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An introductory logic

James Edwin Creighton

New York,: The Macmillan company. Edited by Harold Robert Smart (1904)

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The de Lagunas’ Dogmatism and Evolution, overcoming modern philosophy and making post-Quinean analytic philosophy.Joel Katzav - 2022 - In Eric Schliesser, Neglected Classics of Philosophy, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 192-214.details Willard V. Quine’s 1951 article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Two Dogmas) was taken to be revolutionary because it rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction and the thesis that empirical statements are confirmed individually rather than holistically. The present chapter, however, argues that the overcoming of modern philosophy already included the overcoming of these theses by Hegelians, pragmatists and two critics of Hegelianism and pragmatism, Grace and Theodore de Laguna. From this perspective, Two Dogmas offers a Hegelian epistemology that was already superseded in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
Argument appraisal strategy: A comprehensive approach.Robert H. Ennis - 2001 - Informal Logic 21 (2).details A popular three-stage argument appraisal strategy calls for (1) identifying the parts of the argument, (2) classifYing the argument as deductive, inductive, or some other type, and (3) appraising the argument using the standards appropriate for the type. This strategy fails for a number of reasons. I propose a comprehensive alternative approach that distinguishes between inductive, deductive, and other standards; calls for the successive application of standards combined with assumption-ascription, according to policies that depend for their selection on the goals (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 14 citations
Revisiting Grace de Laguna’s critiques of analytic philosophy and of pragmatism.Joel Katzav - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-21.details I revisit my paper, ‘Grace de Laguna’s 1909 Critique of Analytic Philosophy’ and respond to the commentary on it. I respond to James Chase and Jack Reynolds by further analysing the difference between speculative philosophy as de Laguna conceived of it and analytic philosophy, by clarifying how her critique of analytic philosophy remains relevant to some of its more speculative forms, and by explaining what justifies the criticism of established opinion that goes along with her rejection of analytic philosophy’s epistemic (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Chapter 7 Introduction.Joel Katzav - 2023 - In Joel Katzav, Dorothy Rogers & Krist Vaesen, Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. Cham: Springer. pp. 69-80.details I introduce the key ideas of foundationalist, coherentist and pragmatist theories of knowledge. I then use these ideas as background for presenting the work on knowledge and perception in this part, work by Grace Andrus de Laguna and Marie Collins Swabey. We will see that these authors critique the idea of sense data that was central to the foundationalist theories of knowledge of Bertrand Russel and other early analytic thinkers, though de Laguna’s critique leads to perspectivism about perception and knowledge (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Affirming the consequent.George Bowles - 1996 - Argumentation 10 (4):429-444.details The thesis of this paper is that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its premises at all favorably relevant to its conclusion. In support of this thesis I assume two premises and argue for a third. My two assumptions are these: (1) that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its conclusion certain relative to its premises (this is widely, if not universally, acknowledged by writers (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The concept of relevance and the logic diagram tradition.Jan Dejnožka - 2010 - Logica Universalis 4 (1):67-135.details What is logical relevance? Anderson and Belnap say that the “modern classical tradition [,] stemming from Frege and Whitehead-Russell, gave no consideration whatsoever to the classical notion of relevance.” But just what is this classical notion? I argue that the relevance tradition is implicitly most deeply concerned with the containment of truth-grounds, less deeply with the containment of classes, and least of all with variable sharing in the Anderson–Belnap manner. Thus modern classical logicians such as Peirce, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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