In this chapter, I consider the idea that physician-assisted death might come into question in the cases of psychiatric patients who are incapable of making autonomous choices about ending their lives. I maintain that the main arguments for physician-assisted death found in recent medical ethical literature support physician-assisted death in some of those cases. After assessing several possible criticisms of what I have argued, I conclude that the idea that physicianassisted death can be acceptable in some cases of psychiatric patients (...) who lack autonomy ought to be taken into account in assessing the moral and legal acceptability of physician-assisted death. (shrink)

In this article, the logical implications of a right to life are examined. It is first argued that the prohibition of Termination of life on request confers an inalienable right to life. A right is inalienable if it cannot legitimately be waived or transferred. Since voluntary euthanasia entails waiver of the right to life, the inalienability yields that it cannot be justified. Therefore, any ethical position that is in favor of voluntary euthanasia has to argue that the right to life (...) is an inalienable right and accept the conclusion that killing on request is justified. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Dutch case of Brongersma presents novel challenges to the definition and evaluation of voluntary euthanasia since it involved a doctor assisting the suicide of an individual who was (merely?) ‘tired of life’. Legal officials had called on the courts to ‘set a principled boundary’, excluding such cases from the scope of permissible voluntary euthanasia, but they arguably failed. This failure is explicable, however, since the case seems justifiable by reference to the two major principles in favour of that (...) practice, respect for autonomy and beneficence. Ultimately, it will be argued that those proponents of voluntary euthanasia who are wary of its use in such circumstances may need to draw upon ‘practical’ objections, in order to erect an otherwise arbitrary perimeter. Furthermore, it will be suggested that the issues raised by the case are not peculiarly Dutch in nature and that, therefore, there are lessons here for other jurisdictions too. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 50-51.

This article addresses the bioethical challenges raised by end-of-life care (EoLC) from the perspective of Islamic normativity. Rejecting positivist positions, it argues for the use of a flexible approach midway between a deontological conception of human life as having a sacred value that cannot be bargained over, as represented by the teachings of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's, and one that introduces considerations of pain (alam) and pleasure (ladhdah) into ethical evaluations, as expounded by the jurist Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Under this approach, (...) described as “Islamic evaluator relativity,” moral agents formulate a normative position tailored to their beliefs and the circumstances of the case, in which the right course of action is expressed as a value judgement (amr ijtihādi) and the evaluator (mujtahid) is rewarded regardless of the choices they make. Keywords: Islamic bioethics, End-of-life-care, bioethics, normative ethics. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 48-50.

Most people who defend physician-assisted death (PAD) endorse the Joint View, which holds that two conditions—autonomy and welfare—must be satisfied for PAD to be justified. In this paper, we defend an Autonomy Only view. We argue that the welfare condition is either otiose on the most plausible account of the autonomy condition, or else is implausibly restrictive, particularly once we account for the broad range of reasons patients cite for desiring PAD, such as “tired of life” cases. Moreover, many of (...) the common objections to an Autonomy Only view fail once we understand the extent of the autonomy condition’s requirements—in particular, the importance of one’s values for autonomous choices. If our view is correct, then the scope of permissible PAD is broader than is currently accepted in both the philosophical literature and the law, and therefore poses an important challenge to this widely accepted view on justified PAD. (shrink)