- Interpretative expressivism: A theory of normative belief.James L. D. Brown - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):1-20.details
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In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism.Márton Miklós & Tőzsér János - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (2):169-186.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reference.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-24.details
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Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.details
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Reviews. [REVIEW]Richard Popkin - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):182-185.details
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Response to Elqayam, Nottelmann, Peels and Vahid on my paper 'Perspectivism, deontologism and epistemic poverty'.Robert Lockie - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (3):21-47.details
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International plovers or just dump brids?Carolyn A. Ristau - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373-375.details
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False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.details
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Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.details
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A puzzle for evaluation theories of desire.Alex Grzankowski - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):90-98.details
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Is Having Contradictory Beliefs Possible? Discussion and Critique of Arguments for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction.Maciej Tarnowski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 31:91-126.details
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1. The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Lairs.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 11-28.details
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Adaptationism was always predictive and needed no defense.Richard Dawkins - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):360-361.details
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Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):541.details
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Could man be an irrational animal?Stephen P. Stich - 1985 - Synthese 64 (1):115-35.details
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Naturalizing idealizations: Pragmatism and the interpretivist strategy.Bjørn Ramberg - 2004 - Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (2):1-63.details
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Belief accripton, parsimony, and rationality.John Hell - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-366.details
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The adaptiveness_ of _mentalism?.Nicholas Humphrey - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-366.details
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The International stance faces backward.Howard Rachlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373-373.details
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Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):559-576.details
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Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.details
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A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.details
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Rationality: putting the issue to the scientific community.John Beatty - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):355-356.details
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Psychology Without Principle of Charity.Neven Sesardić - 1986 - Dialectica 40 (3):229-240.details
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The Authority of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis.Justin C. Fisher - unknowndetails
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Nemo psychologus nisi physiologus.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1986 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (June):168-185.details
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The mental simulation debate: A progress report.Tony Stone & Martin Davies - 1996 - In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119--137.details
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The contextual stance.Gordon R. Foxall - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.details
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The scope and ingenuity of evolutionary systems.Dan Lloyd - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):368-369.details
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Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats.K. V. Wilkes - 1997 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42:177-.details
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Inconsistency and interpretation.Lisa Bortolotti - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.details
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Thinking about animal thoughts.Donald R. Griffin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):364-364.details
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Rationality, biology and optimality.Carolyn Price - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):613-634.details
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Epistemic value.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.details
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Beyond Burrhus and behaviorism: Dennett defused.Thomas Gray - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):762-763.details
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A better way to deal with selection.B. F. Skinner - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-378.details
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Lloyd Morgan's canon in evolutionary context.Michael T. Ghiselin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):362-363.details
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Dennett' instrumentalism: A frog at the bottom of the mug.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):358-359.details
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When does the intentional stance work?Daniel C. Dennett - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):763-766.details
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Taking the intentional stance seriously.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):379-390.details
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Dennett' “Panglossian paradigm”.Alison Jolly - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-367.details
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Elementary errors about evolution.Richard C. Lewontin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):367-368.details
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Mental content in linguistic form.William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):147-54.details
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Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science.Edward Stein - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Reviews. [REVIEW]Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.details
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Steps toward an ethological science.Mark S. Seidenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-377.details
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Science as an international system.Arthur C. Danto - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):359-360.details
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Denoting and demoting international systems.George Graham - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):363-364.details
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Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theory.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-365.details
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