Many philosophers these days consider themselves naturalists, but it's doubtful any two of them intend the same position by the term. In Second Philosophy, PenelopeMaddy describes and practices a particularly austere form of naturalism called "Second Philosophy". Without a definitive criterion for what counts as "science" and what doesn't, Second Philosophy can't be specified directly ("trust only the methods of science" for example), so Maddy proceeds instead by illustrating the behaviors of an idealized inquirer she calls (...) the "Second Philosopher". mhis Second Philosopher begins from perceptual common sense experimentation, theory formation and testing, working all the while to asses, correct and improve her methods as she goes. Second Philosophy is then the result of the Second Philosopher's investigations. Maddy delineates the Second Philosopher's approach by tracing her reactions to various familiar skeptical and transcendental views (Descartes, Kant, Carnap, late Putnam, van Fraassen), comparing her methods to those of other self-described naturalists (especially Quine), and examining a prominent contemporary debate (between disquotationalists and correspondence theorists in the theory of truth) to extract a properly second-philosophical line of thought. She then undertakes to practice Second Philosophy in her reflections on the ground of logical truth, the methodology, ontology and epistemology of mathematics, and the general prospects for metaphysics naturalized. (shrink)
PenelopeMaddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits ([Maddy, 2017]). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of 'multiversism', and then I proceed to analyse Maddy's concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics , in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of (...) the multiverse seems to be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to Maddy's concerns based on a careful analysis of 'multiverse practice'. (shrink)
The paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: PenelopeMaddy's and my own. The two theories share a significant element: they both view logic as grounded not just in the mind (language, concepts, conventions, etc.), but also, and crucially, in the world. But the two theories differ in significant ways as well. Most distinctly, one is an anti-holist, "austere naturalist" theory while the other is a non-naturalist "foundational-holistic" theory. This methodological difference affects their questions, goals, orientations, (...) the scope of their investigations, their logical realism (the way they ground logic in the world), their explanation of the modal force of logic, and their approach to the relation between logic and mathematics. The paper is not polemic. One of its goal is a perspicuous description and analysis of the two theories, explaining their differences as well as commonalities. Another goal is showing that and how (i) a grounding of logic is possible, (ii) logical realism can be arrived at from different perspectives and using different methodologies, and (iii) grounding logic in the world is compatible with a central role for the human mind in logic. (shrink)
PenelopeMaddy’s Second Philosophy is one of the most well-known ap- proaches in recent philosophy of mathematics. She applies her second-philosophical method to analyze mathematical methodology by reconstructing historical cases in a setting of means-ends relations. However, outside of Maddy’s own work, this kind of methodological analysis has not yet been extensively used and analyzed. In the present work, we will make a first step in this direction. We develop a general framework that allows us to clarify (...) the procedure and aims of the Second Philosopher’s investigation into set-theoretic methodology; pro- vides a platform to analyze the Second Philosopher’s methods themselves; and can be applied to further questions in the philosophy of set theory. (shrink)
Recent discussions of how axioms are extrinsically justified have appealed to abductive considerations: on such accounts, axioms are adopted on the basis that they constitute the best explanation of some mathematical data, or phenomena. In the first part of this paper, I set out a potential problem caused by the appeal made to the notion of mathematical explanation and suggest that it can be remedied once it is noted that all the justificatory work is done by appeal to the theoretical (...) virtues. In the second part of the paper, I appeal to the theoretical virtues account of axiom justification to provide an argument that judgements of theoretical virtuousness, and therefore of extrinsic justification, are subjective in a substantive sense. This tells against a recent claim by PenelopeMaddy that such justification is “wholly objective”. (shrink)
