What is the relation between things and theories, the material world and its scientific representations? This is a staple philosophical problem that rarely counts as historically legitimate or fruitful. In the following dialogue, the interlocutors do not argue for or against realism. Instead, they explore changing relations between theories and things, between contested objects of knowledge and less contested, more everyday things. Widely seen as the life sciences' first general theory, the cell theory underwent dramatic changes during the nineteenth century. (...) The dialogue establishes that each successive version of the cell theory was formulated -- each identity of the object cell was formed -- around a different material : cork, cartilage, eggs in cleavage, muscle. Such things thus serve as exemplary materials, in ways not described by standard concepts like induction, theory -testing, theory -laden observation, and construction. Still, how can theories and perspective possibly be honed on things if these are apprehended differently by different observers according to their interests, training, culture, or indeed theories? The second part of the dialogue addresses this problem, partly through the verbal and visual schemata that were used by nineteenth-century microscopists and that are comparable to schemata in the visual arts. The third part of the dialogue considers the exemplary materials as a historical sequence, itself needing explanation. Theoretical change devolved partly from wider histories and geographies of the prevalence, availability, or scientific and cultural status of materials such as plants, animals, and muscle. (shrink)

In this article, we redefine classical notions of theory reduction in such a way that model-theoretic preferential semantics becomes part of a realist depiction of this aspect of science. We offer a model-theoretic reconstruction of science in which theory succession or reduction is often better - or at a finer level of analysis - interpreted as the result of model succession or reduction. This analysis leads to 'defeasible reduction', defined as follows: The conjunction of the assumptions of a reducing theory (...) T with the definitions translating the vocabulary of a reduced theory T' to the vocabulary of T, defeasibly entails the assumptions of reduced T'. This relation of defeasible reduction offers, in the context of additional knowledge becoming available, articulation of a more flexible kind of reduction in theory development than in the classical case. Also, defeasible reduction is shown to solve the problems of entailment that classical homogeneous reduction encounters. Reduction in the defeasible sense is a practical device for studying the processes of science, since it is about highlighting different aspects of the same theory at different times of application, rather than about naive dreams concerning a metaphysical unity of science. (shrink)

During large parts of its history chemistry was seen as a science of progress, admired by many. But contemporary public debates on chemistry have been quite critical, mainly for environmental reasons. Therefore is it interesting to note that in the course of the 1990s “green chemistry” emerged. The origins, scientific meaning and drivers behind the spectacular growth of that new field are the subject of Research between Science, Society and Politics: The History and Scientific Development of Green Chemistry. The scientific (...) character of green chemistry has been a matter of dispute since its inception. This book aims to clarify that dispute. It presents a historical analysis of its birth and evolution, with a special focus on the USA, the UK and the Netherlands and the chemical societies in these countries. The emergence of green chemistry differed from one country to another, which is analyzed and compared as well. Based on quantitative and qualitive research methods and a wide range of primary sources never studied before, this book ultimately offers a new characterization of “green chemistry”. It should be of interest to chemists, policy makers and historians & philosophers of chemistry, because Research between Science, Society and Politics accounts for both internal scientific as well as socio-cultural factors that played a role during the emergence and growth of green chemistry. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, é apresentada uma investigação do que poderia ser chamado de formalização lógica do processo de mudança de teorias devido a anomalias. Por anomalia entende-se um fato observado que faz parte do escopo explanatório de uma teoria, mas que vai de encontro à previsão da mesma. Uma abordagem clássica para restaurar o poder explicativo de uma teoria ameaçada por uma anomalia é a postulação de hipóteses novas e provisórias que, em conjunto com as demais hipóteses auxiliares originais, sejam capazes (...) de resolver a anomalia. Após chegar à algumas conclusões sobre a estrutura de tal processo, propomos um framework lógico multimodal e não-monotônico capaz de representar alguns aspectos-chave dessa faceta importante da dinâmica de teorias científicas. Devido à necessidade de acomodar hipóteses provisórias incompatíveis, esse framework incorpora uma forma fraca de paraconsistência. Como um estudo de caso, analisamos o comportamento anômalo do planeta Urano que ameaçou a mecânica celeste Newtoniana por mais de meio século e ensejou a descoberta do planeta Netuno. -/- In this work, an investigation of what could be called the logical formalization of the theory change process due to anomalies is presented. An anomaly is understood as an observed fact that is part of the explanatory scope of a theory, but that goes against its prediction. A classic approach to restoring the explanatory power of a theory threatened by an anomaly is to postulate new and provisional hypotheses that, together with the other original auxiliary hypotheses, are capable of resolving the anomaly. After reaching some conclusions about the structure of such a process, we propose a multimodal and non-monotonic logical framework capable of representing some key aspects of this important facet of the dynamics of scientific theories. Due to the need to accommodate incompatible provisional hypotheses, this framework incorporates a weak form of paraconsistency. As a case study, we analyze the anomalous behavior of the planet Uranus that threatened Newtonian celestial mechanics for more than half a century and prompted the discovery of the planet Neptune. (shrink)

