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  1. Solving Prior’s Problem with a Priorean Tool.Martin Pleitz - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3567-3577.
    I will show how a metaphysical problem of Arthur Prior’s can be solved by a logical tool he developed himself, but did not put to any foundational use: metric logic. The broader context is given by the key question about the metaphysics of time: Is time tenseless, i.e., is time just a structure of instants; or is time tensed, because some facts are irreducibly tensed? I take sides with Prior and the tensed theory. Like him, I therefore I have to (...)
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  • The world is everything that is the case.M. J. Cresswell - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):1 – 13.
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  • Cross‐temporal grounding.Fabrice Correia & Giovanni Merlo - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Cross-temporal grounding is a type of grounding whereby present facts about the past (for example that Caesar was alive) are explained in terms of past facts (for example that Caesar is alive) rather than in terms of other present facts. This paper lays the foundations for a theory of cross-temporal grounding. After introducing the general idea of a type of grounding connecting facts to past facts, we offer two arguments that past-directed facts require cross-temporal grounds—the ‘argument from intimacy’ and the (...)
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  • Semantic nominalism.John Bigelow - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (4):403 – 421.
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  • A Believable A-Theory.Alexander Jackson - manuscript
    The A-theory of time is plagued by certain standard armchair problems: the presentism–eternalism dilemma, the problem of truth-makers, the alleged impossibility of cross-temporal relations, and the problem of temporary intrinsics. These challenges supposedly force A-theories to make incredible claims. I argue that these challenges are not deep antinomies in common sense, but rest on avoidable mistakes. Then I present a new A-theory that shows what’s possible once we move past the old problems. On this proposal, time’s passing is a metaphysically (...)
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