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  1. Author's response.Ned Block - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1).
    The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
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  • P-consciousness presentation/a-consciousness representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.
    P-Consciousness is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect (...)
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  • Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.
    P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”.
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  • Theories of Consciousness as Reflexivity.Dr Frederic Peters - unknown
    Consciousness is best understood in context, as one element of an interactive waking state in which the greater part of cognitive processing takes place in a nonconscious fashion. But if conscious and nonconscious processing are combined in the waking state, what distinguishes the former form the latter, what is consciousness, and what is its purpose? The answer to the second question depends crucially on our conclusion regarding the first. What is the property in virtue of which a state is conscious (...)
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