely the third Critique and the Opus postumum, as a ‘philosophy of force’, in which force, with all its necessary ambiguities, plays central roles in Kant’s late systematising endeavours. I conclude that the perspective of this thesis makes possible a new understanding of the nature and unity of Kant’s philosophical project. (shrink)

La filosofía de Wolff y Baumgarten ha sido tradicionalmente evaluada como nada más que una sistematización, carente de toda originalidad, de las doctrinas de Leibniz. El presente trabajo revisa esta opinión generaliza, concentrándose en el problema específico de la interacción de las sustancias naturales. Se muestra que Wolff y Baumgarten no siguen a Leibniz con el mismo grado de cercanía en relación a algunos de los principios centrales de la teoría armonía preestablecida y, con ello, se problematiza el uso de (...) la etiqueta “leibnizianismo” como referida a un cuerpo homogéneo e indiferenciado de doctrinas. (shrink)

Throughout his life, Jurij Lotman lived at the crossroad between different worlds, ages, and cultures. The many authors, cultures, and ideas that shaped his thought and influenced his theories are scattered at either side of countless geographical, political, and cultural borders, beginning with the one that separates “Russian culture” from “European culture,” porous and ambiguous as any boundary.The task of reconstructing how Lotman’s ideas came to being, how they shifted their meaning as their context shifted, is more and more a (...) crucial task not only for the historian. Many Lotmanian concepts, first and foremost that of semiosphere, are acquiring major relevance not only for semiotics itself and its branches, such as the rising political semiotics, but also for many neighboring disciplines, such as cultural studies and political sciences. Therefore, gaining a better understanding of the meaning of Lotman’s ideas could be of value also for the applied semiotician or the political analyst.The present paper is the result of research started in the Lotman Archives in Tallin, Estonia. Through an analysis of archival material, it aims at reconstructing the origins and meaning of the most political tropes of Lotman’s theories, especially what I will call his theory of the political subject. In the first part, I will argue that, in order to understand this political aspect of Lotman, it is necessary to take into consideration the intellectual debates inside which the author started his intellectual journey in 1930s–1940s Soviet Russia, and how he sought answers to those debates in the works of G. W. Leibniz.In the final part of the paper, I will try to show how this reconstruction of Lotman’s history could contribute to the contemporary debate in semiotics and other connected disciplines. (shrink)

Dans le présent travail, l’auteur analyse la réception de la méthodologie de Leibniz chez Wolff et les wolffiens. Même si ces derniers déclarent s’inspirer des Meditationes, il est clair qu’ils en modifient ou en rejettent des thèses centrales, notamment celles qui concernent les critères de connaissance et l’usage des symboles. L’auteur montre que l’interprétation wolffienne des Meditationes s’est finalement faite au détriment de la méthodologie leibnizienne.

Las demostraciones de la existencia de Dios de Christian Wolff se encuentran principalmente en su _Theologia naturalis_. A pesar de que esta obra contiene en cada una de sus dos partes un argumento distinto, Wolff la llama “sistema de Teología natural”. Por ello, puede entenderse que las dos demostraciones no son totalmente independientes, sino que comparten una estructura argumental similar, aunque Wolff no lo mencione expresamente. En este trabajo me propongo mostrar: 1) que aquello que las dos pruebas tienen en (...) común es que ambas están basadas en la noción del ente que tiene en su esencia la razón de su existencia. 2) Que esta noción es el vínculo entre la perfección absoluta y la existencia necesaria. 3) Que la diferencia entre las dos pruebas consiste en que se desarrollan en direcciones opuestas, cada una presentándose como el reverso de la otra. Mientras que la primera parte de la existencia necesaria y concluye con la perfección absoluta, la segunda parte de la perfección absoluta y concluye con la existencia necesaria. (shrink)

Las filosofías de Wolff y Baumgarten han sido tradicionalmente evaluadas como una mera sistematización de las doctrinas de Leibniz, carente de toda originalidad. Se revisa esta opinión, concentrándose en el problema específico de la interacción de las sustancias naturales. Se muestra que ellos no siguen a Leibniz con el mismo grado de cercanía en algunos de los principios centrales de la teoría de la armonía preestablecida. Se problematiza así el uso de la etiqueta "leibnizianismo" como referida a un cuerpo homogéneo (...) e indiferenciado de doctrinas. The philosophies of Wolff and Baumgarten have been traditionally evaluated as mere systematizations of the doctrines of Leibniz, and, therefore, as lacking all originality. The paper revises that opinion, focusing on the specific problem of the interaction of natural substances, in order to show that they do not follow Leibniz as closely with respect to some of the central principles of pre-established harmony. It also questions the use of "Leibnizianism" as a label to refer to a homogeneous and undifferentiated body of doctrines. As filosofias de Wolff e Baumgarten têm sido tradicionalmente avaliadas como uma mera sistematização das doutrinas de Leibniz, carente de toda originalidade. Neste artigo, revisa-se essa opinião concentrando-se no problema específico da interação das substâncias naturais. Mostra-se que eles não seguem Leibniz com o mesmo grau de aproximação em alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria da harmonia preestabelecida. Problematiza-se, assim, o uso da etiqueta "leibnizianismo" como referência a um corpo homogêneo e indiferenciado de doutrinas. (shrink)

In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics in Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible: consciousness, self-consciousness, and psychology. I argue that we can better understand Kant’s particular arguments and positions within this context, but also gain a more accurate sense of which aspects of Kant’s accounts derive from the antecedent traditions and which constitute (...) genuine philosophical innovations. (shrink)

ITA: L’elaborato ha come obiettivo una ricostruzione storica del dibattito tra Immanuel Kant e Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi nel contesto del cosiddetto _Pantheismusstreit_ degli anni Ottanta del Settecento. In particolare, si andranno ad evidenziare le fonti dei due autori, i quali propongono due interpretazioni uguali e contrarie rispetto alle possibilità della fede, nonché del rapporto che questa intercorre con la ragione. Nello specifico, si andrà esponendo la posizione kantiana oltre al mito del Kant «alles Zermalmender», rimarcando le radici profonde della sua (...) riflessione tanto nelle letture di autori quali Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius o Georg Friedrich Meier, quanto nella sua stessa produzione, come testimoniato già dalla _Principiorum primorum cognitionis methapysicae nova dilucidatio_ all’inizio del suo percorso intellettuale, culminando quindi nel breve saggio _Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?_ e nella seconda edizione della _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ del 1787. Inoltre, si fornirà anche una ricostruzione della posizione jacobiana, delle sue fonti, quali, ad esempio, Johann Georg Hamann o Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, e della sua originale riflessione all’interno del contesto tedesco dell’epoca evocando soprattutto due opere, ovvero _Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn_, vero e proprio _casus belli_ del _Pantheismusstreit_, e _David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus_. Dunque, obiettivi dello scritto sono tanto il dissolvere il mito di uno spietato Kant come «la lama che in Germania ha tagliato la testa al deismo», quanto quello dello Jacobi irrazionalista ed indegno del titolo di filosofo. ENG: The subject of this work is an historical reconstruction of the debate between Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi in the context of the so-called _Pantheismusstreit_ that happened in the '80s of the Eighteenth Century. Specifically, the sources of the two authors are going to be stressed to highlight the equal and opposite interpretations given about the possibilities of the faith, as well as its relationship with reason. In particular, the kantian position is going to be displayed over the myth of Kant as «alles Zermalmender», drawing attention to his thought’s roots as much as in his lectures of Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius or Georg Friedrich Meier, as in his own works, as the _Principiorum primorum cognitionis methapysicae nova dilucidatio_ already testimonies at the beginning of his career, climaxing in the short essay _Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?_ as well in the second edition of the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ in 1787. Also, it is going to be proposed a reconstruction of the jacobian standpoint, careful to remark his sources, like Johann Georg Hamann or Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and his original thought in the German context of the era, summoning two works of his, _Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn_, the very _casus belli_ of the _Pantheismusstreit_, and the _David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus_. Therefore, goals of this works are the dispel of the myth of a ruthless Kant as «the sword that cut deism’s head in Germany», as well as the one on Jacobi as an irrationalist unworthy of being granted the title of philosopher. ​. (shrink)