Most philosophers of science do philosophy ‘on’ science. By contrast, others do philosophy ‘in’ science (PinS), that is, they use philosophical tools to address scientific problems and to provide scientifically useful proposals. Here, we consider the evidence in favour of a trend of this nature. We proceed in two stages. First, we identify relevant authors and articles empirically with bibliometric tools, given that PinS would be likely to infiltrate science and thus to be published in scientific journals (‘intervention’), cited in (...) scientific journals (‘visibility’), and sometimes recognized as a scientific result by scientists (‘contribution’). We show that many central figures in philosophy of science have been involved in PinS, and that some philosophers have even ‘specialized’ in this practice. Second, we propose a conceptual definition of PinS as a process involving three conditions (raising a scientific problem, using philosophical tools to address it, and making a scientific proposal), and we ask whether the articles identified at the first stage fulfil all these conditions. We show that PinS is a distinctive, quantitatively substantial trend within philosophy of science, demonstrating the existence of a methodological continuity from science to philosophy of science. (shrink)

The thesis consists of an introduction and five papers. The introduction gives a brief historical survey of empirical investigations into the effectiveness of medicinal interventions, as well as surveys of the concept of evidence and of the history and philosophy of experiments. The main ideas of the EBM movement are also presented. Paper I: Concerns have been raised that clinical trials do not offer reliable evidence for some types of treatment, in particular for highly individualised treatments, for example traditional homeopathy. (...) With respect to individualised treatments, it is argued that such concerns are unfounded. There are two minimal conditions related to the nature of the treatments that must be fulfilled for evaluability in a clinical trial, namely the proper distinction of treatment groups and the elimination of confounding variables or variations. These conditions do not preclude the testing of individualised medicine. Paper II: Traditionally, mechanistic reasoning has been assigned a negligible role in the EBM literature. When discussed, mechanistic reasoning has almost exclusively been positive – both in an epistemic sense of claiming that there is a mechanistic chain and in a health-related sense of there being claimed benefits for the patient. Negative mechanistic reasoning has been neglected. I distinguish three main types of negative mechanistic reasoning and subsume them under a new definition. One of the three distinguished types, which is negative only in the health-related sense, has a corresponding positive counterpart, whereas the other two, which are epistemically negative, do not have such counterparts, at least not that are particularly interesting as evidence. Accounting for negative mechanistic reasoning in EBM is therefore partly different from accounting for positive mechanistic reasoning. Paper III: Evidence hierarchies are lists of investigative strategies ordered with regard to the claimed strength of evidence. They have been used for a couple of decades within EBM, particularly for the assessment of evidence for treatment recommendations, but they remain controversial. An under-investigated question is what the order in the hierarchy means. Four interpretations of the order are distinguished and discussed. The two most credible ones are, in rough terms, “typically stronger” and “ideally stronger”. The GRADE framework seems to be based on the “typically stronger” reading. Even if the interpretation of an evidence hierarchy were established, hierarchies appear to be rather unhelpful for the task of evidence aggregation. However, specifying the intended order relation may help sort out disagreements. Paper IV: There are three main arguments for randomisation that connect inseparably to theoretical concepts: Randomisation is useful for performing null hypothesis testing. Randomisation is needed for plausible causal inferences from treatment to effect. Randomisation is acceptable and computationally convenient in a Bayesian setting. A critical scrutiny of these arguments shows that is acceptable in the context of clinical trials. As for, it is argued that randomisation only provides weak reasons for drawing causal inferences in the context of real clinical trials. Argument is weak because it is controversial among Bayesians, and because formally Bayesian analyses of trial results are rarely asked for. Paper V: Practical arguments for randomisation are arguments with no necessary connections to theoretical frameworks like null hypothesis testing or causal inferences. Four common practical arguments in the context of clinical trials are distinguished and assessed: Randomisation contributes to allocation concealment. Randomisation contributes to the baseline balance of treatment groups. Randomisation decreases self-selection bias. Randomisation removes allocation bias. Argument is rejected. Arguments and are approved. Argument is rejected if it is formulated so as to be independent from and, but it is true that randomisation contributes to balance through the mechanisms mentioned in and. It is judged that may be the strongest single argument. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism, relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely, Bohr’s relational approach, the modal interpretation by Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational (...) interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational literature. This possibility is to consider relations in ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum mechanics is really talking about. (shrink)

