Wes Morriston contends that William Lane Craig's argument for the impossibility of a beginningless past results in an equally good argument for the impossibility of an endless future. Craig disagrees. I show that Craig's reply reveals a commitment to an unmotivated position concerning the relationship between actuality and the actual infinite. I then assess alternative routes to the impossibility of a beginningless past that have been offered in the literature, and show that, contrary to initial appearances, these routes similarly seem (...) to support the impossibility of an endless future. (shrink)

The second premise of the Kalām cosmological argument, as defended by William Lane Craig, has two supporting arguments; the Hilbert’s Hotel argument and the suc.

ABSTRACT W.L. Craig has argued that the universe has a beginning because (1) the infinitude of the past entails the existence of actual infinite multitudes of past intervals of time, and (2) the existence of actual infinite multitudes is impossible. Puryear has rejected (1) and argued that what the infinitude of the past entails is only the existence of an actual infinite magnitude of past time. But this does not preclude the infinitude of the past, Puryear claims, because there can (...) be no justification for the claim that actual infinite magnitudes are impossible. I argue, against Puryear, that there can be such a justification. I claim, nevertheless, that, for reasons entirely different from Puryear’s, the finitude of the past cannot be established based either on the impossibility of actual infinite multitudes or on the impossibility of actual infinite magnitudes. My arguments in this paper draw on insights from al-Kindī and Avicenna. (shrink)

William Lane Craig's defence of the kalam cosmological argument rests heavily on two philosophical arguments against a past-eternal universe. In this article I take issue with one of these arguments, what I call the – namely, that the metaphysical absurdity of an actually infinite number of things existing precludes the possibility of a beginningless past. After explaining this argument, I proceed to raise some initial doubts. After setting those aside, I show that the argument is ineffective against proponents of presentism. (...) The remainder of the article considers and rejects possible replies on Craig's behalf. (shrink)

In a recent paper published in 2020, Alex Malpass & Wes Morriston discuss the difference between beginningless past and an endless future and try to show that beginningless series of past events and an endless series of future ones are in the same boat. So if (as they believe) an endless series of events is possible, then the possibility of a beginningless series of past events should not be rejected merely on the ground that it would be an actual infinite. (...) I will show in this paper that Malpass and Morriston’s refutations are flawed and that their argument does not provide any evidence that a beginningless past is possible. (shrink)

Yishai Cohen raises three related objections to the kalam cosmological argument. Firstly, Cohen argues that, if the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, which is used to support the kalam cosmological argument, is sound, then a predetermined endless future must also be impossible. Secondly, Cohen argues that the possibility of a predetermined endless future entails the possibility of an actual infinite. Finally, Cohen maintains that Robert C. Koons’ Grim Reaper paradox shows that a predetermined endless future is impossible. (...) I intend to show that Cohen’s three arguments are not sound and that the possibility of an endless future is not a thorn in the kalam cosmological argument. (shrink)