This paper presents a comparison of the philosophical systems of Francesco Patrizi and Henry More. The point, however, is not to demonstrate Patrizi’s influence on More but rather to see how, with respect to some particular subjects, they both tried to offer a modern interpretation of Neoplatonism. The main axis of the analysis follows the topics of space, light, and soul. While to More, light is of merely marginal interest, it is demonstrated that space and soul are of crucial importance (...) and play a similar role in both authors’ systems. They function as intermediary entities that link the higher and the lower reality and form a sort of canvas upon which the material world unfolds. Yet, in comparison with Patrizi, More’s system is both constrained by a much stricter, dualistic classification and at the same time veers dangerously close to immanentism and pantheism (which More tries to avoid). (shrink)

Peirce remarks on several occasions in the 1790s on affinities between his evolutionary metaphysics and Schelling's Idealism, behind which, he avers, lies ‘the monstrous mysticism of the East’. What are these affinities? Why are they affinities with Schelling rather than with Hegel? And what is the mysticism in question? I argue that Schelling, like Peirce but unlike Hegel, is committed to evolution, not only across species boundaries, but also across the boundary between the inorganic and the organic. Moreover, Schelling, like (...) Peirce but unlike Hegel, embeds this account of evolution in an account of the evolution of God through love. The monstrous mysticism of the East, I argue, is Lurianic kabbalah, to which Schelling is demonstrably indebted, and which is committed to an evolutionary theism on which is based, if not an account of natural evolution, an account of reincarnation as a mechanism by which life-forms progress from inorganic to organic bodies as they develop their consciousness. Publicized by.. (shrink)

The work of Spinoza, Descartes and Leibniz is cited in an attempt to develop, both expositorily and critically, the philosophy of Anne Viscountess Conway. Broadly, it is contended that Conway's metaphysics, epistemology and account of the passions not only bear intriguing comparison with the work of the other well-known rationalists, but supersede them in some ways, particularly insofar as the notions of substance and ontological hierarchy are concerned. Citing the commentary of Loptson and Carolyn Merchant, and alluding to other commentary (...) on the Cambridge Platonists whose work was done in tandem with Conway's, it is contended that Conway's conception of the "monad" preceded and influenced Leibniz's, and that her monistic vitalism was in many respects a superior metaphysics to the Cartesian system. It is concluded that we owe Conway more attention and celebration than she has thus far received. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine les façons dont le platonicien de Cambridge Henry More, au XVIIe siècle, a tenté de défendre une rigoureuse séparation ontologique entre les substances matérielles et les substances spirituelles tout en maintenant que les unes et les autres étaient étendues. Nous élucidons certaines des théories et certains des concepts propres à More, tels que l’indiscerpabilité, la pénétrabilité, la spissitude essentielle et l’hylopathie, qui fournissaient, croyait-il, une base solide à cette séparation. Mais nous montrons aussi certaines faiblesses inhérentes (...) à ces théories, concluant en fin de compte que More n’est pas arrivé à maintenir la distinction stricte qu’il recherchait. (shrink)

In my paper, I dispute Christian Hengstermann’s analysis of More’s philosophical system as a form of panentheistic panpsychism in which matter is alive by virtue of being the last emanation from God. I show that, in his mature period, More explicitly rejected such an emanationist doctrine and attributed the non-mechanical powers of matter to an outside immaterial principle, the Spirit of Nature. Ultimately, this leads to a system in which divine space, the Spirit of Nature and the spirit of God (...) are representations of various aspects of the divine essence, as it is at work in the world. On the other hand, matter is not part of this triadic structure and can only be said to be alive at the cost of a rather counterintuitive redefinition of the notion of “life”. (shrink)

The Cambridge Platonist Henry More was fiercely averse to the Lurianic Kabbalah, with which he became acquainted through the two tomes of the Kabbala denudata. More contributed to the first tome substantially and was highly influential in shaping the reception of this work, edited by Christian Knorr von Rosenroth. He denounced the incompatibility of the Christian religion with Luria's system and in his last contribution, the Fundamenta, he put forward an apagogical argument meant to show the inconsistency of Luria's teaching. (...) The article aims at exploring the nature of More's argument so as to highlight the philosophical essence of his criticism, the intention of which was to emphasize the incompatibility of the Kabbalah with any form of rational speculation. Luria's doctrine appeared to More to be a compromise between materialism and spiritualism, a sort of hybrid theory that was even worse than materialism, given its misleading theistic appearance as well as the lack of internal coherence. This compromise was also morally unacceptable, being symptomatic of weakness of the will. (shrink)

The article reconstructs a brief controversy between H. More, G. W. Leibniz and J. G. Wachter about the Kabbalah, or what they called ‘the philosophy of the Hebrews’. I study in particular the status of the proposition ‘nothing comes out of nothing’ in their exchanges - a proposition they all agreed was a fundamental kabbalist axiom while having differing views as to the prospects of reconciling that position with Christianity. I show how Wachter’s curious Kabbalistico-Spinozism provided the stage for an (...) indirect philosophical encounter between Leibniz and More that highlights not only their respective positions on the Kabbalah, but also suggests some important philosophical agreement between them regarding divine transcendence and the nature of creation. (shrink)

Jacob Rhenferd (1654–1712), professor of Hebrew and Oriental languages at the University of Franeker in the United Provinces, is a mostly forgotten figure. This article analyses his theological and historical scholarship, with special attention to his use of Jewish mystical texts. It argues that Rhenferd’s conception of philologia sacra was profoundly shaped by kabbalistic insights and that a recourse to Kabbalah provided him with an idiom to articulate anew some foundational Reformed doctrines. Conversely, a comparison with the kabbalistic studies of (...) some of his contemporaries highlights the incipient difficulties faced by a kabbalistic approach to Christian doctrine and its history. The article uses the case of Rhenferd to propose some historiographical revisions about the role of Kabbalah in Christian scriptural philology around the turn of the eighteenth century, about its institutional currency in prominent Reformed academies and, more broadly, about the validity of ‘Christian Kabbalah’ as a category in modern scholarship. (shrink)