Switch to: References

Citations of:

Reid's Moral Philosophy

In Terence Cuneo & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 243 (2004)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Using Benevolent Affections to Learn Our Duty.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):467-489.
    The puzzle is this: I argue that for Reid, moral sense needs benevolent affections – i.e. some of our animal, non-cognitive principles of action – to apply the rules of duty. But he also thinks that duty can conflict with benevolent affections. So what happens in these conflict cases? I will argue that Reid takes moral psychology seriously and that he believes that our natural benevolent affections can be used as indicators of duty. Although creative, his account has a major (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Naturalism and common sense.Penelope Maddy - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):2-34.
    My topic here is metaphilosophy, the question of how philosophy is properly done. For some years now, I've been developing a particularly austere, roughly naturalistic approach to philosophical questions that I call 'second philosophy'. It has seemed to me that one effective way to convey the spirit of second philosophy is to compare and contrast it with other more familiar methods, like transcendental or therapeutic philosophy. Here I hope to pursue this sort of engagement with two other venerable schools of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Scottish Common Sense, association of ideas and free will.Sebastiano Gino - 2020 - Intellectual History Review 30 (1):109-127.
    Describing the will and the extent of its causal power over human actions, Joseph Priestley famously compared the mind to a stone, as both are subject to deterministic laws: “Though an inclination...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perceptual Categories Derived from Reid’s “Common Sense” Philosophy.Adam Reeves & Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    The 18th-century Scottish ‘common sense’ philosopher Thomas Reid argued that perception can be distinguished on several dimensions from other categories of experience, such as sensation, illusion, hallucination, mental images, and what he called ‘fancy.’ We extend his approach to eleven mental categories, and discuss how these distinctions, often ignored in the empirical literature, bear on current research. We also score each category on five properties (ones abstracted from Reid) to form a 5 × 11 matrix, and thus can generate statistical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Thomas Reid's philosophy of mind: Consciousness and intentionality.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289.
    Thomas Reid’s epistemological ambitions are decisively at the center of his work. However, if we take such ambitions to be the whole story, we are apt to overlook the theory of mind that Reid develops and deploys against the theory of ideas. Reid’s philosophy of mind is sophisticated and strikingly contemporary, and has, until recently, been lost in the shadow of his other philosophical accomplishments. Here I survey some aspects of Reid’s theory of mind that I find most interesting. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Reid vs. the Reidian Legacy.Jeffrey Edwards - 2005 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (1):1-17.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What is Wrong with Reid's Criticism of Hume on Moral Approbation?Laurent Jaffro - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):11-26.
    In his Essays on the Active Powers, Thomas Reid criticises Hume 's theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that Reid shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark