Discussions of the intersection of general relativity and thephilosophy of religion rarely take place on the technical levelthat involves the details of the mathematical physics of generalrelativity. John Earman's discussion of theism and generalrelativity in his recent book on spacetime singularities is anexception to this tendency. By virtue of his technical expertise,Earman is able to introduce novel arguments into the debatebetween theists and atheists. In this paper, I state and examineEarman's arguments that it is rationally acceptable to believethat theism and (...) general relativity form a mutually consistent oreven mutually supportive pair. I conclude that each of hisarguments is unsound. (shrink)

Atheists have tacitly conceded the field to theists in the area of philosophical cosmology, specifically, in the enterprise of explaining why the universe exists. The theistic hypothesis is that the reason the universe exists lies in God’s creative choice, but atheists have not proposed any reason why the universe exists. I argue that quantum cosmology proposes such an atheistic reason, namely, that the universe exists because it has an unconditional probability of existing based on a functional law of nature. This (...) law of nature (“the wave function of the universe”) is inconsistent with theism and implies that God does not exist. I criticize the claims of Alston, Craig, Deltete and Guy, Oppy and Plantinga that theism is consistent with quantum cosmology. (shrink)

The article investigates one of the positions of Zubiri with respect to the problem ofGod, which the author terms the “cosmic way” to distinguish it from the better-known “wayof relegation”. In his “cosmic way,” Zubiri elaborates an argument for the existence of Godstarting from the data of the physics of his time, in particular, the cosmology of the “BigBang.” Undoubtedly, the “way of relegation” is the most characteristic of Zubiri’s philosophy, and the one which is in best agreement with the (...) whole corpus of his work. And theadvantages of the “way of relegation” stand out especially when it is compared to the “cosmic way”. But this does not mean that the “cosmic way” cannot be considered criticallyfrom the point of view of its own merits.El artículo investiga uno de los planteamientos de Zubiri en torno al problema de Dios,y que el autor denomina “vía cósmica” para distinguirla de la más conocida “vía de la religación”. En su vía cósmica, Zubiri elaboraba un argumento sobre la existencia de Dios apartir de los datos de la física de su tiempo, especialmente a partir de la cosmología del “BigBang”. Sin embargo, la vía de la religación es la más característica de la filosofía de Zubiri,y la más acorde con el conjunto de su filosofía. Las ventajas de la vía de la religación destacan especialmente cuando se la compara con la vía cósmica. Ello no obsta para que la víacósmica de Zubiri pueda ser considerada críticamente desde el punto de vista de sus propios méritos. (shrink)

Combining time travel with certain kinds of supertask, this paper proposes a novel model for Hell. Temporally-closed spacetimes allow otherwise impossible opportunities for material kinds of damnation and reveal surprising limitations on metaphysical objections to Hell. Prima facie, eternal damnation requires either infinite amounts of time or time for the damned to speed-up arbitrarily. However, spatiotemporally finite ‘time travel’ universes can host unending personal torment for infinitely many physical beings, while keeping fixed finite limits on rates of temporal passage. Such (...) ‘Hilbert's Inferno’ spacetimes suggest neither materialism nor the finitude of time and space need forbid Hell. A material Hell can be spatiotemporally finite yet eternal for its inhabitants. Hilbert's Inferno also sheds light on Hell's location and accessibility, and shows that some spacetimes are intrinsically better suited to punishment than reward. (shrink)

According to certain interpretations of quantum mechanics, the behavior of some physical systems is random—that is, certain current states of physical systems are related to other current states and the set of possible future states in a probabilistic, rather than a deterministic, fashion. This account of physical systems seems to conflict with the claim that there is an omnipotent God—that is, a God Who can efficaciously bring about any logically possible creaturely state, and Who can cause efficacious secondary causes—and so (...) raises problems for classical theism. After explaining these problems, I provide a solution to them based upon a version of hylomorphism, which I call Theistic Hylomorphism with Randomness. On this view, it can be affirmed that the physical world is both random and in determinate states, and divine omnipotence can be upheld in a random world. After presenting this version of hylomorphism and showing how it defeats the problems for classical theism raised by quantum mechanics, I defend it against three objections. (shrink)