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Why is Frege's Puzzle Still Puzzling?

In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 151--168 (1995)

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  1. On Different Ways of Being Equal.Bruno Bentzen - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1809-1830.
    The aim of this paper is to present a constructive solution to Frege's puzzle (largely limited to the mathematical context) based on type theory. Two ways in which an equality statement may be said to have cognitive significance are distinguished. One concerns the mode of presentation of the equality, the other its mode of proof. Frege's distinction between sense and reference, which emphasizes the former aspect, cannot adequately explain the cognitive significance of equality statements unless a clear identity criterion for (...)
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  • Frege: Two theses, two senses.Carlo Penco - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):87-109.
    One particular topic in the literature on Frege’s conception of sense relates to two apparently contradictory theses held by Frege: the isomorphism of thought and language on one hand and the expressibility of a thought by different sentences on the other. I will divide the paper into five sections. In (1) I introduce the problem of the tension in Frege’s thought. In (2) I discuss the main attempts to resolve the conflict between Frege’s two contradictory claims, showing what is wrong (...)
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  • In What Sense is Frege's (Statement of the) Puzzle 'Problematic'?Ludovic Soutif - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53 (136):51-57.
    I take issue with Glezakos’s explanation of why Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. On her view, Frege’s statement – how can sentences of the form a=a and a=b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they express the same semantic content/are made true by the same object’s self-identity? – should not be considered any puzzling either because it is on the whole circular, or because, neutrally stated, it cannot even be set up. I argue against this that if, as she takes (...)
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