Paul Horwich (1990) once suggested restricting the T-Schema to the maximally consistent set of its instances. But Vann McGee (1992) proved that there are multiple incompatible such sets, none of which, given minimal assumptions, is recursively axiomatizable. The analogous view for set theory---that Naïve Comprehension should be restricted according to consistency maxims---has recently been defended by Laurence Goldstein (2006; 2013). It can be traced back to W.V.O. Quine(1951), who held that Naïve Comprehension embodies the only really intuitive conception of set (...) and should be restricted as little as possible. The view might even have been held by Ernst Zermelo (1908), who,according to PenelopeMaddy (1988), subscribed to a ‘one step back from disaster’ rule of thumb: if a natural principle leads to contra-diction, the principle should be weakened just enough to block the contradiction. We prove a generalization of McGee’s Theorem, anduse it to show that the situation for set theory is the same as that for truth: there are multiple incompatible sets of instances of Naïve Comprehension, none of which, given minimal assumptions, is recursively axiomatizable. This shows that the view adumbrated by Goldstein, Quine and perhaps Zermelo is untenable. (shrink)
Albert Einstein once made the following remark about "the world of our sense experiences": "the fact that it is comprehensible is a miracle." (1936, p. 351) A few decades later, another physicist, Eugene Wigner, wondered about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, concluding his classic article thus: "the miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve" (1960, p. 14). (...) At least three factors are involved in Einstein's and Wigner's miracles: the physical world, mathematics, and human cognition. One way to relate these factors is to ask how the universe could possibly be structured in such a way that mathematics would be applicable to it, and we would be able to understand that application. This is roughly Wigner's question. Alternatively, the way of the mathematical naturalist is to argue that we abstract certain properties from the world, perhaps using our bodies and physical tools, thereby articulating basic mathematical concepts, which we continue building into the complex formal structures of mathematics. John Stuart Mill, PenelopeMaddy, and Rafael Nuñez teach this strategy of cognitive abstraction, in very different manners. But what if the very concepts and basic principles of mathematics were built into our cognitive structure itself? Given such a cognitive a priori mathematical endowment, would the miracles of the link between world and cognition (Einstein) and mathematics and world (Wigner) not vanish, or at least significantly diminish? This is the stance of Stanislas Deheane and Elizabeth Brannon's 2011 anthology, following a venerable rationalist tradition including Plato and Immanuel Kant. (shrink)
Some recent work by philosophers of mathematics has been aimed at showing that our knowledge of the existence of at least some mathematical objects and/or sets can be epistemically grounded by appealing to perceptual experience. The sensory capacity that they refer to in doing so is the ability to perceive numbers, mathematical properties and/or sets. The chief defense of this view as it applies to the perception of sets is found in PenelopeMaddy’s Realism in Mathematics, but a (...) number of other philosophers have made similar, if more simple, appeals of this sort. For example, Jaegwon Kim, John Bigelow, and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter have all defended such views. The main critical issue that will be raised here concerns the coherence of the notions of set perception and mathematical perception, and whether appeals to such perceptual faculties can really provide any justification for or explanation of belief in the existence of sets, mathematical properties and/or numbers. (shrink)
Review of *New Essays on the A Priori*, an excellent collection edited by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke. Contributors include: Tyler Burge; Quassim Cassam; Philip Kitcher; PenelopeMaddy; Hartry Field; Paul Horwich; Peter Railton; Stephen Yablo; Bob Hale; Crispin Wright; Frank Jackson; Stewart Shapiro; Michael Friedman; Martin Davies; Bill Brewer; and Thomas Nagel.
In this paper, I argue that a naturalist approach in philosophy of mathematics justifies a pluralist conception of set theory. For the pluralist, there is not a Single Universe, but there is rather a Multiverse, composed by a plurality of universes generated by various set theories. In order to justify a pluralistic approach to sets, I apply the two naturalistic principles developed by PenelopeMaddy (cfr. Maddy (1997)), UNIFY and MAXIMIZE, and analyze through them the potential of (...) the set theoretic multiverse to be the best framework for mathematical practice. According to UNIFY, an adequate set theory should be foundational, in the sense that it should allow one to represent all the currently accepted mathematical theories. As for MAXIMIZE, this states that any adequate set theory should be as powerful as possible, allowing one to prove as many results and isomorphisms as possible. In a recent paper, Maddy (2017) has argued that this two principle justify ZFC as the best framework for mathematical practice. I argue that, pace Maddy, these two principles justify a multiverse conception of set theory, more precisely, the generic multiverse with a core (GMH). (shrink)
Defining consciousness along the lines of Nagel, an organism has consciousness iff there is something it is like to be that organism, I relate three types of consciousness (phenomenal, access and reflexive) to the three types of short-term memory (sensory memories, short-term working memory and the central executive). The suggestion is that these short-term memory stores may be a key feature of consciousness.
This paper explores the question of what logic is not. It argues against the wide spread assumptions that logic is: a model of reason; a model of correct reason; the laws of thought, or indeed is related to reason at all such that the essential nature of the two are crucially or essentially co-illustrative. I note that due to such assumptions, our current understanding of the nature of logic itself is thoroughly entangled with the nature of reason. I show that (...) most arguments for the presence of any sort of essential re- lationship between logic and reason face intractable problems and demands, and fall well short of addressing them. These arguments include those for the notion that logic is normative for reason (or that logic and correct reason are in some way the same thing), that logic is some sort of description of correct reason and that logic is an abstracted or idealised version of correct reason. A strong version of logical realism is put forward as an alternative view, and is briefly explored. (shrink)
I argue that one in particular of CrispinWright’s attempts to capture our common or intuitive concepts of objectivity, warrant, and other associated notions, relies on an ambiguity between a given constructivist reading of the concepts and at least one other, arguablymore ‘ordinary’, version of the notions he tries to accommodate. I do this by focusing on one case in point, and concluding with a brief argument showing how this case generalises. I demonstrate why this ambiguity is unacceptable and also that (...) its resolution undermines the aim it serves: to account for and accommodate our ordinary conception of (at least) objectivity, warrant (or justication) and truth. (shrink)
Trans theory is characterized in part by the apparent tension between discursive analyses of cisgender society and phenomenological descriptions of trans experiences. While traditional inquiry into the history of philosophy proposes an interminable opposition between phenomenology and discourse analysis, Rubin’s alternative suggestion is that within the domain of trans studies that they fulfill complimentary dimensions of investigation. Discourse analysis and phenomenology converge in trans studies because they are submitted to the same ethical and political imperative: the systematic development of the (...) trans archive. Both discourse analysis and phenomenology as methods in trans studies are directed toward the development of a genuinely trans history, perspective, and theory, with special methodological consideration toward the way that this perspective is misunderstood or obscured by dominant frameworks within cisgender society. In what follows, I provide a brief reconstruction of two major interventions in trans phenomenology, demonstrating that each is carefully concerned with distinctly archival considerations, but I further argue that each project remains incomplete because of an incomplete bracketing of medicalized cisgender concepts. I then propose a brief alternative program aimed at the full suspension of cisgender categories that I call transgender existentialism. (shrink)
Personality research has functioned under the prevailing influence of middle-level theorizing sufficiently long to justify consideration of the effects of this approach. Despite improvements in precision and testability of hypotheses, with resulting increases in volume of research, the pervasive effect of several practical dangers of middle-level theorizing are identified. These involve the unappreciated failure to test comprehensive theories when concepts from them have been extirpated, overly-weak justification of research methods, a vanity of small differences, and insufficient theoretical precision in framing (...) empirical efforts. Ways of avoiding these dangers are explored, and it is concluded that the most promising is a comparative analytic stance toward inquiry that reconsiders comprehensive theorizing without courting ambiguity and imprecision. (shrink)
Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important particular case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the reduction is unexplanatory. In defense (...) of this claim, I offer evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences. (shrink)
Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs (...) or not: Maddy’s reasons for getting beer in equipoise with her reasons to remain in her comfortable seat do not determine that she will get up or stay seated, so it seems beyond her control, hence lucky, that she gets up. In this paper I consider a sub-set of the luck objection called the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection, according to which indeterministic physical processes cause actions to occur or not, and agent’s lack control over these indeterministic physical processes, so agent’s lack control over, hence it is lucky, whether action occurs or not. After motivating the physical indeterminism luck objection, I consider responses from three recent event-causal libertarian models, and conclude that they fail to overcome the problem, though one promising avenue is opened up. (shrink)
In this work we argue that there is no strong demarcation between pure and applied mathematics. We show this first by stressing non-deductive components within pure mathematics, like axiomatization and theory-building in general. We also stress the “purer” components of applied mathematics, like the theory of the models that are concerned with practical purposes. We further show that some mathematical theories can be viewed through either a pure or applied lens. These different lenses are tied to different communities, which endorse (...) different evaluative standards for theories. We evaluate the distinction between pure and applied mathematics from a late Wittgensteinian perspective. We note that the classical exegesis of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, due to Maddy, leads to a clear-cut but misguided demarcation. We then turn our attention to a more niche interpretation of Wittgenstein by Dawson, which captures aspects of the aforementioned distinction more accurately. Building on this newer, maverick interpretation of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, and endorsing an extended notion of meaning as use which includes social, mundane uses, we elaborate a fuzzy, but more realistic, demarcation. This demarcation, relying on family resemblance, is based on how direct and intended technical applications are, the kind of evaluative standards featured, and the range of rhetorical purposes at stake. (shrink)
Table of contents for MONSTERS AND PHILOSOPHY, edited by Charles T. Wolfe (London 2005) -/- List of Contributors iii Acknowledgments vii List of Abbreviations ix -/- Introduction xi Charles T. Wolfe The Riddle of the Sphinx: Aristotle, Penelope, and 1 Empedocles Johannes Fritsche Science as a Cure for Fear: The Status of Monsters in 21 Lucretius Morgan Meis Nature and its Monsters During the Renaissance: 37 Montaigne and Vanini Tristan Dagron Conjoined Twins and the Limits of our Reason 61 (...) Annie Bitbol-Hespériès Degeneration and Hybridism in the Early Modern Species 109 Debate: Towards the Philosophical Roots of the Creation-Evolution Controversy Justin E. H. Smith Leibniz on the Unicorn and Various other Curiosities 131 Roger Ariew The Creativity of God and the Order of Nature: 153 Anatomizing Monsters in the Early Eighteenth Century Anita Guerrini The Status of Anomalies in the Philosophy of Diderot 169 Annie Ibrahim The Materialist Denial of Monsters 187 Charles T. Wolfe Cerebral Assymetry, Monstrosities and Hegel. 205 On the Situation of the Life Sciences in 1800 Michael Hagner The Lady Knight of the Perilous Place 217 Elfriede Jelinek Monster: More than a Word. . . From Portent to Anomaly, 231 the Extraordinary Career of Monsters Beate Ochsner Index 281 . (shrink)
When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.
Felsefe tarihinin hiç şüphesiz en önemli filozoflarından biri olan Aristoteles (M.Ö. 384-322), aynı zamanda bilim tarihinin de en önemli kişilerindendir. Yaşadığı dönemde henüz bilim ve felsefe ayrılmamıştır; bununla birlikte Aristoteles, bilimsel ve sistemli düşünmenin, örnekleme yapmanın, bilim insanının doğaya öğrenmek için yaklaşmasının ilkelerini, ilk kez bu derece düzenli şekilde ortaya koyan kişi olmuştur. Dört neden kuramı söz konusu ilkelerin temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışmada günümüz biyolojisinin en kapsamlı tartışmalarından biri olan ‘fenotipin ne olduğu ve nasıl oluştuğu’ konusunun, Aristoteles’in dört neden kuramı (...) ile ilişkisi incelenmiştir. Genotip, fenotip ve çevrenin son derece karmaşık yolları içeren etkileşim ağı, araştırılması için birden fazla nedensel sorgulamayı gerektirir ki bu sorgulama bir anlamda Aristoteles’in dört neden kuramının, maddi, formel ve fail nedenlerinin bir arada sorgulanmasına benzerdir. (shrink)