The following thesis starts from the question «why be moral?» and adresses an action-theoretic strategy for answering this question in the positive by reference to the constitutive natur of actions. In these debates, the epistemology of action has turned into a central issue. The thesis adresses these debates and develops a novel account of the epistemology: an account that may well turn out to provide a ground for the aforementioned constitutivist strategies.

This thesis offers a naturalist revision of Alain Badiou’s philosophy. This goal is pursued through an encounter of Badiou’s mathematical ontology and theory of truth with contemporary trends in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. I take issue with Badiou’s inability to elucidate the link between the empirical and the ontological, and his residual reliance on a Heideggerian project of fundamental ontology, which undermines his own immanentist principles. I will argue for both a bottom-up naturalisation of Badiou’s philosophical approach (...) to mathematics and a top-down naturalisation. Articulating my particular understanding of what realism and naturalism should commit us to, I propose a creative fusion of Badiou’s attention to metamathematical results with a structural-informational metaphysics, proposing a ‘matherialism’ uniting the more daring speculative insights of the former with the naturalist and empiricist commitments motivating the latter. (shrink)

This paper provides arguments to philosophers, scientists, administrators and students for why science students should be instructed in a mandatory, custom-designed, interdisciplinary course in the philosophy of science. The argument begins by diagnosing that most science students are taught only conventional methodology: a fixed set of methods whose justification is rarely addressed. It proceeds by identifying seven benefits that scientists incur from going beyond these conventions and from acquiring abilities to analyse and evaluate justifications of scientific methods. It concludes that (...) teaching science students these skills makes them better scientists. Based on this argument, the paper then analyses the standard philosophy of science curriculum, and in particular its adequacy for teaching science students. It is argued that the standard curriculum on the one hand lacks important analytic tools relevant for going beyond conventional methodology—especially with respect to non-epistemic normative aspects of scientific practice—while on the other hand contains many topics and tools that are not relevant for the instruction of science students. Consequently, the optimal way of training science students in the analysis and evaluation of scientific methods requires a revision of the standard curriculum. Finally, the paper addresses five common characteristics of students taking such a course, which often clash with typical teaching approaches in philosophy. Strategies how best to deal with these constraints are offered for each of these characteristics. (shrink)

Michael Strevens offers an account of causal explanation according to which explanatory practice is shaped by counterbalanced commitments to representing causal influence and abstracting away from overly specific details. In this paper, I challenge a key feature of that account. I argue that what Strevens calls explanatory frameworks figure prominently in explanatory practice because they actually improve explanations. This suggestion is simple but has far-reaching implications. It affects the status of explanations that cite multiply realizable properties; changes the explanatory role (...) of causal factors with small effect; and undermines Strevens’ titular explanatory virtue, depth. This results in greater coherence with explanatory practice and accords with the emphasis that Strevens places on explanatory patterns. Ultimately, my suggestion preserves a tight connection between explanation and the creation of understanding by taking into account explanations’ role in communication. (shrink)

A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher‐level explanations are sometimes or always preferable because they are more general than reductive explanations. Here I challenge two basic assumptions that are needed for that argument to succeed. It cannot be assumed that higher‐level explanations are more general than their lower‐level alternatives or that higher‐level explanations are general in the right way to be explanatory. I suggest a novel form of pluralism regarding levels of explanation, according to which explanations at different (...) levels are preferable in different circumstances because they offer different types of generality, which are appropriate in different circumstances of explanation. (shrink)

