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  1. Deductive schemas with uncertain premises using qualitative probability expressions.Guy Politzer & Jean Baratgin - 2016 - Thinking and Reasoning 22 (1):78-98.
    ABSTRACTThe new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning redirects the investigation of deduction conceptually and methodologically because the premises and the conclusion of the inferences are assumed to be uncertain. A probabilistic counterpart of the concept of logical validity and a method to assess whether individuals comply with it must be defined. Conceptually, we used de Finetti's coherence as a normative framework to assess individuals' performance. Methodologically, we presented inference schemas whose premises had various levels of probability that contained non-numerical (...)
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  • Evaluating conditional arguments with uncertain premises.Raymond S. Nickerson, Daniel H. Barch & Susan F. Butler - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (1):48-71.
    ABSTRACTTreating conditionals as probabilistic statements has been referred to as a defining feature of the “new paradigm” in cognitive psychology. Doing so is attractive for several reasons, but it complicates the problem of assessing the merits of conditional arguments. We consider several variables that relate to judging the persuasiveness of conditional arguments with uncertain premises. We also explore ways of judging the consistency of people's beliefs as represented by components of conditional arguments. Experimental results provide evidence that inconsistencies in beliefs (...)
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  • Conceptual clarity and empirical testability: Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023).Nicole Cruz - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (3):396-408.
    Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2022) criticise the use of the term “new paradigm” in the psychology of reasoning and raise important issues about how to advance research in the field. In this commentary I argue that for the latter it would be helpful to clarify further the concepts that reasoning theories rely on, and to strengthen the links between the theories and the empirical observations that would and would not be compatible with them.
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