What is a problem? What is problematic about any problem whatsoever, philosophical or otherwise? As the origin of assertion and apodeiction, the problematic suspends the categories of necessity and contingency, possibility and impossibility. And it is this suspension that is the essence of the problem, which is why it is so suspenseful. But then, how is the problem problematic? Only if what is suspended neither comes to presence, nor simply goes out into absence, that is, if the suspension continues, which (...) continues the problem. But what is problematic about suspension? As a consideration of language shows, the problem of suspension is the problem of implication. If being, for example, is merely implied, neither present nor absent, then it is the suspension of both, at least insofar as it is problematic. And this not only says something about language; rather, it has ontological implications as well — it speaks of being, and the being of anything whatsoever. For if being is implied, if that is the problem of being, it is because being is an implication. Then the being of things like problems is implied as well; or being is in things by implication. But what does it mean for being to be neither presence nor absence, but an implication? It means that being is implied in a way that is problematic — before it is necessary, or even possible. For being’s way of being is characterized by suspension — which has implications for thinking and speaking about being, and about things like problems, even about anything whatsoever. And this has implications for what being implies, namely, unity and time and aspect. (shrink)

Ce mémoire vise à élucider le rapport entre la violence et le pouvoir souverain à partir de la Critique de la violence de Walter Benjamin et Force de loi de Jacques Derrida. Les réflexions proposées ici sont issues de deux constats : (i) que nos structures politiques reposent sur l’emploi continu de la violence et (ii) qu’une révolution abolit l’ordre existant en s’accordant le monopole sur la violence légitime, reconduisant ainsi le cycle de la violence. Pour sortir de cette impasse, (...) Benjamin imagine une violence capable de destituer le pouvoir souverain, c’est-à-dire de l’abolir sans pour autant le saisir à son tour. Ce mémoire poursuit le développement du concept de destitution en trois temps. Dans un premier temps, nous lisons de près la Critique de la violence de Benjamin. Dans un deuxième temps, nous approfondissons notre analyse avec la lecture déconstructive proposée par Derrida dans Force de loi. Finalement, le concept de destitution est enrichi par des travaux contemporains et examiné sous l’angle de la responsabilité pour l’avenir. -/- *** -/- This thesis investigates the relationship between violence and sovereign power by drawing on Walter Benjamin's Critique of Violence and Jacques Derrida's Force de loi. The reflections proposed here are based on two observations: (i) that our political structures are based on the continuous use of violence, and (ii) that a revolution abolishes the existing order by granting itself a monopoly on legitimate violence, thus renewing the cycle of violence. To break this deadlock, Benjamin imagines a form of violence capable of destituting sovereign power, i.e. abolishing it without seizing it. This dissertation further develops the concept of destitution in three steps. First, we carefully read Benjamin's Critique of Violence. Secondly, we deepen our analysis with the deconstructive reading proposed by Derrida in Force de loi. Finally, we enrich the concept of destitution with contemporary works and examine it through the lens of responsibility for what is to come. (shrink)

Proper attention to the theme of corporeality is crucial for understanding Derrida’s analysis of Hegel in “The Pit and the Pyramid.” This article argues that Derrida’s essay compels us to face the impossibility of giving a wholly coherent account of embodiment. The _Aufhebung_ supposedly unites the exteriority of the corporeal with interiority in a higher unity that cancels and preserves them both; Hegel’s own text reveals, however, that meaning is primordially absent from the body that was thought to incarnate it. (...) And it is this absence of ideal meaning that is originary: Differance conditions the body as it conditions speech, rendering the body other than itself such that it is not categorizable as flesh that is the self or as an object that is not the self. I am and am not my body because the dichotomy between interiority and exteriority breaks down even at the level of the body. Indeed, I am and am not my self; the embodied self is disrupted from the start, never self-contained. Thus embodiment always already testifies to the other. (shrink)

Los fenómenos urbanos son modos concretos de reproducción social y, como toda reproducción, tienen un carácter histórico. En este artículo se defenderá que es posible identificar tres grandes paradigmas históricos en el desarrollo urbano del Occidente moderno —la ciudad, la metrópolis y la postmetrópolis— y que su forma de gobernanza coincide con los tres tipos de poder identificados por Foucault: el soberano, el disciplinar y el biopolítico. Además, se analizará cómo cada una de estas tres dobles configuraciones de la reproducción (...) social genera unos puntos neurálgicos, cuya manipulación produce un impacto sobre el sistema mucho mayor que cualquier otra posible acción, tanto si está orientada al dominio institucional del poder constituido como a la resistencia frente al mismo. El presente trabajo aborda la lógica de funcionamiento de estos tres modelos urbanos, identificando sus respectivos centros neurálgicos como punto de partida desde el que es viable constituir el sujeto político antagónico más efectivo posible en cada uno de ellos. (shrink)