Those matters that are judged to be spiritual are seen as especially valuable and important. For this reason it is claimed that nurses need to be able to offer spiritual care when appropriate and, to aid them in this, nurse theorists have discussed the nature of spirituality. In a recent debate John Paley has argued that nurses should adopt a naturalistic stance which would enable them to employ the insights of modern science. Barbara Pesut has criticized this thesis, especially as (...) it is applied to palliative care. This paper re-examines this debate with particular attention to the meaning of 'spirituality' and the justification for accepting spiritual and religious theories. It is argued that when we take into consideration the great diversity among religious and spiritual ideas, the lack of rational means of deciding between them when they conflict, and the practicalities of nursing, we find that a spiritual viewpoint is less useful than a naturalistic one, when offering palliative care. (shrink)

Psychophysical studies of change blindness indicate that, at any instant, human observers are aware of detail in few parts of the visual field. Such results suggest, to some theorists, that human vision reconstructs only a few portions of the visual scene and that, to bridge the resulting representational gaps, it often lets physical objects serve as their own short-term memory. We propose that human vision reconstructs no portion of the visual scene, and that it never lets physical objects serve as (...) their own short-term memory. (shrink)

In this paper we compare two different notions of 'power', both of which attempt to provide a realist understanding of quantum mechanics grounded on the potential mode of existence. For this propose we will begin by introducing two different notions of potentiality present already within Aristotelian metaphysics, namely, irrational potentiality and rational potentiality. After discussing the role played by potentiality within classical and quantum mechanics, we will address the notion of causal power which is directly related to irrational potentiality and (...) has been adopted by many interpretations of QM. We will then present the notion of immanent power which relates to rational potentiality and argue that this new concept presents important advantages regarding the possibilities it provides for understanding in a novel manner the theory of quanta. We end our paper with a comparison between both notions of 'power', stressing some radical differences between them. (shrink)

In this article, the argument is put forth that controversies about the scope and limits of science should be considered in Nature of Science teaching. Reference disciplines for teaching NOS are disciplines, which reflect upon science, like philosophy of science, history of science, and sociology of science. The culture of these disciplines is characterized by controversy rather than unified textbook knowledge. There is common agreement among educators of the arts and humanities that controversies in the reference disciplines should be represented (...) in education. To teach NOS means to adopt a reflexive perspective on science. Therefore, we suggest that controversies within and between the reference disciplines are relevant for NOS teaching and not only the NOS but about NOS should be taught, too. We address the objections that teaching about NOS is irrelevant for real life and too demanding for students. First, we argue that science-reflexive meta-discourses are relevant for students as future citizens because the discourses occur publicly in the context of sociopolitical disputes. Second, we argue that it is in fact necessary to reduce the complexity of the above-mentioned discourses and that this is indeed possible, as it has been done with other reflexive elements in science education. In analogy to the German construct Bewertungskompetenz, we suggest epistemic competency as a goal for NOS teaching. In order to do so, science-reflexive controversies must be simplified and attitudes toward science must be considered. Discourse on the scientific status of potential pseudoscience may serve as an authentic and relevant context for teaching the controversial nature of reflexion on science. (shrink)

In this essay, I term the dominant educational paradigm of our time as scientific education and subject it to historical analysis in order to bring its tacit racial, colonial and Eurocentric biases into view. I subsume this cluster of problems under the general heading of “the problem of scientific education”, a problem simultaneously submerged deeply in the invisible background of current education and across its foreground inasmuch as it conditions daily educational practices beyond educators’ awareness. The delicate question to be (...) answered is: enclosed as we are within a scientific framing of our educational system, how can we find an alternative way of looking at this educational system that will help us resolve the problem of colonial, racial and cultural subordinations inherent in its scientific framing? (shrink)

