Abstract: This article shows how in the Pāli Nikāyas, after having defined Eternalism and Nihilism as two opposed positions, Gotama makes a dialectical use of Eternalism as means to eliminate Nihilism, upheld to be the worst point of view because of its denial of kammic maturation in terms of puñña and pāpa. Assuming, from an Eternalist perspective, that actions have effects also beyond the present life, Gotama underlines the necessity of betting on the validity of moral kammic retribution. Having thus (...) demonstrated the central ethical error of Nihilism, he subtly introduces peculiar Buddhist moral concepts (kusala/akusala) to purify the Eternalist vision from the doctrine of a real existing self (attāvāda) and from the puñña/pāpa dichotomy. We can summarize this dialectical course as follows: Nihilism is pāpa/akusala because it denies kamman, Eternalism is puñña/not-akusala because it upholds kamman from a non-Buddhist perspective, Buddhism is kusala because it admits the law of kamman not centred on a theory of a real existing self (anattāvāda). (shrink)

The relationship between the physical body and the conscious human mind has been a deeply problematic topic for centuries. Physicalism is the 'orthodox' metaphysical stance in contemporary Western thought, according to which reality is exclusively physical/material in nature. However, in the West, theoretical dissatisfaction with this type of approach has historically lead to Cartesian-style dualism, wherein mind and body are thought to belong to distinct metaphysical realms. In the current discussion I compare and contrast this standard Western approach with an (...) alternative form of dualism developed in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophical tradition, where matter and pure consciousness are held to belong to distinct and independent realms, but where the mind is placed on the material side of the ontological divide. I argue that this model possesses a number of theoretical advantages over Cartesian-style dualism, and constitutes a compelling theoretical framework for re-conceptualizing the mind-body problem. (shrink)

The catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma is an argumentative figure familiar to any reader of Buddhist philosophical literature. Roughly speaking it consists of the enumeration of four alternatives: that some propositions holds, that it fails to hold, that it both holds and fails to hold, that it neither holds nor fails to hold. The tetralemma also constitutes one of the more puzzling features of Buddhist philosophy as the use to which it is put in arguments is not immediately obvious and certainly not (...) uniform: sometimes one of the four possibilities is selected as ‘the right one’, sometimes all four are rejected, sometimes all four are affirmed. It seems that this confusion is only exacerbated by the plethora of treatments we find in the modern commentarial literature, many of which try to analyze the tetralemma by recourse to notions of modern logic. Despite some important work done during the last decades a comprehensive study of the origin and development of the catuṣkoṭi from its use in the earliest Buddhist literature up to its later employment in the Buddhist philosophical works of Tibet, China, and Japan remains yet to be written. The present paper is obviously not intended to fill this gap, but has the specific objective of giving an interpretation of Nāgārrjuna’s employment of the tetralemma which makes both logical sense and is in accordance with his general philosophical position. (shrink)

The Vārṣṇeyādhyātma, which is comprised of chapters 203–210 of the 12th Book of the Mahābhārata, is an early exposition of the practice of Yoga centered on the manas and the bodily channel called manovahā. The importance of the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma’s doctrine for the history of Yoga has not been appropriately acknowledged in previous research and its systematic description of the practice of Yoga has never been studied in its entirety. A careful reading of the text suggests that the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma touches upon (...) the physiological as well as psychological aspects of a human being in the context of the practice of Yoga. This paper attempts to reconstruct the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma’s understanding of the manas and the manovahā channel on the basis of a critical reading of Mahābhārata 12.207.16–29. (shrink)

This thesis is a Tamil to English translation of Tirukkaḷirruppaṭiyar, composed by Uyyavanta Tevanayanar toward the end of the twelfth century C.E. The work contains one hundred quatrains of Tamil poetry composed in veṇpa meter. It is a poetic expansion of Tiruvuntiyar, an earlier composition likely by the author's teacher's teacher. The TKP is a transitional text between the devotional religious bhakti hymns of the nayanmar, who lived between the sixth century and the twelfth, and the Saiva-Siddhanta Theo-philosophical system, which (...) developed between the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries. TKP is the second work in the canon of fourteen texts called the Meykaṇṭa Sastra, TU being the first. The introduction in the thesis discusses the date of the author, his position in the lineage of teachers, major themes found in the work such as the importance of a teacher, types of worship, miracles of the Saiva saints and final release from the cycle of births and deaths. TKP's similarities and differences with the TU, and how the TKP provides a foundation for later Saiva Siddhanta thought are addressed. Besides translation, each verse has a gloss and there are several appendices, tables and charts with additional information. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to clarify Nāgārjuna’s use of the term pratijñā in verse 29 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī as situated in its contemporaneous thriving debate culture. In contrast to the standard formulation, which interprets the term pratijñā as a reference to the thesis of śūnyatā proffered by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, an examination of the debate culture in, and leading up to, second-century CE India shows that the term pratijñā refers to the first of five steps within the (...) Nyaya five-membered syllogism as it functions within a vitaṇḍā form of debate. Through an examination of the context in which this verse was written, the association made between Nāgārjuna’s use of pratijñā in the VV and śūnyatā within other texts becomes dislodged, thereby demonstrating the inadequacy of the standard formulation and the need for a revised understanding of the intent of the VV. (shrink)

