I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is remarkable the extent to which there is agreement in the philosophy of religion amongst theists, agnostics, and atheists alike that John Mackie’s argument for atheism is either invalid or (...) unsound. As a result, the focus has entirely shifted from the logical problem of evil to the so-called evidential one. But I think that this is a mistake, not necessarily because I think Mackie’s argument is sound, but rather because I reject an assumption made by apparently all parties to the debate, which is that there is only one logical problem of evil. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to defend a deductive argument that God* does not exist. As far as I can tell, the basic idea of this argument is a novel one: while Mackie’s argument has a more or less consequentialist framework, mine has a deontological one. The evil of which I will speak is that of our having been thrown into the world. (shrink)

Leibniz is commonly labeled a foe of Molinism. His rejection of robust libertarian freedom coupled with some explicit passages in which he distances himself from the doctrine of middle knowledge seem to justify this classification. In this paper, I argue that this standard view is not quite correct. I identify the two substantive tenets of Molinism. First, the connection between the conditions for free actions and these free actions is a contingent one: free actions follow contingently from their sufficient conditions. (...) Second, God knows what creatures would freely do in different possible circumstances prevolitionally—that is, prior to God willing anything. I argue that Leibniz himself endorses a version of both tenets and utilizes them for theoretical purposes similar to those of Molinists. I conclude that Leibniz is much closer to Molinism than is typically acknowledged. Leibniz is best characterized as a friend—rather than a foe—of Molinism. (shrink)

در برابر «تقدیرگرایان کلامی»، که معتقدند علم پیشین الاهی با ارادة آزاد انسان در تعارض است، «سازگارگرایان» بر این باورند که علم پیشین خداوند با ارادة آزاد انسان سازگار است. «علامه طباطبایی» و «ویلیام کریگ» به گروه اخیر تعلق دارند و برای حل این مسئله راه‌حل ارائه می‌دهند. در این مقاله به بررسی تطبیقی «نظریة علم میانه»، به‌منزلة راه‌حل نهایی کریگ و دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی در باب این مسئله، می‌پردازیم. نتیجة نهایی آن است که با وجود تفاوت دیدگاه دو متفکر (...) در برخی موارد، هر دو اندیشمند ضمن پذیرش سازگاری علم پیشین الهی با اختیار انسان معتقدند معرفت خداوند به افعال اختیاری انسان ناشی از معرفت او به این نوع افعال با تمام شرایط و خصوصیات آن‌هاست. (shrink)