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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Lewisian Time Travel in a Relativistic Setting
Metaphysica 15 (2):329-345 (2014)
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This paper brings two fresh perspectives on Lewis’s theory of time travel. First: many key aspects and theoretical desiderata of Lewis’s theory can be captured in a framework that does not commit to eternalism about time. Second: implementing aspects of Lewisian time travel in a non-eternalist framework provides theoretical resources for a better treatment of time travel to the future. While time travel to the past has been extensively analyzed, time travel to the future has been comparatively underexplored. I make (...) |
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We standardly evaluate counterfactuals and abilities in temporally asymmetric terms—by keeping the past fixed and holding the future open. Only future events depend counterfactually on what happens now. Past events do not. Conversely, past events are relevant to what abilities one has now in a way that future events are not. Lewis, Sider and others continue to evaluate counterfactuals and abilities in temporally asymmetric terms, even in cases of backwards time travel. I’ll argue that we need more temporally neutral methods. (...) |
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Being alive throughout all history need not save you from dying, even if history extends infinitely into the past and future. Infinitely-long lives can fall short of genuine immortality and suffer all an ordinary mortal’s diminution in experience. Adapting David Lewis on time travel, Roy Sorensen imagines quasi-immortal ‘spore gods’, whose finite personal lives are distributed across infinite external time. While criticising the ‘Eleatic’ terms in which Sorensen presents spore gods, this paper argues his essential claims are correct: ‘spore god’ (...) |
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This is a paper about time travel and what it teaches us about freedom. I argue that cases of time travel bring out an important difference between two ways of thinking about “the past”—either in terms of time itself, or in terms of causation. This ambiguity naturally transfers over to our talk about things like fixity, determinism, and incompatibilism. Moreover, certain cases of time travel suggest that our freedom is not constrained by the temporal past _per se_, but by our (...) |
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_ Belief: A Pragmatic Picture _ By ZimmermanAaron Z.Oxford University Press, 2018. viii + 180 pp. |
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_ Paradoxes of Time Travel _ By WassermanRyanOxford University Press, 2018. x + 250 pp. |
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Lewis argued that although paradoxes such as the famous Grandfather Paradox can be solved, only a limited set of time travel fiction is consistent. In this paper, I discuss how to extend a Lewisian approach to a class of time travel fiction not considered by Lewis: transmigration or mental time travel fiction. To this end, Lewis’s definition of personal time needs refining, and this is the primary focus of my paper. I discuss some alternative refinements of Lewis’s definition: a Solely (...) |
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