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

The chapter discusses Quentin Meillassoux's recent interpretation and critique of Heidegger's philosophical position, which he describes as "strong correlationism." It emphasizes the fact that Meillassoux situates Heidegger in the post-Kantian tradition of transcendental idealism that he defines in terms of a focus on the correlation between being and thinking. It is argued that Meillassoux's "speculative" attempt to overcome the Kantian philosophical framework in the name of absolute contingency should be understood as a further development and dialectical overcoming of its ultimate (...) contemporary form, the Heideggerian philosophy of finitude. (shrink)

This article focuses on Michel Foucault’s concepts of authorship and power. Jacques Derrida has often been accused of being more of a literary author than a philosopher or political theorist. Richard Rorty complains that Derrida’s views on politics are not pragmatic enough; he sees Derrida’s later work, including his political work, more as a “private self-fashioning” than concrete political thinking aimed at devising short-term solutions to problems here and now. Employing Foucault’s work around authorship and the origins of power, I (...) show that Derrida is indeed fashioning himself. This self-fashioning is not merely private or fanciful. Rather, I argue that Derrida can be read as employing what Foucault would call “technologies of the self” to not only show the play of possibility and impossibility at work in all politics and thought, but also to use his savoir to create two important and potentially constructive power structures. First, there is the power of deconstruction itself as a “militant critique” that calls for a forceful and irreducible justice. Second, there is the power of Derrida himself, understood as leaving behind a legacy of himself as the “originator” of deconstruction and as a public intellectual. (shrink)

El problema de la evaluación en política presenta la dificultad del querer comparar, jerarquizar y por lo tanto cuantificar valores que se presentan bajo la modalidad de la cualidad. Para poder salir de esta dificultad, Spinoza propone una política plenamente inmanente en la cual el único criterio de evaluación es el de la duración. Así entendemos por qué Spinoza pudo afirmar, en pleno siglo XVII, el carácter absoluto en todo de la democracia, no en razón de los valores que promueve (...) sino, al contrario, en razón de su capacidad a durar de manera inmanente. (shrink)

My paper examines Derrida's attempts to resist, on the one hand, what he thought of as the increasing international hegemony of American English as the technolanguage of communication, and, on the other hand, forms of linguistic nationalism, when using the resources of the French language to deploy the syntagma: démocratie à venir. It does this by investigating what happens when claims about democracy are made in such a way as to be singularly idiomatic – made from a cosmopolitan point of (...) view that takes into account, rather than vitiates à la Kant, the singular poeticity of idioms. It contrasts Derrida's analysis of the relationship between the national, democracy and idiomaticity with Tocqueville's nationalistic claims; examining, in particular, the issue of how language supposedly binds people together, the role of singularity and generality in thinking about idioms, the divide between originary and techno-scientific idioms, and Derrida's practice of writing in plus d'une langue. It also outlines how, paradoxically, it is a form of idiomaticity and not linguistic instrumentality that disrupts the logic of appropriation, the logic inscribed in the neighbouring, though different, conceptual values of idion, proprius and le propre. (shrink)

O artigo visa discutir formas de pensar o conceito de liberdade para além de sua submissão às figuras da autonomia. O objetivo é avaliar a necessidade e pertinência de pensarmos, em nosso contexto sócio-histórico, a liberdade como heteronomia sem servidão. Conceito este que nasce da crítica à elevação do paradigma do auto-pertencimento a condição de via única para a definição da liberdade.

Este texto sigue el movimiento de la palabra “anarquía” en De otro modo que ser. Este término que Lévinas despolitiza al acudir a su sentido estrictamente etimológico, viene al texto como un exceso que no puede recogerse bajo la unidad de un nombre o de un discurso. Lo que se busca con este texto es explorar la significación de esta anarquía, su relación con el orden discursivo y con el orden político, para preguntar finalmente si la anarquía no acaba de (...) alguna manera siendo neutralizada en una forma de poder soberano que dicta la orden ética desde una cierta bondad originaria y originante. (shrink)

