Non-Archimedean probability functions allow us to combine regularity with perfect additivity. We discuss the philosophical motivation for a particular choice of axioms for a non-Archimedean probability theory and answer some philosophical objections that have been raised against infinitesimal probabilities in general.

Non-Archimedean probability functions allow us to combine regularity with perfect additivity. We discuss the philosophical motivation for a particular choice of axioms for a non-Archimedean probability theory and answer some philosophical objections that have been raised against infinitesimal probabilities in general. _1_ Introduction _2_ The Limits of Classical Probability Theory _2.1_ Classical probability functions _2.2_ Limitations _2.3_ Infinitesimals to the rescue? _3_ NAP Theory _3.1_ First four axioms of NAP _3.2_ Continuity and conditional probability _3.3_ The final axiom of NAP (...) _3.4_ Infinite sums _3.5_ Definition of NAP functions via infinite sums _3.6_ Relation to numerosity theory _4_ Objections and Replies _4.1_ Cantor and the Archimedean property _4.2_ Ticket missing from an infinite lottery _4.3_ Williamson’s infinite sequence of coin tosses _4.4_ Point sets on a circle _4.5_ Easwaran and Pruss _5_ Dividends _5.1_ Measure and utility _5.2_ Regularity and uniformity _5.3_ Credence and chance _5.4_ Conditional probability _6_ General Considerations _6.1_ Non-uniqueness _6.2_ Invariance Appendix. (shrink)

This article discusses how the concept of a fair finite lottery can best be extended to denumerably infinite lotteries. Techniques and ideas from non-standard analysis are brought to bear on the problem.

We give a direct and elementary proof of the fact that every real-valued probability measure can be approximated—up to an infinitesimal—by a hyperreal-valued one which is regular and defined on the whole powerset of the sample space.

Shelah's theory of forking is generalized in a way which deals with measures instead of complete types. This allows us to extend the method of forking from the class of stable theories to the larger class of theories which do not have the independence property. When restricted to the special case of stable theories, this paper reduces to a reformulation of the classical approach. However, it goes beyond the classical approach in the case of unstable theories. Methods from ordinary forking (...) theory and the Loeb measure construction from nonstandard analysis are used. (shrink)

Cardinality arguments against regular probability measures aim to show that no matter which ordered field ℍ we select as the measures for probability, we can find some event space F of sufficiently large cardinality such that there can be no regular probability measure from F into ℍ. In particular, taking ℍ to be hyperreal numbers won't help to guarantee that probability measures can always be regular. I argue that such cardinality arguments fail, since they rely on the wrong conception of (...) the role of numbers as measures of probability. With the proper conception of their role we can see that for any event space F, of any cardinality, there are regular hyperreal-valued probability measures. (shrink)

The nonstandard stroboscopy method links discrete-time ordinary difference equations of first-order and continuous-time, ordinary differential equations of first order. We extend this method to the second order, and also to an elementary, yet general class of partial difference/differential equations, both of first and second order. We thus obtain straightforward discretizations and continuizations, even avoiding change of variables. In fact, we create intermediary objects: partial difference equations with S-continuous solutions, which have both discrete and continuous properties.