A longstanding orthodoxy holds that the Mohists regard the promotion of li (benefit, 利) as their ultimate normative criterion, meaning that they measure what is yi (just, 義) or buyi (unjust, 不義) depending on whether it maximizes li or not. This orthodoxy dates back at least to Joseph Edkins (1859), who saw Mozi as a utilitarian and an ally of Bentham. In this paper, we will argue that this orthodoxy should be reconsidered because it does not square with several passages (...) from the Mozi. That the Mohists place a strong weight on the promotion of ‘li for the whole world (tianxia zhi li, 天下之利)’ is uncontroversial. We argue, however, that in certain cases the Mohist moral calculus diverges in its rationale or outcome from li-promotionalism. This position rejects the orthodoxy by showing that Mohism and li-promotionalism are not entirely coterminous. (shrink)

In the Western studies of the texts of Mozi, three distinctive views have surfaced in the past few decades: (1) Mozi is inconsistent because he seems to have been committed to both a Utilitarian standard and a divine command theory; (2) Mozi is a divine command theorist who argues that it is right to benefit the world because it is the will of heaven; and (3) Mozi is a utilitarian thinker who has based morality on the criterion of whether actions (...) benefit the world. In this paper, I will argue that the whole debate about whether Mozi is a divine command theorist or a utilitarian is misguided, because it is based on an incorrect understanding of the fundamental cultural perspective associated with the notion of Tian. An adequate understanding of the notion of Tian will reveal its fundamental difference from the Western notion of heaven. Such an understanding will enable us to put Mozi's moral philosophy in the ancient Chinese perspective in which a tension and potential conflict between 'the will of heaven' and 'the benefit of the world' simply cannot arise. (shrink)

In the Western studies of the texts of Mozi, three distinctive views have surfaced in the past few decades: (1) Mozi is inconsistent because he seems to have been committed to both a Utilitarian standard and a divine command theory; (2) Mozi is a divine command theorist who argues that it is right to benefit the world because it is the will of heaven; and (3) Mozi is a utilitarian thinker who has based morality on the criterion of whether actions (...) benefit the world. In this paper, I will argue that the whole debate about whether Mozi is a divine command theorist or a utilitarian is misguided, because it is based on an incorrect understanding of the fundamental cultural perspective associated with the notion of Tian. An adequate understanding of the notion of Tian will reveal its fundamental difference from the Western notion of heaven. Such an understanding will enable us to put Mozi's moral philosophy in the ancient Chinese perspective in which a tension and potential conflict between ‘the will of heaven’ and ‘the benefit of the world’ simply cannot arise. (shrink)

The Mencius contains several negative remarks about the Mohists and their doctrine of ‘universal love’ (jian’ai). However, little attention has been paid to whether Mencius’ descriptions of Mohism were accurate. Fortunately, there is a surviving record of the beliefs of Mozi in the text that bears his name. In this essay, I analyze this text and descriptions of Mohism from other early Chinese texts, and compare them to the criticisms of Mohism in the Mencius. Ultimately, I show that the image (...) of the Mohists as ones who promoted a doctrine that contradicted filial piety was inaccurate, and obscured the complexities of filial piety in the Warring States period. (shrink)

According to A. C. Graham, ‘the crucial question’ for the early Chinese thinkers was ‘Where is the Way [dao]?’–‘the way to order the state and conduct personal life’ rather than ‘What is the Truth?’1 This observation is most apt when applied to the thinking of Mozi and his followers as it is exemplified in the ethical and political chapters of the eponymously named text .2 A striking feature of the Mohists’ thinking, however, is the concern they have with yan , (...) and the role they assigned to yan in their ethical project. Part I of this article will outline the nature and scope of the Mohists’ concern with yan. In the Mohists’ conception, right yan is the linguistic counterpart to proper dao. And conduct that follows dao is a matter of affirming the right yan and taking it as a model in one’s actions. The Mohists’ concern with yan is prominently exhibited in their proposing objective standards, or ‘gauges’, by means of which any yan may be assessed. Part II introduces these gauges and discusses how they function as standards for right yan and right conduct. Given the generally pragmatic outlook of their thinking, the question remains as to whether, in their conception of yan, the Mohists conceived of language exclusively in terms of its action guiding function, and whether they deployed the notion of truth at all. Part III discusses this issue, arguing that there is a minimal sense in which yan that are positively assessed by the gauges are true, and that the Mohists are not insensitive to the distinction between descriptive as opposed to action guiding uses of language. Part IV briefly discusses how the Mohists’ attitude towards yan contrasts with those of early Confucian and Daoist thinkers. (shrink)

One aspect of the intellectual changes taking place in China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the emergence of utilitarian ideas. Although it may be useful to think of modern Chinese thought from the perspective of the emergence of social Darwinism and nationalism, it is significant that the country's most progressive scholars at the turn of thecentury derived their inspiration from utilitarianism. Utilitarianism was accepted as a weapon with which to challenge traditional social, political, and cultural ideas, (...) and to justify social and political reforms. (shrink)

Fraser highlights an unattractive feature of Mohist ethics: the Mohists, while criticizing their Confucian contemporaries, restrict one’s pursuits to the most basic sorts of goods. Fraser suggests that the Mohists assume the perpetuity of scarce resources, which leads to a commitment to austerity, which in turn leads them to deny a plausible third way between austerity and excess. In their defence, I argue that the Mohists do not assume perpetuity of scarce resources but rather the hedonic treadmill. And instead of (...) begging the question by assuming austerity and then denying a moderate alternative to excess, the Mohists take the hedonic treadmill to preclude a principled stopgap between austerity and excess, leaving austerity as the only acceptable option. Finally, these dynamics illuminate a feature that should make us wary of parallels to Millian utilitarianism: the maximization principle of the latter is absent from Mohism, and this goes hand-in-hand with austerity. (shrink)

The most significant contemporary controversy surrounding the interpretation of the moral thought of Mozi is the debate over his ultimate criterion for right action. The problem is that there are two significant candidates found in the text of the Mozi.1 One is a kind of utilitarian principle: whatever benefits the world is right and whatever harms the world is wrong. The other is a divine will principle: whatever Heaven desires is right and whatever Heaven disapproves of is wrong. Both principles (...) play an undeniably important role in Mozi's system, but their precise relationship is surprisingly difficult to determine. Is one more fundamental than the other? If so, which? And what purpose does the less basic of the .. (shrink)

Mozi and George Berkeley are philosophers who are not often put into conversation. However, I argue that comparing them can shed some light on the relationship between certain philosophical positions and their resulting moral philosophies. Specifically, I will draw attention to the way that their lack of interest in an appearance-reality distinction and in "essence" gives rise to a tension between consequentialism and divine command theory. These similarities exist despite the fact that Mozi and Berkeley otherwise have quite distinct views. (...) For example, Mozi's dao-centered theoretical orientation leads him to assume that the world simply is as it is given through our senses, whereas Berkeley holds that the world is... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Mohism has been called the most religious of all Chinese philosophies. Living up to that name, it developed unique proofs for the existence of the spiritual realm within a distinctly Chinese context. The Mozi uses testimonies from China’s mythic history to prove the existence of spirits. But beyond these cultural proofs, the Mozi also introduces a logical argument that is very similar to Pascal’s wager. Beyond these four explicit arguments, the Mozi also contains a fifth proof based on the (...) existence of a supernatural order that exists in the structure of the world. (shrink)

Ph.D. Thesis. University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa 2018.