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Moral Realism, QuasiRealism, and Skepticism

In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 176 (2008)

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Superspreading the word.Bart Streumer - forthcoming - Noûs.details Quasi‐realists are expressivists who say much of what realists say. To avoid making their view indistinguishable from realism, however, they usually stop short of saying everything realists say. Many realists therefore think that something important is missing from quasi‐realism. I argue that quasi‐realists can undermine this thought by defending a version of quasi‐realism that I call super‐quasi‐realism. This version seems indistinguishable from realism, but I argue that this is a mistaken impression that arises because we cannot believe super‐quasi‐realism. Download Export citation Bookmark
A Universal Morality: An account of Moral Objectivity against Moral Error Theory.Utkarsh Rana - manuscriptdetails Moral error theory is a meta-ethical view that discusses how one makes an error when making a moral judgment or claim. The error resides in the fact that the moral values about which the judgments are made, do not exist in the natural fabric of the world. In the first section of this article, I shall discuss about the moral error theory itself and the claims that it makes. Since the moral error theory in a structured form first came from (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Can expressivism have it all?Terence Cuneo - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):219-241.details Quasi-realist expressivists set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the “realist-sounding” elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively antirealist. Its critics have long suspected that the position cannot have what it wants. In this essay, I develop this suspicion. I do so by distinguishing two paradigmatic versions of the view—what I call Thin and Thick expressivism respectively. I contend that there is a metaethical datum regarding our epistemic (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):850-879.details Despite having occupied a peripheral position in contemporary metaethics, moral nonnaturalism has recently experienced a revival of sorts. But what is moral nonnaturalism? And what is there to be said in favor of it? In this article, I address these two questions. In the first place, I offer an account of what moral nonnaturalism is. According to the view I propose, nonnaturalism is better viewed not as a position, but as a theoretical stance. And, second, I critically engage with three (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 32 citations
Expressivism and the Reliability Challenge.Camil Golub - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):797-811.details Suppose that there are objective normative facts and our beliefs about such facts are by-and-large true. How did this come to happen? This is the reliability challenge to normative realism. As has been recently noted, the challenge also applies to expressivist “quasi-realism”. I argue that expressivism is useful in the face of this challenge, in a way that has not been yet properly articulated. In dealing with epistemological issues, quasi-realists typically invoke the desire-like nature of normative judgments. However, this is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations
Critical Notice: The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism.Bredo Johnsen - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):56-67.details Download Export citation Bookmark

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