There are three theories of luck in the literature, each of which tends to appeal to philosophers pursuing different concerns. These are the probability, modal, and control views. I will argue that all three theories are irreparably defective; not only are there counterexamples to each of the three theories of luck, but there are three previously undiscussed classes of counterexamples against them. These are the problems of lucky necessities, skillful luck, and diachronic luck. I conclude that a serious reevaluation of (...) the role of luck in philosophy is called for. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the representational realist stance as a pluralist ontic approach to inter-theoretic relationships. Our stance stresses the fact that physical theories require the necessary consideration of a conceptual level of discourse which determines and configures the specific field of phenomena discussed by each particular theory. We will criticize the orthodox line of research which has grounded the analysis about QM in two metaphysical presuppositions —accepted in the present as dogmas that all interpretations must follow. We will (...) also examine how the orthodox project of "bridging the gap" between the quantum and the classical domains has constrained the possibilities of research, producing only a limited set of interpretational problems which only focus in the justification of "classical reality" and exclude the possibility of analyzing the possibilities of non-classical conceptual representations of QM. The representational realist stance introduces two new problems, namely, the superposition problem and the contextuality problem, which consider explicitly the conceptual representation of orthodox QM beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. In the final part of the paper, we revisit, from a representational realist perspective, the quantum to classical limit and the orthodox claim that this inter-theoretic relation can be explained through the principle of decoherence. (shrink)

In a recent paper Griffiths [38] has argued, based on the consistent histories interpretation, that Hilbert space quantum mechanics is noncontextual. According to Griffiths the problem of contextuality disappears if the apparatus is “designed and operated by a competent experimentalist” and we accept the Single Framework Rule. We will argue from a representational realist stance that the conclusion is incorrect due to the misleading understanding provided by Griffiths to the meaning of quantum contextuality and its relation to physical reality and (...) measurements. We will discuss how the quite general incomprehension of contextuality has its origin in the ''objective-subjective omelette'' created by Heisenberg and Bohr. We will argue that in order to unscramble the omelette we need to disentangle, firstly, representational realism from naive realism, secondly, ontology from epistemology, and thirdly, the different interpretational problems of QM. In this respect, we will analyze what should be considered as Meaningful Physical Statements within a theory and will argue that Counterfactual Reasoning -considered by Griffiths as ''tricky''- must be accepted as a necessary condition for any representational realist interpretation of QM. Finally we discuss what should be considered as a problem in QM from a representational realist perspective. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze the definition of quantum superpositions within orthodox Quantum Mechanics and their relation to physical reality. We will begin by discussing how the metaphysical presuppositions imposed by Bohr on the interpretation of QM have become not only interpretational dogmas which constrain the limits of the present Orthodox Line of Research, but also how these desiderata implicitly preclude the possibility of developing a physical representation of quantum superpositions. We will then continue analyzing how most interpretations of QM (...) argue against the existence of superpositions. Firstly, we will focus on those interpretations which attempt to recover a classical representation about ''what there is'', and secondly, we will concentrate on the arguments provided by Dieks and Griffiths who, staying close to the orthodox formalism, also attempt to ''get rid of the ghost of Schrodinger's cat''. Contrary to the OLR, we will argue -based on our definition of Meaningful Physical Statements - that from a representational realist perspective which stays close to the orthodox Hilbert space formalism, quantum superpositions are not only the key to the most important -present and future- technological and experimental developments in quantum information processing but also, they must be considered as the kernel of any interpretation of QM that attempts to provide a physical representation of reality. We will also argue that the price to pay for such representational realist development must be the abandonment of the idea that 'Actuality = Reality'. (shrink)

We interpret the philosophy of Niels Bohr as related to the so called ''linguistic turn'' and consider paraconsistency in the light of the Bohrian notion of complementarity. Following [16], Jean-Yves Beziau has discussed the seemingly contradictory perspectives found in the quantum mechanical double slit experiment in terms of paraconsistent view-points [7, 8]. This interpretation goes in line with the well known Bohrian Neo-Kantian epistemological account of quantum mechanics. In the present paper, we put forward the idea that one can also (...) consider, within quantum mechanics and departing from the philosophy of the danish physicist, a more radical paraconsistency found within one of the main formal elements of the theory, namely, quantum superpositions. We will argue that, rather than epistemological, the contradictions found within quantum superpositions could be interpreted as ontological contradictions. (shrink)

