In this article, I argue that Paulo Freire’s liberatory conception of education is interesting, challenging, even transforming because central to it are important aspects of education which other philosophers marginalise. I also argue that Freire’s critics are right when they claim that he paid insufficient attention to another important aspect of education. Finally, I argue for a conception of education which takes account of the strengths and at the same time overcomes the limitations of Freire’s liberatory conception.

? This article is reproduced by kind permission of the author and O.E.C.D. (Paris) who are publishing the material in the series Studies in the Learning Sciences (Paris, O.E.C.D., 1975).

The aim of this paper is to describe Dewey’s reception in the Spanish-speaking countries that constitute the Hispanic world. Without any doubt, it can be said that in the past century Spain and the countries of South America have been a world apart, lagging far behind the mainstream Western world. It includes a number of names and facts about the early translation of Dewey’s works in Spain, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and Argentina in the first half of the century and a (...) brief explanation of the decline of Dewey in the second half. To a great extent, Dewey’s conception of education was immersed in the international movement of reform that started at the turn of the century and would eventually slowly but surely, renovate the structure of the educational system throughout the entire century, including that of South America. But it is equally clear that the Spanish-speaking countries have displayed a general ignorance of Dewey and, by extension, of American pragmatism during most of the century. In spite of mutual incomprehension, a deep affinity between Dewey’s pragmatism and Hispanic philosophy is suggested in this paper, anticipating that the gradual process of democratization of Spain and the Hispanic countries of South America may be in some sense related to the rediscovery of Dewey and to the application of his key ideas in education. After decades of neglect of Dewey and of his contribution, there is a strong feeling not only that his conception of things is important to understand the last century but that Dewey – along with Peirce and other American classical pragmatists – may very well prove to be a key thinker for the XXIst century also in the Hispanic world. Along this vein, the recent resurgence of pragmatism can be understood not as the latest academic fashion but the occasion to start to close the gap between the two worlds. (shrink)

This paper seeks to address the question of schooling for democracy by, first, identifying at least one form of social character, dependent, after Marcuse, on the historical emergence of a “new sensibility.” It then explores one pedagogical thread related to the emergence of this form of subjectivity over the course of the last two centuries in the west, and traces its influence in the educational counter-tradition associated with philosophical anarchism, which is based on principles of dialogue and social reconstruction as (...) opposed to monologue and reproduction. The idea of a dialogical school has been made possible by a historical shift in adult views of child as interlocutor rather than “othered” object of adult formation—a shift that can be observed in an historical process of “closer approaches” between adult and child and a recognition of childhood and adulthood as forms of subjectivity that lie on a synchronous rather than a diachronic lifespan continuum. Finally the author identifies an archetype of “school” understood as a specific type of intentional community—an experimental zone in which participants are allowed and encouraged, through explicitly dialogical practice, to develop the personal and relational habits that make authentic democracy possible—a communal form that gives practical meaning to Dewey’s notion of school as “embryonic society”: a utopian space where natality is recognized as a fundamental cultural force, and where the evolutionary possibilities inherent in neoteny are taken as normative. (shrink)

Between 1940 and 1945, while still a student of theoretical physics and without any contact with the history of science, Thomas S. Kuhn developed a general outline of a theory of the role of belief in science. This theory was well rooted in the philosophical tradition of Emerson Hall, Harvard, and particularly in H. M. Sheffer’s and C. I. Lewis’s logico-philosophical works—Kuhn was, actually, a graduate student of the former in 1945. In this paper I reconstruct the development of that (...) general outline after Kuhn’s first years at Harvard. I examine his works on moral and aesthetic issues—where he displayed an already ‘anti-Whig’ stance concerning historiography—as well as his first ‘Humean’ approach to science and realism, where his earliest concern with belief is evident. Then I scrutinise his graduate work to show how his first account of the role of belief was developed. The main aim of this paper is to show that the history of science illustrated for Kuhn the epistemic role and effects of belief he had already been theorising about since around 1941.Keywords: Intension; Belief; Causality; Thomas Kuhn; Clarence Irving Lewis; Henry Sheffer. (shrink)

This paper assumes the significance of Rousseau's Emile for the practice of radical education in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s. It is argued that the educational philosophy espoused in Emile is far more conservative than that actually attributed to his inspiration by some radical educators.

