The language of linear temporal logic can be interpreted on the class of dynamic topological systems, giving rise to the intuitionistic temporal logic ${\sf ITL}^{\sf c}_{\Diamond \forall }$, recently shown to be decidable by Fernández-Duque. In this article we axiomatize this logic, some fragments, and prove completeness for several familiar spaces.

This paper provides several examples of how modal logic can be used in studying the XML document navigation language XPath. More specifically, we derive complete axiomatizations, computational complexity and expressive power results for XPath fragments from known results for corresponding logics. A secondary aim of the paper is to introduce XPath in a way that makes it accessible to an audience of modal logicians.

How can we prove that some fragment of a given logic has the power to define precisely all structural properties that satisfy some characteristic semantic preservation condition? This issue is a fundamental one for classical model theory and applications in non-classical settings alike. While methods differ greatly, and while the classical methods can usually not be matched for instance in the setting of finite model theory, this note surveys some interesting commonality revolving around the use and availability of tractable representatives (...) in the relevant model classes. The construction of models in which simple invariants like partial types based on some weak fragment control all the relevant structural properties, may be seen at the heart of such questions. We highlight some constructions involving degrees of acyclicity and saturation that can be achieved in finite model constructions, and discuss their uses towards expressive completeness w.r.t. bisimulation based equivalences in hypergraphs and relational structures. The emphasis is on the combinatorial challenges in such more constructive approaches that work in non-classical settings and especially in finite model theory. One new result concerns expressive completeness w.r.t. guarded negation bisimulation, a back-and-forth equivalence involving local homomorphisms. (shrink)

The tangle modality is a propositional connective that extends basic modal logic to a language that is expressively equivalent over certain classes of finite frames to the bisimulation-invariant fragments of both first-order and monadic second-order logic. This paper axiomatises several logics with tangle, including some that have the universal modality, and shows that they have the finite model property for Kripke frame semantics. The logics are specified by a variety of conditions on their validating frames, including local and global connectedness (...) properties. Some of the results have been used to obtain completeness theorems for interpretations of tangled modal logics in topological spaces. (shrink)

We show that given a finite, transitive and reflexive Kripke model 〈 W , ≼, ⟦ ⋅ ⟧ 〉 and $${w \in W}$$ , the property of being simulated by w (i.e., lying on the image of a literalpreserving relation satisfying the ‘forth’ condition of bisimulation) is modally undefinable within the class of S4 Kripke models. Note the contrast to the fact that lying in the image of w under a bi simulation is definable in the standard modal language even (...) over the class of K4 models, a fairly standard result for which we also provide a proof. We then propose a minor extension of the language adding a sequent operator $${\natural}$$ (‘tangle’) which can be interpreted over Kripke models as well as over topological spaces. Over finite Kripke models it indicates the existence of clusters satisfying a specified set of formulas, very similar to an operator introduced by Dawar and Otto. In the extended language $${{\sf L}^+ = {\sf L}^{\square\natural}}$$ , being simulated by a point on a finite transitive Kripke model becomes definable, both over the class of (arbitrary) Kripke models and over the class of topological S4 models. As a consequence of this we obtain the result that any class of finite, transitive models over finitely many propositional variables which is closed under simulability is also definable in L + , as well as Boolean combinations of these classes. From this it follows that the μ -calculus interpreted over any such class of models is decidable. (shrink)

Dynamic Topological Logic (DFH) is a multimodal system for reasoning about dynamical systems. It is defined semantically and, as such, most of the work done in the field has been model-theoretic. In particular, the problem of finding a complete axiomatization for the full language of DFH over the class of all dynamical systems has proven to be quite elusive. Here we propose to enrich the language to include a polyadic topological modality, originally introduced by Dawar and Otto in a different (...) context. We then provide a sound axiomatization for DFH over this extended language, and prove that it is complete. The polyadic modality is used in an essential way in our proof. (shrink)

There are several known Lindström-style characterization results for basic modal logic. This paper proves a generic Lindström theorem that covers any normal modal logic corresponding to a class of Kripke frames definable by a set of formulas called strict universal Horn formulas. The result is a generalization of a recent characterization of modal logic with the global modality. A negative result is also proved in an appendix showing that the result cannot be strengthened to cover every first-order elementary class of (...) frames. This is shown by constructing an explicit counterexample. (shrink)

This book illustrates the program of Logical-Informational Dynamics. Rational agents exploit the information available in the world in delicate ways, adopt a wide range of epistemic attitudes, and in that process, constantly change the world itself. Logical-Informational Dynamics is about logical systems putting such activities at center stage, focusing on the events by which we acquire information and change attitudes. Its contributions show many current logics of information and change at work, often in multi-agent settings where social behavior is essential, (...) and often stressing Johan van Benthem's pioneering work in establishing this program. However, this is not a Festschrift, but a rich tapestry for a field with a wealth of strands of its own. The reader will see the state of the art in such topics as information update, belief change, preference, learning over time, and strategic interaction in games. Moreover, no tight boundary has been enforced, and some chapters add more general mathematical or philosophical foundations or links to current trends in computer science. The theme of this book lies at the interface of many disciplines. Logic is the main methodology, but the various chapters cross easily between mathematics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive and social sciences, while also ranging from pure theory to empirical work. Accordingly, the authors of this book represent a wide variety of original thinkers from different research communities. And their interconnected themes challenge at the same time how we think of logic, philosophy and computation. Thus, very much in line with van Benthem's work over many decades, the volume shows how all these disciplines form a natural unity in the perspective of dynamic logicians (broadly conceived) exploring their new themes today. And at the same time, in doing so, it offers a broader conception of logic with a certain grandeur, moving its horizons beyond the traditional study of consequence relations. (shrink)

This chapter presents a new semantics for inductive empirical knowledge. The epistemic agent is represented concretely as a learner who processes new inputs through time and who forms new beliefs from those inputs by means of a concrete, computable learning program. The agent’s belief state is represented hyper-intensionally as a set of time-indexed sentences. Knowledge is interpreted as avoidance of error in the limit and as having converged to true belief from the present time onward. Familiar topics are re-examined within (...) the semantics, such as inductive skepticism, the logic of discovery, Duhem’s problem, the articulation of theories by auxiliary hypotheses, the role of serendipity in scientific knowledge, Fitch’s paradox, deductive closure of knowability, whether one can know inductively that one knows inductively, whether one can know inductively that one does not know inductively, and whether expert instruction can spread common inductive knowledge—as opposed to mere, true belief—through a community of gullible pupils. (shrink)