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  1. More on prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
    Some cases of prosopagnosia involve a highly circumscribed loss of A-consciousness. When seen in this way they offer further support for the arguments made in Block's target article.
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  • What counts as local?Andrew W. Young - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):88-89.
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  • Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
    In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content (such as an item of information) without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.
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  • Modularity need not imply locality: Damaged modules can have nonlocal effects.Edgar Zurif & David Swinney - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):89-90.
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  • Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
    It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
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  • Consciousness is not a natural kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
    Blocks distinction between “phenomenal feel” consciousness and “thought/cognition” consciousness is a cultural construction. Consciousness (and its “subspecies”) is not a natural kind. Some crosscultural data are presented to support this.
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  • Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness and the interactive brain.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84-85.
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  • Playing Flourens to Fodor's Gall.Tim van Gelder - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84-84.
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  • The symbolic brain or the invisible hand?René van Hezewijk & Edward H. F. de Haan - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):85-86.
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  • The localization/distribution distinction in neuropsychology is related to the isomorphism/multiple meaning distinction in cell electrophysiology.Gerald S. Wasserman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):87-88.
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  • Should we continue to study consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
    Block has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the term “consciousness” by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness, each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears to further becloud the topic, however. Perhaps consciousness cannot be defined adequately and should not be considered as a topic that can be studied scientifically.
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  • Locus-pocus.Carlo Semenza - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):80-80.
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  • Throwing out the neuropsychological data with the locality bathwater?Philip Servos & Elizabeth M. Olds - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):80-81.
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  • How access-consciousness might be a kind of consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
    In response to the objection that his “access-consciousness” is not really consciousness but a matter of the availability of certain information for certain kinds of processing, Block will probably have to argue that consciousness in a more basic, familiar, traditional sense is an essential component of any instance of access-consciousness and thus justifies the name.
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  • Conscious and nonconscious control of action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
    I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.
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  • Block's philosophical anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
    Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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  • The real functional architecture is gray, wet and slippery.Steven L. Small - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):81-82.
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  • The functional architecture of visual attention may still be modular.Carlo Umiltà - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):82-83.
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  • Distributed locality and large-scale neurocognitive networks.M. Marsel Mesulam - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):74-76.
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  • Computational levels again.Mike Oaksford - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):76-77.
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  • Parallel distributed processing challenges the strong modularity hypothesis, not the locality assumption.David C. Plaut - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):77-78.
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  • Local and distributed processes in attentional orienting.Michael I. Posner - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):78-79.
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  • Access and what it is like.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260.
    Block's cases of superblindsight, the pneumatic drill, and the Sperling experiments do not show that P-consciousness and Aconsciousness can come apart. On certain tendentious but not implausible construals of the concepts of P- and A-consciousness, they refer to the same psychological phenomenon.
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  • Phenomenal access: A moving target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.
    Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
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  • Access denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.
    The information processing that constitutes accessconsciousness is not sufficient to make a representational state conscious in any sense. Standard examples of computation without consciousness undermine A-consciousness, and Block's cases seem to derive their plausibility from a lurking phenomenal awareness. That is, people and other minded systems seem to have access-consciousness only insofar as the state accessed is a phenomenal one, or the state resulting from access is phenomenal, or both.
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  • Phenomenal and attentional consciousness may be inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.
    In common sense consciousness has a fairly determinate content – the (single) way an experience feels, the (single) line of thought being consciously followed. The determinacy of the object may be achieved by linking Block's two concepts, so that as long as we hold on to the determinacy of content we are unable to separate P and A.
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  • Perception and its interactive substrate: Psychophysical linking hypotheses and psychophysical methods.Robert Sekuler - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):79-79.
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  • No threat to modularity.Yosef Grodzinsky & Uri Hadar - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):70-71.
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  • Go with the flow but mind the details.Glyn W. Humphreys & M. Jane Riddoch - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):71-72.
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  • Do neuropsychologists think in terms of interactive models?Marcel Kinsbourne - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):72-73.
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  • Neuropsychology: Going loco?Rosaleen A. McCarthy - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):73-74.
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  • On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind.Leonard D. Katz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259.
    One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.
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  • Triangulating phenomenal consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):259-260.
    This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.
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  • Further advantages of abandoning the locality assumption in face recognition.Jules Davidoff & Bernard Renault - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):68-68.
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  • Neurocomputing and modularity.Joachim Diederich - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):68-69.
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  • Clarifying the locality assumption.Clark Glymour - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):69-70.
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  • Is consciousness of perception really separable from perception?Martha J. Farah - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):254-255.
    Although not the main point of his target article, Block defends the view that perception and awareness of perception could be functions of different brain systems. I will argue that the available data do not support this view, and that Block's defense of the view rests on problematic eonstruals of the “executive system” and of the components of information-processing models.
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  • Guilty consciousness.George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):255-256.
    Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.
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  • Phenomenal fallacies and conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.
    A “fallacy” is something like the sense-datum fallacy, involving a logically invalid argument. A “conflation” is something like Block's conflation of the (alleged) raw feel of an experience with what it is like to have the experience. Trivially, a self is conscious of something only if it accesses it. Substantive issues concern the nature of the conscious self and the nature of access.
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  • Blocking out the distinction between sensation and perception: Superblindsight and the case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.
    Block's notion of P-consciousness catches too much in its net. He would do better to exclude all states that do not have a sensory component. I question what he says about my work with the “blind” monkey, Helen.
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  • Regional specialities.Brian Butterworth - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):63-63.
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  • Discarding locality assumptions: Problems and prospects.Ruth Campbell - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):64-65.
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  • Locality, modularity and numerical cognition.Jamie I. D. Campbell - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):63-64.
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  • Casting one's net too widely?D. P. Carey & A. D. Milner - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):65-66.
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  • More empirical cases to break the accord of phenomenal and access-consciousness.Talis Bachmann - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-251.
    Additional experiments show that P-consciousness and A consciousness can be empirically dissociated for the theoretically so phisticated observer. Phenomenal consciousness can have several degrees that are indirectly measurable.
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  • Modularity, interaction and connectionist neuropsychology.Nick Chater - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):66-67.
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  • Breakthrough on the consciousness front or much ado about nothing?N. F. Dixon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):253-254.
    Propositions as to the nature of consciousness, based on disorders of perception that result from brain damage, and taking insufficient account of the numerous ways in which normal subjects may deviate from that “usual” sequence of events (input → subjective awareness → output) risk increasing rather than diminishing any existing confusion about the function of consciousness.
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  • Perception-consciousness and action-consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):247-248.
    Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is accepted, and it is agreed that one may be found without the other, but his account of the distinction is challenged. Phenomenal consciousness is perceptual consciousness, and it is a matter of gaining information of a detailed, nonverbal sort about the subject's body and environment. Access consciousness is good, old-fashioned introspection.
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  • Evidence that phenomenal consciousness is the same as access consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-249.
    Block seems to propose untested answers to empirical questions. Whether consciousness is a “mongrel problem,” rather than a single core fact with many facets, is an empirical issue. Likewise, the intimate relationship between personal consciousness and global access functions cannot be decided pretheoretically. This point is demonstrated by the reader's private experience of foveal versus parafoveal vision, and for conscious versus unconscious representation of the many meanings of common words.
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