The black hole information loss paradox is a catch-all term for a family of puzzles related to black hole evaporation. For almost 50 years, the quest to elucidate the implications of black hole evaporation has not only sustained momentum, but has also become increasingly populated with proposals that seem to generate more questions than they purport to answer. Scholars often neglect to acknowledge ongoing discussions within black hole thermodynamics and statistical mechanics when analyzing the paradox, including the interpretation of Bekenstein-Hawking (...) entropy, which is far from settled. To remedy the dialectical gridlock, I have formulated an overarching, unified framework, which I call ``Black Hole Paradoxes'', that integrates the debates and taxonomizes the relevant `camps' or philosophical positions. -/- I demonstrate that black hole evaporation within Hawking's semi-classical framework insinuates how late-time Hawking radiation is an entangled global system, a contradiction in terms. The relevant forms of information loss are associated with a decrease in maximal Boltzmann entropy and an increase in global von Neumann entropy respectively, which engender what I've branded the ``paradox of phantom entanglement''. Prospective solutions are then tasked with demonstrating how late-time Hawking radiation is either exclusively an entangled subsystem, in which a black hole remnant lingers as an information safehouse, or exclusively an unentangled global system, in which information is evacuated to the exterior. -/- The disagreement between safehouse and evacuation solutions boils down to the statistical interpretation of thermodynamic black hole entropy, i.e., Bekenstein-Hawking entropy. Safehouse solutions attribute Bekenstein-Hawking entropy to a minority of black hole degrees of freedom, those that are associated with the horizon. Evacuation solutions, in contrast, attribute Bekenstein-Hawking entropy to all black hole degrees of freedom. I argue that the interpretation of Bekenstein-Hawking entropy is the litmus test to vet the overpopulated proposal space. So long as any proposal rejecting Hawking's original calculation independently derives black hole evaporation, globally conserves degrees of freedom and entanglement, preserves a version of semi-classical gravity at sub-Planckian scales, and describes black hole thermodynamics in statistical terms, then it counts as a genuine solution to the paradox. (shrink)

Guiding principles are central to theory development in physics, especially when there is only limited empirical input available. Here I propose an approach to such principles looking at their heuristic role. I suggest a distinction between two modes of employing scientific principles. Principles of nature make descriptive claims about objects of inquiry, and principles of epistemic action give directives for further research. If a principle is employed as a guiding principle, then its use integrates both modes of employment: guiding principles (...) imply descriptive claims, and they provide directives for further research. By discussing the correspondence principle and the naturalness principle as examples, I explore the consequences for understanding and evaluating current guiding principles in physics. Like principles of nature, guiding principles are evaluated regarding their descriptive implications about the research object. Like principles of epistemic action, guiding principles are evaluated regarding their ability to respond to context-specific needs of the epistemic agent. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge two widespread convictions about unification in physics: unification is an aim of physics and unification is driven by metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions. I call these external explanations of why there is unification in physics. Against this, I claim that unification is a by-product of physical research and unification is driven by basic methodological strategies of physics alone. I call this an internal explanation of why there is unification in physics. To support my claims, I will (...) investigate the actual practice undertaken in physics in paradigmatic examples of unification. (shrink)

While there are some empirical problems that could suggest the need for a theory of quantum gravity, most of these are not standardly taken as motivations for seeking a new theory. Rather, the quest for a theory of quantum gravity has been primarily motivated, guided, and constrained by philosophical and theoretical concerns. A critical examination of these can help us better understand what the theory is supposed to achieve—and, further, what it should be expected to achieve. On the other hand, (...) there are various approaches towards finding a theory of quantum gravity, with different aims, methods, and starting-points—they disagree on what the theory is supposed to be like. A relevant question is then: what is it that unites these approaches such that we classify them as approaches to quantum gravity? This paper argues that a basic characterisation of the theory can be given in terms of the minimal shared motivation across these different approaches, and that this itself can be seen as motivated by various other problems that have been appealed to as reasons for seeking a theory of quantum gravity. (shrink)

I argue that philosophical issues concerning reductive explanations help constrain the construction of quantum theories with appropriate state spaces. I illustrate this general proposal with two examples of restricting attention to physical states in quantum theories: regular states and symmetry-invariant states. 1Introduction2Background2.1 Physical states2.2 Reductive explanations3The Proposed ‘Correspondence Principle’4Example: Regularity5Example: Symmetry-Invariance6Conclusion: Heuristics and Discovery.

It is argued that certain quantum theories of gravity — string theory, loop quantum gravity, non-commutative field theory — do not include spacetime as part of their fundamental ontology. There is a concern in the literature that theories of this kind are physically opaque and empirically incoherent. In this paper, I clarify and amend Huggett and Wüthrich’s argument against these claims. Whereas the content of this paper centres on the disappearance and re-emergence of spacetime in quantum gravity, much of the (...) philosophical work centres more generally on issues of (emergent) ontology and how this ontology can be extracted from formal theories, the role of formal derivations in justifying ontological relations, the nature of Kuhnian revolutions, and the application of these revolutions to quantum gravity. (shrink)

The search for a new scientific theory is typically prompted by an encounter with something in the world that cannot be explained by current theories. This is not the case for the search for a theory of quantum gravity, which has been primarily motivated by theoretical and philosophical concerns. This Element introduces some of the motivations for seeking a theory of quantum gravity, with the aim of instigating a more critical perspective on how they are used in defining and constraining (...) the theory sought. These motivations include unification, incompatibilities between general relativity and quantum field theory, consistency, singularity resolution, and results from black hole thermodynamics. (shrink)

Scientific principles can undergo various developments. While philosophers of science have acknowledged that such changes occur, there is no systematic account of the development of scientific principles. Here we propose a template for analyzing the development of scientific principles called the ‘life cycle’ of principles. It includes a series of processes that principles can go through: prehistory, elevation, formalization, generalization, and challenge. The life cycle, we argue, is a useful heuristic for the analysis of the development of scientific principles. We (...) illustrate this by discussing examples from foundational physics including Lorentz invariance, Mach’s principle, the naturalness principle, and the perfect cosmological principle. We also explore two applications of the template. First, we propose that the template can be employed to diagnose the quality of scientific principles. Second, we discuss the ramifications of the life cycle’s processes for the empirical testability of principles. (shrink)