An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out (...) conditions under which attitudes are rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence but not candidates for knowledge (even if true). The latter conditions will typically be “pragmatic” or “practical,” and thus license acceptance from a “practical” point of view. For Kant, only broadly-speaking practical reasons can provide adequate motivation for adopting a positive attitude towards a proposition (rather than suspending judgment) in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds. -/- . (shrink)

As with other aspects of post-Minoan Crete studies there has been a tendency to accept a pan-Cretan economic model. A Dorian aristocracy, served by pre-Dorian serfs and their descendants, depended upon the produce of their private kleroi for membership in an andreion and citizen status. The elite preserved their political, social, and economic position by discouraging the development of a market economy on Crete in favor of a subsistence economy based upon agriculture, animal husbandry, and hunting. Discouraged were production of (...) coinage, elite display, and manufacture for export . Specialist craftsmen and other kinds of wage earners were either foreigners or members of a dependent population. (shrink)