Gila Sher interviewed by Chen Bo: -/- I. Academic Background and Earlier Research: 1. Sher’s early years. 2. Intellectual influence: Kant, Quine, and Tarski. 3. Origin and main Ideas of The Bounds of Logic. 4. Branching quantifiers and IF logic. 5. Preparation for the next step. -/- II. Foundational Holism and a Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge: 1. General characterization of foundational holism. 2. Circularity, infinite regress, and philosophical arguments. 3. Comparing foundational holism and foundherentism. 4. A post-Quinean model of knowledge. (...) 5. Intellect and figuring out. 6. Comparing foundational holism with Quine’s holism. 7. Evaluation of Quine’s Philosophy -/- III. Substantive Theory of Truth and Relevant Issues: 1. Outline of Sher’s substantive theory of truth. 2. Criticism of deflationism and treatment of the Liar. 3. Comparing Sher’s substantive theory of truth with Tarski’s theory of truth. -/- IV. A New Philosophy of Logic and Comparison with Other Theories: 1. Foundational account of logic. 2. Standard of logicality, set theory and logic. 3. Psychologism, Hanna’s and Maddy’s conceptions of logic. 4. Quine’s theses about the revisability of logic. -/- V. Epilogue. (shrink)
Este artículo toma como referencia la novela La ciudad y los perros para realizar un análisis intratextual, que se basa en el desentrañamiento de factores coincidentes en la obra de un solo autor. Para lograr ese objetivo, se confrontan los siguientes libros: El pez en el agua (1993), El loco de los balcones (1993), Ojos bonitos, cuadros feos (1996), Los cuadernos de don Rigoberto (1997), La fiesta del Chivo (2000), El Paraíso en la otra esquina (2003), Travesuras de la niña (...) mala (2006), Odiseo y Penélope (2007), Al pie del Támesis (2008), Las mil y una noches (2009), El sueño del celta (2010) y Fonchito y la Luna (2010). Un rasgo peculiar en esos textos es el tratamiento de la agresividad que, para esta investigación, se denominará protagonismo violento (término adaptado de la epistemología formulada por Mijaíl Bajtín). Este concepto permitirá el reconocimiento del desempeño ofuscador de los personajes principales, adscritos a una realidad oprimente y transgresora, la misma que se utiliza como justificación y causa para validar ese proceder. Eso se apreciará en las áreas relacionadas con la familia, la sociedad, la política, las organizaciones militares, la ética, el sexo y la psicología que se plasman en el discurso del escritor peruano Mario Vargas Llosa. (shrink)
The laws of classical logic are taken to be logical truths, which in turn are taken to hold objectively. However, we might question our faith in these truths: why are they true? One general approach, proposed by Putnam [8] and more recently Dickson [3] or Maddy [5], is to adopt empiricism about logic. On this view, logical truths are true because they are true of the world alone – this gives logical truths an air of objectivity. Putnam and Dickson (...) both take logical truths to be true in virtue of the world’s structure, given by our best empirical theory, quantum mechanics. This assumes a determinate logical structure of the world given by quantum mechanics. Here, I argue that this assumption is false, and that the world’s logical structure, and hence the related ‘true’ logic, is underdetermined. This leads to what I call empirical conventionalism. (shrink)
