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Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism

Ethics 127 (4):821-851 (2017)

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  1. Standing up for supervenience.Bart Streumer - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):138-154.
    There is a well‐known argument against irreducibly normative properties that appeals to the following claim about supervenience: for all possible worlds W and W*, if the instantiation of descriptive properties in W and W* is exactly the same, then the instantiation of normative properties in W and W* is also exactly the same. This claim used to be uncontroversial, but recently several philosophers have challenged it. Do these challenges undermine this argument? I argue that they do not, since the negation (...)
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  • Rossian Intuitionism without Self-Evidence?David Kaspar - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (3):68.
    The first phase of the recent intuitionist revival left untouched Ross’s claim that fundamental moral truths are self-evident. In a recent article, Robert Cowan attempts to explain, in a plausible way, how we know moral truths. The result is that, while the broad framework of Ross’s theory appears to remain in place, the self-evidence of moral truths is thrown into doubt. In this paper, I examine Cowan’s Conceptual Intuitionism. I use his own proposal to show how he arrives at a (...)
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  • William David Ross.Anthony Skelton - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Presents and argues for a novel interpretation of Ross's distinctive contribution to moral theory and meta-ethics.
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  • Moral Knowledge Without Knowledge of Moral Knowledge.David Kaspar - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):155-172.
    Most people believe some moral propositions are true. Most people would say that they know that rape is wrong, torturing people is wrong, and so on. But despite decades of intense epistemological study, philosophers cannot even provide a rudimentary sketch of moral knowledge. In my view, the fact that we have very strong epistemic confidence in some fundamental moral propositions and the fact that it is extremely difficult for us to provide even the basics of an account of moral knowledge (...)
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