Dr Gillian Craig (1) has argued that palliative medicine services have tended to adopt a policy of sedation without hydration, which under certain circumstances may be medically inappropriate, causative of death and distressing to family and friends. We welcome this opportunity to defend, with an important modification, the approach we proposed without substantive background argument in our original article (2). We maintain that slowing and eventual cessation of oral intake is a normal part of a natural dying process, that artificial (...) hydration and alimentation (AHA) are not justified unless thirst or hunger are present and cannot be relieved by other means, but food and fluids for (natural) oral consumption should never be 'withdrawn'. The intention of this practice is not to alter the timing of an inevitable death, and sedation is not used, as has been alleged, to mask the effects of dehydration or starvation. The artificial provision of hydration and alimentation is now widely accepted as medical treatment. We believe that arguments that it is not have led to confusion as to whether or not non-provision or withdrawal of AHA constitutes a cause of death in law. Arguments that it is such a cause appear to be tenuously based on an extraordinary/ordinary categorisation of treatments by Kelly (3) which has subsequently been interpreted as prescriptive in a way quite inconsistent with the Catholic moral theological tradition from which the distinction is derived. The focus of ethical discourse on decisions at the end of life should be shifted to an analysis of care, needs, proportionality of medical interventions, and processes of communication. (shrink)

"Best interests" is widely accepted as the appropriate foundation principle for medico-legal decisions concerning treatment withdrawal from patients in persistent vegetative state (PVS). Its application appears to progress logically from earlier use regarding legally incompetent patients. This author argues, however, that such confidence in the relevance of the principle of best interests to PVS is misplaced, and that current construction in this context is questionable on four specific grounds. Furthermore, it is argued that the resulting legal inconsistency is distorting both (...) the principle itself and, more particularly, individual patient interests. (shrink)

Continuous deep sedation at the end of life is a practice that has been the topic of considerable ethical debate, for example surrounding its perceived similarity or dissimilarity with physician-assisted dying. The practice is generally considered to be legal as a form of symptom control, although this is mostly only assumed. France has passed an amendment to the Public Health Act that would grant certain terminally ill patients an explicit right to continuous deep sedation until they pass away. Such a (...) framework would be unique in the world. In this paper we will highlight and reflect on four relevant aspects and shortcomings of the proposed bill. First, that the bill suggests that continuous deeps sedation should be considered as a sui generis practice. Second, that it requires that sedation should always be accompanied by the withholding of all artificial nutrition and hydration. In the most recently amended version of the legal proposal it is stated that life sustaining treatments are withheld unless the patient objects. Third, that the French bill would not require that the suffering for which continuous deep sedation is initiated is unbearable. Fourth, the question as to whether the proposal should be considered as a way to avoid having to decriminalise euthanasia and/or PAS or, on the contrary, as a veiled way to decriminalise these practices. The French proposal to amend the Public Health Act to include a right to continuous deep sedation for some patients is a unique opportunity to clarify the legality of continuous deep sedation as an end-of-life practice. Moreover, it would recognize that the practice of continuous deep sedation raises ethical and legal issues that are different from those raised by symptom control on the one hand and assisted dying on the other hand. Nevertheless, there are still various issues of significant ethical concern in the French legislative proposal. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEntscheidungen der Therapiebegrenzung und in der Betreuung am Lebensende sind häufig komplex und von ethischen Problemen begleitet. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung steht die entscheidende Frage, wie hilfreich existierende „Ethik-Richtlinien“, die eine ethische Orientierung bei solchen Entscheidungen geben sollen, in der klinischen Praxis tatsächlich sind. Die Frage, welchen Nutzen „Ethik-Richtlinien“ bei der Entscheidungsfindung haben oder haben können, wird hier exemplarisch an einem klinischen Fallbeispiel aus einer Ethik-Kooperationsstudie in der Intensivmedizin analysiert. Vergleichend werden hierzu „Ethik-Richtlinien“ aus Deutschland, der Schweiz und aus Großbritannien (...) herangezogen, die Gegenstand eines internationalen Projekts zur Analyse von Richtlinien waren. Die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer ethischen Orientierung an „Ethik-Richtlinien“ bei Entscheidungsproblemen der Therapiebegrenzung und in der Betreuung am Lebensende werden anhand der Fallstudie diskutiert und illustriert. Abschließend werden Schlussfolgerungen für die Entwicklung ethischer Richtlinien für die klinische Praxis formuliert. (shrink)

The author reviews and continues the debate initiated by her recent paper in this journal. The paper was critical of certain aspects of palliative medicine, and caused Ashby and Stoffell to modify the framework they proposed in 1991. It now takes account of the need for artificial hydration to satisfy thirst, or other symptoms due to lack of fluid intake in the terminally ill. There is also a more positive attitude to the emotional needs and ethical views of the patient's (...) family and care-givers. However, clinical concerns about the general reluctance to use artificial hydration in terminal care remain, and doubts persist about the ethical and legal arguments used by some palliative medicine specialists and others, to justify their approach. Published contributions to the debate to date, in professional journals, are reviewed. Key statements relating to the care of sedated terminally ill patients are discussed, and where necessary criticised. (shrink)

Patients who are dying of cancer usually give up eating and then stop drinking. This raises ethical dilemmas about providing nutritional support and fluid replacement. The decision-making process should be based on a knowledge of the risks and benefits of giving or withholding treatments. There is no clear evidence that increased nutritional support or fluid therapy alters comfort, mental status or survival of patients who are dying. Rarely, subcutaneous fluid administration in the dying patient may be justified if the family (...) remain distressed despite due consideration of the lack of medical benefit versus the risks. Some cancer patients who are not imminently dying become dehydrated from reversible conditions such as hypercalcaemia. This may mimic the effects of advanced cancer. These conditions should be sought and fluid replacement therapy should be given along with the specific treatments for the condition. (shrink)

When a severely suffering dying patient is deeply sedated, and this sedated condition is meant to continue until his death, the doctor involved often decides to abstain from artificially administering fluids. For this dual procedure almost all guidelines require that the patient should not have a life expectancy beyond a stipulated maximum of days (4–14). The reason obviously is that in case of a longer life-expectancy the patient may die from dehydration rather than from his lethal illness. But no guideline (...) tells us how we should describe the dual procedure in case of a longer life-expectancy. Many arguments have been advanced why we should not consider it to be a form of homicide, that is, ending the life of the patient (with or without his request). I argue that none of these arguments, taken separately or jointly, is persuasive. When a commission, even one that is not itself life-shortening, foreseeably renders a person unable to undo the life-shortening effects of another, simultaneous omission, the commission and the omission together should be acknowledged to kill her. I discuss the legal and ethical implications of this conclusion. (shrink)