This book is written so as to be ‘accessible to philosophers without a mathematical background’. The reviewer can assure the reader that this aim is achieved, even if only by focusing throughout on just one example of an arithmetical truth, namely ‘7+5=12’. This example’s familiarity will be reassuring; but its loneliness in this regard will not. Quantified propositions — even propositions of Goldbach type — are below the author’s radar.The author offers ‘a new kind of arithmetical epistemology’, one which ‘respects (...) certain important intuitions’ 1 : apriorism, realism, and empiricism. The book contains some clarification of these ‘isms’, and some thoughtful critiques of major positions regarding them, as espoused by such representative figures as Boghossian, Bealer, Peacocke, Field, Bostock, Maddy, Locke, Kant, C.I. Lewis, Ayer, Quine, Fodor, and McDowell. The philosophical reader will find some interest and value in these wider-ranging discussions. Our concern in this review, however, is to examine closely the original positive proposal on offer.Arithmetical truths, the author maintains, are conceptual truths. Knowing truths like 7+5=12 involves no ‘epistemic reliance on any empirical evidence’; but that, she says, is not to claim ‘epistemic independence of the senses altogether’. She wants to show that "experience grounds our concepts … and then mere conceptual examination enables us to learn arithmetical truths ." Concepts that are ‘appropriately sensitive’ to ‘the nature of [an independent] reality’ she calls grounded. Because of the role of grounded concepts, ‘arithmetical truths explain our arithmetical beliefs in the right sort of way for those beliefs to count as knowledge’ .In the context of her concentration on the special nature of arithmetical knowledge, the author offers what could strike some bystanders as an unnecessarily over-ambitious account of knowledge tout court. Knowledge, for the author, is "true belief which … ". (shrink)
İdrak ve niteliği felsefenin en önemli problemlerinden biridir. İbn Sînâ hissî, hayalî, vehmî ve aklî olmak üzere dört farklı idrak mertebesi dillendirir. Buna göre insan nefsi nesnelerin suretlerini duyu yetileriyle algılar. Daha sonra bu suretleri hayal yetisine teslim eder. Akabinde akıl bu sureti barındırdığı maddî eklentilerden arındırarak aklî suretlerin oluşumu için gerekli zeminleri hazırlar. Daha sonra faal akıl insan nefsine aklî suretleri verir. İnsan zihninde duyularla algılanan bu kavramlardan başka kavramlar da vardır. Bu küllî kavramların yeri nesnel âlem değil öznel (...) âlemdir. İslam felsefesi geleneğinde Fârâbî ilk defa bu ayırımı yapar ve ma‘kūlleri birinci ve ikinci ma‘kūller diye iki kısma ayırır. İbn Sînâ da bu sınıflandırmayı benimser ve konu hakkında yeni açıklamalar getirir. İbn Sînâ, ikinci ma‘kūllerin sonraki dönemlerde yapılan felsefî ve mantıkî ayırımını her ne kadar dillendirmese de eserlerinden bu iki ma‘kūl türünün farklılığına teveccüh eder. Bu çalışmada İbn Sînâ felsefesinde idrak olgusunun gerçekleşme niteliği ele alınacak ve daha sonraki dönemlerde dillendirilen ikinci felsefî ma‘kūl anlamların İbn Sînâ felsefesindeki yeri açıklanacaktır. (shrink)
I've previously suggested that the historical evidence used to challenge scientific realism should lead us to embrace what I call Uniformitarianism, but many recently influential forms of scientific realism seem happy to share this commitment. I trace a number of further points of common ground that collectively constitute an appealing Middle Path between classical forms of realism and instrumentalism, and I suggest that many contemporary realists and instrumentalists have already become fellow travelers on this Middle Path without recognizing how far (...) they have thereby diverged from those who share their labels and slogans. I conclude by describing their central remaining disagreement and the sorts of evidence needed to resolve it. (shrink)
21. yüzyılın üçüncü on yılının şafağında, insanlığın varlığı son derece tehlikeli hale geldi. Ormanlarımızı kesiyor, tatlı su akiferlerimizi tüketiyor ve hayati önem taşıyan topraklarımızı kaybediyoruz. Okyanuslarımızdaki yaşamı sıyırıp yerine yüz milyonlarca ton plastik atık koyuyoruz. Çevremizi toksik endüstriyel kimyasallarla dolduruyoruz. Kirliliğimiz, kıtalardaki yaşamın dokusunu parçalayan ısı dalgalarına, kuraklıklara ve vahşi yangınlara neden olan iklim değişikliğini tetikliyor. Ve dünyaya yeni nesiller getiriyoruz, onurlu bir varoluşun kaynaklarına erişmeye ihtiyaç duyan milyonlarca insan. Hayata yönelik tehditlerin kapsamı ve genişliği her geçen gün artmaktadır. Bu (...) sürdürülebilir bir kalkınma şekli değildir. -/- Hastalıklarımızın temel nedeni, yanlış bir düşünce tarzından kaynaklanır. Bu tam olarak ne anlama