This paper attempts to reconcile two apparently opposed ways of thinking about the imagination and its relationship to literature, one which casts it as essentially concerned with fiction-making and the other with culture-making. The literary imagination’s power to create fictions is what gives it its most obvious claim to “autonomy”, as Kant would have it: its freedom to venture out in often wild and spectacular excess of reality. The argument of this paper is that we can locate the literary imagination’s (...) complementary power of cultural articulation in this fictional activity. The suggestion is that we should conceive of the literary imagination as expressing its interests in culture not mimetically but by producing a certain kind of meaning. This meaning is irreducibly narratological, and understanding it helps us to see the role of narrative in bringing into harmony the literary imagination’s interests in both the imaginary and the real. (shrink)

The reception of Avicenna by medieval Jewish readers presents an underappreciated enigma. Despite the philosophical and scientific stature of Avicenna, his philosophical writings were relatively little studied in Jewish milieus, be it in Arabic or in Hebrew. In particular, Avicenna's philosophical writings are not among the “Hebräische Übersetzungen des Mittelalters” – only very few of them were translated into Hebrew. As an author associated with a definite corpus of writings, Avicenna hardly existed in Jewish philosophy in Hebrew. Paradoxically, however, some (...) of Avicenna's most distinctive ideas were widely known and embraced by Jewish philosophers. This is the phenomenon that we dub Avicennian knowledge without Avicenna. In contrast with the philosophical treatises, Avicenna's medical writings were widely and intensively studied by Jews, especially in Hebrew, and remained influential until at least the seventeenth century. The present article presents a comprehensive picture of Avicenna's reception within medieval Jewish cultures in both Arabic and Hebrew and tries to explain the Jews’ complex attitude to Avicenna.La réception d'Avicenne par les érudits juifs médiévaux présente une énigme dont on n'a pas encore pris toute la mesure. Malgré la grande stature scientifique et philosophique d'Avicenne, ses écrits philosophiques ont été peu connus des savants juifs, que ce soit en arabe ou en hébreu. Ils n'ont guère fait partie des “Hebräische Übersetzungen des Mittelalters” – peu seulement ont été traduits en hébreu. En tant qu’auteur associé à un corpus de textes, Avicenne n'existe presque pas dans la philosophie juive en hébreu. Paradoxalement cependant, certaines des idées les plus caractéristiques d'Avicenne étaient bien connues et acceptées par des philosophes juifs. Nous appelons ce phénomène savoir avicennien sans Avicenne. Contrairement aux écrits philosophiques, les ouvrages médicaux d'Avicenne, eux, étaient lus et utilisés par les juifs, notamment en traductions hébraïques, et ce jusqu'au xviie siècle. Cet article présente un tableau général de la réception d'Avicenne, en arabe et en hébreu, dans les différentes cultures juives et il tente d'expliquer l'attitude complexe des savants juifs vis-à-vis d'Avicenne.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.AVICENNA AMONG MEDIEVAL JEWS THE RECEPTION OF AVICENNA'S PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL WRITINGS IN JEWISH CULTURES, EAST AND WESTVolume 22, Issue 2Gad Freudenthal and Mauro Zonta DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000033Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. AVICENNA AMONG MEDIEVAL JEWS THE RECEPTION OF AVICENNA'S PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL WRITINGS IN JEWISH CULTURES, EAST AND WESTVolume 22, Issue 2Gad Freudenthal and Mauro Zonta DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000033Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. AVICENNA AMONG MEDIEVAL JEWS THE RECEPTION OF AVICENNA'S PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL WRITINGS IN JEWISH CULTURES, EAST AND WESTVolume 22, Issue 2Gad Freudenthal and Mauro Zonta DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000033Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Saadya Gaon (882 – 942), one of the outstanding Rabbis in the period of the Geonim, rejected the legitimacy of legal inference, as part of his polemics with his contemporary Karaite scholars. The paper analyzes Saadya's stance regarding the logical basis of legal inference, and shows that Saadya's distinction between reason and revelation in the domain of legal inference is only in regard to the ‘illah– the factor that connects the case with its law. The rationality of the commandments, on (...) the other hand, is based according to Saadya upon the manfa‘ah– the utility of the commandments, and hence Saadya's religious doctrine turns out to be coherent and consistent. Maimonides (1138–1204), who was one of the most important figures in the Jewish scholarly world in the Middle Ages, adopted the Aristotelian concept of dialectics in order to facilitate his theory of Jewish legal argumentation. Unlike Saadya, Maimonides saw inferences in the realm of the law as legitimate. His position can be considered an inclination towards the Karaite ideology according to which reason must be the ruler in the realm of the law. Nevertheless, Maimonides' stance deviates from that of Karaites in a crucial point: according to Maimonides, only authorized institutions are qualified to use legal inference. Since the Talmud, according to Maimonides, represents the teachings of the rabbinical authorized institutions, its legal instructions must be followed. The article describes Maimonides' position regarding legal and Talmudic inferences, and shows that Maimonides' inclination towards the Karaite theory remains within the limits of the Rabbanite ideology. (shrink)

When questioning whether political deception can be ethically warranted, two competing intuitions jump to the fore. First, political deception is a fact of human life, used in the realpolitik of governance. Second, the ethical warrant of truth asserts itself as inexorably and indefatigably preferable to falsehood. Unfortunately, a cursory examination of the history of philosophy reveals a paucity of models to marry these basic intuitions. Some thinkers (e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Kant, Mill, and Rawls) privilege the truth by neglecting the (...) realpolitik, i.e., the truth is inviolate. Others (e.g., Machiavelli, Bentham, and the often infamous caché of 20th century dictators) focus upon the realpolitik to the exclusion of the primacy of the truth. A third group of critical thinkers (e.g., Arendt and Bok) examine the topic but offer no positive, systematic treatment of deception. Lacking are theories which simultaneously recognize that political untruth is often necessary, but that untruth is only justified when a) truth is politically impossible, b) the necessity of untruth is demonstrable, and c) the truth can be replaced with a minimally injurious untruth. Plato offers one such account in the Republic, arguing that deceit must be applied medicinally to the city. However, his account is problematic in detail. One of Plato’s inheritors, the 10th century thinker al-Fārābī, advanced Plato’s theoretical account, arguing that political governance requires restrained political deception. This deception, the expression of philosophical truths through the symbols of religion, meets the criteria mentioned above, being necessary, demonstrably necessary, and minimally injurious. But while al-Fārābī provides a valuable model for what justified political deception could look like, the lengths to which he must go in order to create a viable model for political deception reveals the untenability of the notion of justified political deception writ large. One must orchestrate an entire cosmos around the notion, notably a cosmos that does not match our own. One must adopt very specific conceptions of human nature, association, and happiness, as well as a particular metaphysics and epistemology. For, while al-Fārābī shows that political deception can be justifiable, he also reveals its unjustifiability outside an idealized setting. (shrink)