A science is an intellectual activity defined by its mechanisms that prevent its scientists from always reaching the conclusions that they set out to reach. Such mechanisms are needed because, if scientists are given full control over what hypotheses they select, what data they discard, and what results they publish, they can communicate any conclusion that they desire. Synthesis, by setting a grand challenge, forces scientists across uncharted territory where they encounter and solve unscripted problems. When theory is inadequate, the (...) synthesis fails, and fails in a way that cannot be ignored. Therefore, synthesis drives discovery and paradigm change in ways that simple hypothesis testing cannot. Here, we describe the discoveries that emerged when synthetic biologists were challenged to create an alternative genetic system that has different molecular structures than DNA and RNA. In pursuit of this particular “grand challenge,” synthesis forced the recognition that the community did not know as much about the double helix as it had constructively assumed. In general, a field of science having access to synthesis as a research strategy can create knowledge even if its practitioners do not fit the ideal of a dispassionate, advocacy-free scientist. (shrink)

We use recently developed approaches in argumentation theory in order to revamp the hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation, thus alleviating the well-known paradoxes the H-D account faces. More specifically, we introduce the concept of dialectic confirmation on the background of the so-called theory of dialectical structures (Betz 2010, 2012b). Dialectic confirmation generalises hypothetico-deductive confirmation and mitigates the raven paradox, the grue paradox, the tacking paradox, the paradox from conceptual difference, and the problem of surprising evidence.

Showcasing original arguments for well-defined positions, as well as clear and concise statements of sophisticated philosophical views, this volume is an ...

In this article, the author describes his sense of synchronicity with Edgar Morin's concepts of complexity. Although Morin only briefly addresses Gaia per se, the implications of Morin's work may reveal the Gaia concept as an element of the general breakthroughs of complexity science. Morin demonstrates a phase transition that is gaining momentum right now, whereby the new, more benign science is overwhelming the old Cartesian world.

In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and Heisenberg through the mix of objective accounts and subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics. We will begin by addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present "quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the second scrambling epistemic approaches (...) with ontological questions. A good example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes" type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic Bayesian approach to QM. We will argue that QBists have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble -at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several criticisms it has recently received. We end our paper with a discussion about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM. (shrink)

In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been always related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an actual state of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum mechanics through a completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics in terms of "strange" quantum particles. This interpretation, naturalized through a widespread "way of speaking" in the physics community, contradicts Born's physical account of Ψ as a "probability wave" which provides statistical information about outcomes that, in fact, cannot (...) be interpreted in terms of 'ignorance about an actual state of affairs'. In the present paper we discuss how the metaphysics of actuality has played an essential role in limiting the possibilities of understating things differently. We propose instead a metaphysical scheme in terms of powers with definite potentia which allows us to consider quantum probability in a new light, namely, as providing objective knowledge about a potential state of affairs. (shrink)

Though some influentially critical objections have been raised during the ‘classical’ pre-computational simulation philosophy of science tradition, suggesting a more nuanced methodological category for experiments, it safe to say such critical objections have greatly proliferated in philosophical studies dedicated to the role played by computational simulations in science. For instance, Eric Winsberg suggests that computer simulations are methodologically unique in the development of a theory’s models suggesting new epistemic notions of application. This is also echoed in Jeffrey Ramsey’s notions of (...) “transformation reduction,”—i.e., a notion of reduction of a more highly constructive variety. Computer simulations create a broadly continuous arena spanned by normative and descriptive aspects of theory-articulation, as entailed by the notion of transformation reductions occupying a continuous region demarcated by Ernest Nagel’s logical-explanatory “domain-combining reduction” on the one hand, and Thomas Nickels’ heuristic “domain-preserving reduction,” on the other. I extend Winsberg’s and Ramsey’s points here, by arguing that in the field of computational fluid dynamics as well as in other branches of applied physics, the computer plays a constitutively experimental role—supplanting in many cases the more traditional experimental methods such as flow-visualization, etc. In this case, however CFD algorithms act as substitutes, not supplements when it comes to experimental practices. I bring up the constructive example involving the Clifford-Algebraic algorithms for modeling singular phenomena in CFD by Gerik Scheuermann and Steven Mann & Alyn Rockwood who demonstrate that their algorithms offer greater descriptive and explanatory scope than the standard Navier-Stokes approaches. The mathematical distinction between Navier-Stokes-based and Clifford-Algebraic based CFD has essentially to do with the regularization features exhibited to a far greater extent by the latter, than the former. Hence, CACFD indicate that the utilization of computational techniques can be based on principled reasons, as opposed to merely practical. CACFD hence exhibit a new generative role in the field of fluid mechanics, by offering categories of experimental evidence that are optimally descriptive and explanatory—i.e., pace Batterman can be both ontologically and epistemically fundamental. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its rivals.