geliyor? bu, ruhsal doğamızı inkar ederken kendimizi esas olarak maddi varlıklar olarak düşündüğümüz anlamına gelir. Maddi varlıklar olarak var olduğumuzu ve başka bir şey olmadığını düşündüğümüz için öncelikle bedenlerimizi zararlardan korumaya ve maddi varlığımızı sürdürmeye önem veririz. Manevi doğamız, eğer hiç düşünülürse, fiziksel varlığımızın ikincil bir yönü olarak ele alınır - ciddiye alınmaması gereken bir şey. Bizim için önemli olan tek şey maddi dünyada ortaya çıkan fenomenlerdir - görülebilen, duyulabilen, dokunulabilen veya ölçülebilen şeyler, ancak duyularımızın bizi aldattığını biliyoruz, duyular beynin bir yapısıdır. . Gerçek bir dünya olarak kabul ettiğimiz şey bir yanılsamadır. Pozitivist ve materyalist düşüncenin tahakkümü mantıksızlığa ve yıkıma yol açar. -/- Peki bu yaklaşım bizi nereye götürdü? Bize bir mutluluk ve tatmin duygusu getirdi mi? Her günü neşeli bir işbirliği ruhu içinde, parlak umutlar ve mutlu beklentilerle dolu kalplerimizle yaşamak yerine, kendimizi diğerlerinden soyutladık ve onları rakip veya düşman olarak gördük. Düşüncelerimiz, sonsuz bir savaş, yoksulluk, açlık ve çevresel yıkım döngüsüne yol açan şüphe, korku ve açgözlülükle dolu. Yakında uyanmadıkça ve ruhsal doğamıza dikkat etmedikçe, Dünya'da insanlık için bir gelecek olmayacak. -/- Kelimeler hayattır. Kelimeler hafiftir. Kelimeler güçtür. Kelimeler enerjidir. Sözler gerçektir. Kelimeler canlandırabilir ve kelimeler de öldürebilir. Kelimeler umut verebilir veya bizi umutsuzluğa sürükleyebilir. İnsanlar barışı inşa etmek için kelimeleri, savaşmak için kelimeleri kullanırlar. Kelimeler kültürler, dinler ve milletler arasında duvarlar oluşturabilir. Ve kelimeler de köprüler kurabilir. Bir bireyin, bir ailenin, bir topluluğun, bir ülkenin ve gezegenimizin varlığı, konuştuğumuz kelimelerin gücüyle iyiye veya kötüye yönlendirilmektedir. Konuştuğumuz kelimeler bu dünyada olan her şeyden sorumludur. Bu nedenle, konuştuğumuz kelimelerden sorumlu olmalıyız. Gelecek nesiller adına, umarım her birimiz sadece parlak, ışık dolu sözler söylemek için elimizden gelen her şeyi yaparız, böylece bir gün torunlarımız ışıkla dolu bir dünyaya doğar. Kaybedecek vakit yok. Bu andan itibaren, umarım hepimiz kullandığımız kelimelere yakından bakar ve onları parlaklık ile doldurmak için sürekli çaba gösteririz. -/- Kimse bizim için hayatımızı değiştiremez. Kimse bizim için dünyayı değiştirmeyecek. Her birimizin, konuştuğumuz her kelimenin serbest bıraktığı olağanüstü, yaratıcı gücü tanımasının ve bilinçli olarak sadece şükran, teşvik ve iyi niyetle dolu kelimeleri konuşmanın zamanı geldi. Bu andan itibaren, kendimiz ve başkaları için sevgi ve bağışlama ile rezonansa giren kelimeleri seçelim. Sadece bir adım ileri gidersek bunu kesinlikle yapabiliriz. Her seferinde bir adım, her seferinde bir kelime, bilincimizdeki trajedi ve izolasyon tohumlarını söküp onları mutluluk ve uzlaşma dalgalarına dönüştürebiliriz. Kendimiz, Toprak Ana ve gelecek nesiller adına, insanlığın Dünya üzerindeki olumlu evrimine katkıda bulunan kelimeleri kullanalım. (shrink)
Worte verletzen und kränken. Woher aber kommt diese Verletzungsmacht? Während in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie Sprache meist als Gegenmittel zur Gewalt begriffen wird, hat die US-amerikanische Debatte um "hate speech" gezeigt, dass das Sprechen Gewalt nicht nur androhen oder verhindern, sondern selbst eine Form von Gewaltausübung sein kann. Wie nun sind sprachliche Verletzung, Ausgrenzung und Missachtung zu erklären und zu verstehen? Aus der Sicht verschiedener Disziplinen untersuchen die Beiträge dieses Bandes, welcher Logik, Grammatik und Rhetorik unser verletzendes Sprechen gehorcht. Mit Beiträgen (...) von u.a. Pierre Bourdieu, Penelope Brown/Stephen Levinson, Harold Garfinkel und Rae Langton. Steffen Kitty Herrmann und Hannes Kuch sind wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter am Institut für Philosophie der Freien Universität Berlin und arbeiten im Forschungsprojekt”Zur Performanz sprachlicher Gewalt“am Sonderforschungsbereich 447”Kulturen des Performativen“. Sybille Krämer ist Professorin für Philosophie an der FU Berlin und Permanent Fellow am Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin. (shrink)
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