In this paper, we present four philosophical approaches and their prominent advocates toward the problem of relationship between Darwinian evolution and theistic beliefs: Atheistic Inconsistency: there is a deep conflict between Darwinian evolution and theism; among atheists, Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett could be regarded as the best representatives in this branch. Theistic Inconsistency: A deep conflict could also be seen among theists, M.H. Tabātabā’ī’s Quranic exegesis is one of the most significant sources in this regard from Islamic side, correspondent (...) to the same in other theistic religions. Theistic Consistency: There is a concord between theism and Darwinian evolution; we have considered Alvin Plantinga and Murtazā Mutaharī in this category. Reductionist Consistency: Theism and Darwinian evolution, or science and religion in general, are two different and noncompeting levels of explanation; John Haught advocates such reductionist consistency between science and religion. Having mentioned the four above classes and a few of many representatives of each category and some important questions toward these approaches, we have attempted to show that the alleged consistency between theistic beliefs and Darwinian evolution by the principle of natural selection fails. (shrink)

Resumen Recientemente la ciencia cognitiva de la religión ha permitido desarrollar argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores, los cuales buscan poner en entredicho no solo la racionalidad sino la verdad del teísmo. Dado que hay dos formas de concebir la racionalidad y la justificación epistémicas, a saber, la internalista y la externalista, cabe preguntarse ¿de qué modo tales argumentos afectan al teísmo? El objetivo de este artículo es responder a esta cuestión mediante una reconstrucción y evaluación de tres argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores subproductistas contra (...) la racionalidad del teísmo que Dennett sostendría. Sostendré que solo uno de los tres argumentos de Dennett es posiblemente válido. igualmente, mostraré que el argumento adicional del sesgo cognitivo es probablemente exitoso en socavar la justificación internalista y externalista del teísmo. Finalmente, mostraré que estos argumentos evolutivos desacreditadores pueden ser invalidados indirectamente a partir del argumento evolutivo desacreditador en contra del naturalismo desarrollado por Plantinga, al cual se le puede contraponer el argumento lógico cancelador de la epistemología reformada.Recently, the cognitive science of religion has allowed the development of evolutionary debunking arguments, which seek to challenge not only rationality but the truth of theism. Since there are two ways of conceiving epistemic rationality and justification, viz., the internalist and the externalist, one may wonder ¿how such arguments affect theism? The purpose of this article is to answer this question through a reconstruction and evaluation of three evolutionary debunking arguments against the rationality of theism that Dennett would hold. I will argue that only one of the three Dennett's evolutionary debunking arguments is possibly valid. I will also show that the argument of cognitive bias is probably successful in undermining both the internalist and externalist justification of theism, under certain conditions. Finally, I will show that this arguments can be indirectly disproved from evolutionary argument against naturalism developped by Plantinga, argument to which one can counterpose logical defeater argument against the reformed epistemology. (shrink)

It is often assumed that science provides the most accurate knowledge about nature. This view not only collapses distinctions between different forms of knowing but also results in a paradox whereby understanding what it means to exist in the world is dictated by practioners of science. In this essay I argue for the relevance of an existential conception of nature via the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and how his notions of thrownness and phusis enable us to recognize a certain ethical (...) bond to nature. I conclude with a critical analysis of liability insurance and actuarial science to demonstrate my points. (shrink)

commentary on Fodor, “Against Darwinism.”.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.