In a doxography of views called the Ṣaṭtantrīsāra, a seventeenth century commentator and Advaitin, Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara, describes the doctrines of a group he calls the Miśras. Nīlakaṇṭha represents the doctrines of the Miśras as in most ways distinct from those of the canonical positions that usually appear in such doxographies, both āstika and nāstika. And indeed, some of the doctrines he describes resemble those of the Abrahamic faiths, concerning the creator, a permanent afterlife in heaven or hell, and the unique (...) births of souls. Other doctriness are difficult to associate with any known South Asian religion, for example the emphasis placed on astrological determinism in the moral economy of the creation. As the Ṣaṭtantrīsāra is unpublished to date, a preliminary edition of those portions that concern the Miśras is presented here, together with a translation, notes, and some further discussion. Though the identification is not certain, it seems most likely that the views Nīlakaṇṭha describes in this text belonged to Vanamālī Miśra, a North Indian Mādhva who had lived in the Ganges-Yamuna doab in the mid to late seventeenth century. Even if that identification turns out to be correct, many questions remain. (shrink)

Materialism is considered to be an anathema to Indian philosophy. Despite this, Indian tradition boasts of a strong materialist trend predating the Vedas. This paper traces the proto-materialist ideas as found in the ancient Tantra and pre-classical or original Sāṃkhya. Representing the naturalistic trend in Indian philosophy, ancient Tantra identified the brain as the seat of human consciousness. The pre-classical Sāṃkhya considered matter as the primal non-intelligent or non-sentient first cause from which the universe was to evolve. It considers the (...) material cause to be self-sufficient for the purpose of producing the world; the principle of consciousness is potentially contained in the primeval matter. This paper aims to provide an overview of the Indian materialist viewpoint for multidisciplinary scholars. (shrink)

У статті визначено характеристики терміна «дг’яна» в «Йоґа-сутрах» Патанджалі. Досліджено згадки про дг’яну у тексті Патанджалі, показано, що поняття «дг’яна» в «Йоґа-сутрах» вперше отримує виражене філософське обґрунтування, в якому ключову роль відіграє когнітивна складова терміна. Незважаючи на давню історію дослідження «Йоґа-сутр», поняттю дг’яна та його властивостям було приділено мало уваги, що визначає актуальність дослідження. У статті розкрито зміст сутр Патанджалі, що пояснюють властивості дг’яни: ретельно проаналізовано місце дг’яни в досліджуваному тексті, її зв’язок з іншими поняттями, а також її ієрархічне положення. (...) Встановлено, що «Йоґа-сутри» включають у себе не тільки визначення дг’яни, але й описують її функцію по відношенню до свідомості – стійкість до неуважності, що визначає значення дг’яни як практики для збирання свідомості докупи. У результаті аналізу сутр вдалося виявити дві ключові властивості дг’яни щодо свідомості: «інтегруючу» та «трансцендуючу». Дг’яна призводить до стану зібраності свідомості, що є «інтегруючою властивістю» дг’яни як практики щодо протидії неуважності свідомості. Показано, що дг’яна, будучи інструментом подолання «розщеплення» свідомості, проявляє свою «трансцендуючу властивість», що сприяє ускладненню свідомості. Також у коментарі В’яси до «Йоґа-сутри» виділено перший приклад «соматизації дг’яни»: таким чином виявлено семантичний перехід від ментально-орієнтованого розуміння дг’яни до тілесноспрямованої, «соматичної» концепції, коли акцент уваги в йозі був зміщений від когнітивності до тілесності. (shrink)

Some scholars, especially almost all Indian philosophers, defined man as an ethical animal. Why do they say that man is an ethical animal? The aim of this paper is to present the concept of suffering in Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy. The usage methods are the descriptive and evaluative method. The research finding is that principle of reciprocity can be used as an ethical principle. The moral principle in Eightfold Mean of Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy will be used in this research paper. This paper will (...) contribute an understanding of the ethical conduct is indispensable foundation in Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy. (shrink)