Ever since its formative years in the USA a century ago, the discipline of education has taken an uneasy stand on its own ‘scientific’ status, not least with regard to the basic issue of the relationships between theory and practice. When a science of education was introduced as a panacea for rational planning in the fields of schooling and teacher training, general solutions on a scientific basis were to underpin efficient steering at all levels. Presently, there are signs of similar (...) approaches to science in federal policies concerned with evidence‐based educational practice in the USA. At the same time a new conception of educational science has been launched in Sweden as a means to promote more fruitful research. With the background of some striking similarities as well as differences among dominant conceptions of educational science in these varying contexts, this article aims to reconsider some basic aspects of the persistent issue of the relationships between pedagogic theory and practice. (shrink)

Many modern discussions on Vocational education and Training (VET) only consider it’s goals in terms of the labor market or social inclusion. This article argues that vocations are an important contribution to the common good of society as whole, and not only a method of securing laborers. In order to acknowledge this contribution there needs to be a reorientation on VET from an educational perspective first and foremost. In order to do this, this article revisits a public debate John Dewey (...) had with two early educational reformers David Snedden and Charles Prosser in the early twentieth century. In this debate, the economic arguments used by Snedden and Prosser, which have found their echoes in the modern VET debates were opposed to the educational arguments of Dewey. This article wishes to show the significant educational nature of Dewey’s counter arguments and argue for the relevance of this approach in the modern VET discussion. (shrink)

Contemporary educational theorists focus on the significance of Dewey’s conception of experience, learning-by-doing and collateral learning. In this essay, I reexamine the chapters of Dewey’s Democracy and Education, that pertain to thinking and highlight their relationship to Dewey’s How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking in the Educative Process—another book written explicitly for teachers. In How We Think Dewey explains that nothing is more important in education than the formation of concepts. Concepts introduce permanency into an (...) otherwise impermanent world. He defines concepts as established meanings, or intellectual deposits used to found a better understanding of new experiences; they are what makes any experience educationally worthwhile. Dewey accuses traditional and progressive education of failing to appropriately form concepts in students. His position is that concepts are formed and transformed by experience, reflection and activity. He argues that the individual makes a personalized use of concepts for which he or she requires: continuity of experience, exposure to new or surprising possibilities, and sustained communication with others—all of which are discussed at length in Democracy & Education. I conclude with the practical recommendation that K-12 schools introduce philosophy into the curriculum. Philosophy not only invites students to engage their concepts in a reflective manner, but it also provides a valuable resource for that engagement. Most if not all of philosophy’s canonical texts are dedicated to analyzing such concepts as beauty, friendship, love and justice. The introduction of philosophy in K-12 education would, I suggest, offer a correction to both traditional and progressive education. (shrink)

In what follows I explore the question of fictionality in history writing. First, I venture into the unfamiliar genre of ego-histoire and make my own professional training in the tenets of positivist or realist historiography an object of theoretical reflection and critical analysis. Then as a way of dealing with the literary dimension of written history, I make a canonical work in history of education an object of rhetorical analysis. Finally, as another way of coming to terms with the “fictions (...) of historiography,” I revisit one of my own productions and make it an object of metacritical consideration. My central theme is that historiographical realism alone will not suffice, that historians are as dependant upon literary invention as upon documents, that history cannot be written without the aid of the “fictions of historiography,” and that the difference between the historian and the novelist is narrower than we may have been accustomed to think. I further argue that attention to the literary or rhetorical dimension of history is long overdue in history of education, where it flourishes unacknowledged. I conclude that historical writing is not just a literary pastime and the issue remains: how to come to grips with fictionalizing and the truth claims of historiography. (shrink)