In this paper we attempt to discuss what has Kochen-Specker theorem to say about physical invariance and quantum individuality. In particular, we will discuss the impossibility of making reference to objective physical properties within the orthodox formalism of quantum mechanics. Through an analysis of the meaning of physical invariance and quantum contextuality we will derive a Corollary to KS theorem that proves that a vector in Hilbert space cannot be interpreted coherently as an object possessing physical properties. As a consequence, (...) the notion of quantum object can be only defined in terms of nomological properties. We conclude the paper by analyzing the consequences of this Corollary to KS theorem for the ongoing debate about quantum individuality. (shrink)

Harold Kincaid in Individualism and the Unity of Science postulates a model of unity-without-reduction in order to accurately describe the relation between individualism and macroeconomics. I present this model and apply it to the description of the relation between chemistry and quantum mechanics. I argue that, when it comes to the description of molecular structure, chemistry and quantum mechanics are unified in Kincaid’s sense. Specifically, the two disciplines contribute to the formation of a unified body of knowledge with respect to (...) molecular structure. (shrink)

Quantum Mechanics has faced deep controversies and debates since its origin when Werner Heisenberg proposed the first mathematical formalism capable to operationally account for what had been recently discovered as the new field of quantum phenomena. Today, even though we have reached a standardized version of QM which is taught in Universities all around the world, there is still no consensus regarding the conceptual reference of the theory and, if or if not, it can refer to something beyond measurement outcomes. (...) In this work we will argue that the reason behind the impossibility to reach a meaningful answer to this question is strictly related to the 20th Century Bohrian-positivist re-foundation of physics which is responsible for having introduced within the theory of quanta a harmful combination of metaphysical dogmatism and naive empiricism. We will also argue that the possibility of understanding QM is at plain sight, given we return to the original framework of physics in which the meaning of understanding has always been clear. (shrink)

In this paper we derive a theorem which proves that the physical interpretation implied by the first postulate of quantum mechanics is inconsistent with the orthodox formalism. In order to expose this inconsistency we will analyze how the concept of ‘physical system’ is built within classical theories through the notion of invariance and explain in what sense a vector in Hilbert space is not capable of fulfilling these same mathematical conditions. Through an analysis of the mathematical formalism we derive a (...) No Dynamical Invariance theorem which proves that, contrary to what is claimed in the first postulate, a vector in Hilbert space cannot be interpreted coherently as the state of a physical system. We conclude the paper by analyzing the consequences of the NDI theorem with respect to several ongoing debates in QM. (shrink)

In, Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued in favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms of a paraconsistent approach. We claimed that, even though most interpretations of quantum mechanics attempt to escape contradictions, there are many hints that indicate it could be worth while to engage in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause have raised several arguments against this approach. In the present paper we attempt to answer the main (...) questions presented by Arenhart and Krause. We will argue, firstly, that the obstacles presented by them are based on a specific metaphysical stance, which we will characterize in terms of what we call the Orthodox Line of Research. Secondly, that this is not necessarily the only possible line, and that a different one, namely, a Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research provides a different perspective in which the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions can be regarded as a valuable prospect that could be used by different interpretations of quantum mechanics. Finally, we provide a set of specific answers to the main problems raised by Arenhart and Krause in order to clarify our line of research as well as the original perspective introduced by the PAQS. (shrink)

This chapter traces the development of structural realism within the scientific realism debate and the wider current of structuralism that has swept the philosophy of the natural sciences in the twentieth century.1 The primary aim is to make perspicuous the many manifestations of structural realism and their underlying claims. Among other things, I will compare structural realism’s various manifestations in order to throw more light onto the relations between them. At the end of the chapter, I will identify the main (...) objections raised against the epistemic form of structural realism. This last task will pave the way for the evaluation of the structural realist answer to the main epistemological question, an evaluation that will be central to the rest of this dissertation. (shrink)

