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  1. Naturalizing Idealizations: Pragmatism and the Interpretivist Strategy.Bjørn Ramberg - 2004 - Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (2):1-63.
    Following Quine, Davidson, and Dennett, I take mental states and linguistic meaning to be individuated with reference to interpretation. The regulative principle of ideal interpretation is to maximize rationality, and this accounts for the distinctiveness and autonomy of the vocabulary of agency. This rationality-maxim can accommodate empirical cognitive-psychological investigation into the nature and limitations of human mental processing. Interpretivism is explicitly anti-reductionist, but in the context of Rorty's neo-pragmatism provides a naturalized view of agents. The interpretivist strategy affords a less (...)
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  • Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas?H. G. Callaway - 1992 - Dialectica 46 (3-4):225-242.
    SummaryThis paper argues that the influence of language on science, philosophy and other field is mediated by communicative practices. Where communications is more restrictive, established linguistic structures exercise a tighter control over innovations and scientifically motivated reforms of language. The viewpoint here centers on the thesis that argumentation is crucial in the understanding and evaluation of proposed reforms and that social practices which limit argumentation serve to erode scientific objectivity. Thus, a plea is made for a sociology of scientific belief (...)
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  • Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  • A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.
    The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees (...)
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  • John Dewey. Una Perspectiva de Su Concepción de la Verdad.Ronald Teliz - 2007 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 19 (2):241-264.
    “John Dewey. A perspective of his Concept of Truth”. Rorty proposes his view as being an heir of pragmatism, such as J. Dewey’s, emphasizing that it stems, among other things, from the pragmatist notion of truth. Differing from many of Rorty’s ideas, I attempt to expound some notions I deem relevant in J. Dewey’s philosophy, and especially discuss some aspects of his conceptof truth. I plan to show that Dewey’s pragmatism takes up some traces of our everyday concept of truth, (...)
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  • The Limit of Charity and Agreement.Chuang Ye - 2008 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):99-122.
    Radical interpretation is used by Davison in his linguistic theory not only as an interesting thought experiment but also a general pattern that is believed to be able to give an essential and general account of linguistic interpretation. If the principle of charity is absolutely necessary to radical interpretation, it becomes, in this sense, a general methodological principle. However, radical interpretation is a local pattern that is proper only for exploring certain interpretation in a specific case, and consequently the principle (...)
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  • Replies to Bacon, Eklund, and Greenough on Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):422-475.
    ABSTRACTAndrew Bacon, Matti Eklund, and Patrick Greenough have individually proposed objections to the project in my book, Replacing Truth. Briefly, the book outlines a conceptual engineering project – our defective concept of truth is replaced for certain purposes with a team of concepts that can do some of the jobs we thought truth could do. Here, I respond to their objections and develop the views expressed in Replacing Truth in various ways.
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  • Ende oder Wende der analytischen Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie?Dirk Koppelberg - 1981 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 12 (2):364-400.
    My concern in what follows is to give a comparative report on some important lectures held at the Hegel-Kongreß 1981 in Stuttgart. In discussing the views of Quine, Hacking, Davidson, Putnam and Habermas I want to confront them with some details of Rorty's recent critique of our philosophical tradition. At last I try to give a tentative answer whether there is an end or a turning-point for current analytical philosophy.
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  • Les Conditions de L'Interprétation.Martin Montminy - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (3):505-528.
    Donald Davidson considère qu'une théorie de l'interprétation doit être radicale, c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne doit présupposer aucune connaissance de la langue à interpréter. Cette exigence repose sur l'idée suivante: si une théorie de l'interprétation pour une langue L présuppose une certaine compréhension de L, alors elle perd son pouvoir explicatif et échoue à rendre compte de ce qui permet la compréhension de L. L'interpr'tation radicale a l'avantage de nous forcer à rendre explicite ce qui est à l'œuvre dans le processus d'interprétation (...)
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