This chapter traces the development of structural realism within the scientific realism debate and the wider current of structuralism that has swept the philosophy of the natural sciences in the twentieth century.1 The primary aim is to make perspicuous the many manifestations of structural realism and their underlying claims. Among other things, I will compare structural realism’s various manifestations in order to throw more light onto the relations between them. At the end of the chapter, I will identify the main (...) objections raised against the epistemic form of structural realism. This last task will pave the way for the evaluation of the structural realist answer to the main epistemological question, an evaluation that will be central to the rest of this dissertation. (shrink)

This thesis investigates the epistemological and metaphysical relations between chemistry and quantum mechanics. These relations are examined with respect to how chemistry and quantum mechanics each describe a single inert molecule. A review of how these relations are understood in the literature shows that there is a proliferation of positions which focus on how chemistry is separate from quantum mechanics. This proliferation is accompanied by a tendency within the philosophy of chemistry community to connect the legitimacy of the field with (...) the autonomy of chemistry. First, it is argued that this connection should not be made. Secondly, it is argued that chemistry and quantum mechanics are unified in accordance with Harold Kincaid’s model of non-reductive unity because the two theories exhibit particular epistemic and metaphysical interconnections. Thirdly, a metaphysical account is examined which is incompatible with Kincaid’s model of unity; namely strong emergence as understood by Robin Hendry. According to Hendry, the structure of a single inert molecule strongly emerges from its quantum mechanical entities in the sense that there is downward causation. However, Hendry’s defense of this account faces certain problems. Moreover, the putative empirical evidence for his understanding of strong emergence can be explained without invoking strong emergence. This is shown by considering how quantum mechanics assumes an idealized understanding of a molecule’s stability and structure. In the light of the philosophical literature on idealizations, this idealization can be interpreted in two different ways, both of which explain why quantum mechanics describes the structure of a single molecule the way it does, without assuming strong emergence in Hendry’s sense. Each interpretation has philosophical implications regarding the nature of chemical properties, and the relation of chemistry and quantum mechanics. These implications are consistent with Kincaid’s model of unity and thus further support chemistry’s unity with quantum mechanics (as per Kincaid). (shrink)

The practice of justifying scientific explanations generates argumentative patterns in which several types of arguments may play a role. This paper is aimed at identifying these patterns on the basis of an exploration of the institutional conventions regarding the nature, the shape and the quality of scientific explanations as reflected in the writings of influential philosophers of science. First, a basic pattern for justifying scientific explanations is described. Then, two types of extensions of this pattern are presented. These extensions are (...) derived from philosophical accounts of requirements for the quality of explanations and the choice of the best explanation from a number of candidate explanations respectively. The description of the second extension will make clear how pragmatic argumentation plays a role in argumentative patterns within the scientific domain. (shrink)

Perspicuous representation, Wittgenstein offers, is not another methodology, but it consists in seeing the connections. The Wittgensteinian perspicuous representation is therapeutic. The method he suggests for philosophy is the same method he suggests for social sciences. In both of these cases, he tries to get us to see the confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing and theorizing. In both of these disciplines he warns us not to advance explanatory, metaphysical theories. In this paper, I connect this concern with Wittgenstein’s (...) critique of Frazer. In criticizing Frazer, Wittgenstein adopts the important part of Spengler’s view. Nonetheless, there are differences between Wittgenstein’s views and those of Spengler; this paper aims to show similarities as well as these differences. The first part of the paper briefly summarizes Frazer’s views. The second part focuses on Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer concerning science and technology. The third part gives an account of his critique regarding method of social sciences and philosophy. The last part concentrates on Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer pertaining to the tolerance towards alternative forms of life. Key Words: context-free vacuum • evolutionary explanation • incommensurability • methodology of social sciences • perspicuous representation • science • technology • tolerance • totem and taboo. (shrink)

Professor Dowding has written an interesting and stimulating book on the relevance (R) of general philosophical insights for the conduct of political science enquiry. In this paper, I challenge his positive analysis due to the relevance (R) difficulty. The social sciences have to struggle with a set of philosophical questions, but they hardly belong to general ontological or epistemological theories.

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to (...) restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions. (shrink)