Taking as its starting point the commonly held claim about the obscurity of the concept of sovereignty, the article first identifies a fundamental paradox between the classical Westphalian notion of state sovereignty and human rights. In the rhetoric of international politics, attempts to establish the responsibility of states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms within their jurisdictions are often countered with claims referring to the “sovereign equality” of all states and the subsequent principle of non-intervention. The article suggests that (...) in a more contemporary understanding of sovereignty the responsibility of a state to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms is seen as a constituent ingredient of the state itself. The chapter continues to elaborate how this change has come about. The classical notion of sovereignty is illustrated through a reading of Bodin’s Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576). In Bodin’s world, sovereignty is a constitutive element of the state, and the possibility of a multitude of sovereign entities in a global world logically denying the possibility of any “supra-national” normative framework is still a minor consideration. This possibility is only worked out with the emergence of international law. In both classics such as Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1758) and more contemporary treatises such as Lassa Oppenheim’s International Law (1905), state sovereignty has become conditional to recognition by other sovereign states and a subsequent membership in the “family of nations.” The conditional membership in the “family of nations” involves a contradiction: a sovereign state must act in a “dignified” manner, it must use its sovereignty with “restraint” by respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, i.e., it must employ its sovereignty in a non-sovereign way. This restriction of sovereignty, addressed as “ethical sovereignty,” becomes a constitutive element in a post-Westphalian state and a central ingredient in the contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The article further criticizes the various uses (and abuses) of “ethical sovereignty” in the regulation of “failing” and “rogue” states and concludes by identifying its general political dangers. Finally, with reference to Jacques Derrida’s Rogues (2003), the article suggests a more radical reappraisal of the concept of sovereignty.It is a fact that sovereignty is a term used without any well-recognised meaning except that of supreme authority. Under these circumstances those who do not want to interfere in a mere scholastic controversy must cling to the facts of life and the practical, though abnormal and illogical, condition of affairs.1—Lassa OppenheimBut to invoke the concept of national sovereignty as in itself a decisional factor is to fall back on a word which has an emotive quality lacking meaningful specific content. It is to substitute pride for reason.2—Eli Lauterpacht. (shrink)

This essay examines the capacity of language (‘word’) to convey what there is (‘world’). It draws on philosophical thought, which it seeks to apply to law while making specific reference to comparative legal studies, that is, to the investigation of law that is foreign to its interpreter.

In Jacques Derrida's formalisation of the problem of the gift in Donner le temps (1991), where Derrida offers a joint reading of Marcel Mauss’’ The Gift and Baudelaire's La Fausse monnaie, there is an apparent rejection of rational calculation (and of economism) in a narrow sense. This exclusion is only one of the steps in the deconstruction of the metaphysics of the gift, and of other motifs such as, for example, invention, forgiveness, and hospitality. In another step, calculation and economy (...) are the terms of logico-formal paradoxes, and engages us to think of the incompatible demands of calculability and incalculability between which reason is torn, and which Derrida has discussed, for example, in ‘‘The ““World”” of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation and Sovereignty)’’ (2003). In this paper, I argue that in his evaluation of Mauss’’ moderate view of economy and exchange, Derrida has limited Mauss’’ notions of economy and rationality to reason as calculation. This evaluation jars with Derrida's deconstruction of calculation in his reading of Hegel and Rousseau among others, as I begin to show, Hegel, for whom ‘‘counting was a bad procedure’’. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the theoretical foundations of the professional secret and confidentiality in Social Work and Social Education in order to propose an alternative approach to the issue which does not reduce the professional secret to a utilitarian device designed to increase the success of social services. Our approach rests upon the idea that the professional secret not only protects the individual that has confided a secret, but also society as a whole, since intimacy and (...) privacy are a necessary presupposition of all other human rights. Understood this way, the professional secret should be regarded as a cornerstone of democracy. The article therefore concludes by warning policy-makers and social workers and educators of the paradox inhabited by the professional secret: breaching confidentiality may be simultaneously an inevitable measure to safeguard society and a way to render society as a whole more vulnerable. (shrink)

In this paper we try to analyze that which in Jacques Derrida’s philosophical and political thinking is called “political untranslatable” through a triple movement described in the late texts: a deconstruction movement, which can be found in his entire works and which, in terms of political philosophy, aims to identify in politics an untranslatable remain that cannot be contained in any binary categories of philosophy; an autoimmune movement, which stretches and complicates deconstruction and which expresses the capacity of western political (...) philosophy concepts to obliterate themselves from their inside. The political untranslatable, in terms of autoimmunity, signifies the difficulty, if not impossibility of transferring these concepts from a historical experience to another. Finally, the precariousness movement completes deconstruction and autoimmune vocabulary and refers to the necessity of considering, in any philosophical composition, the fragility of political, economic or social structures of the globalized world in which we live. The political untranslatable is another name for the rest of our individual and collective lives that resist to any recovery in totalizing ideologies. (shrink)

The link between force, violence and events in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida is explored, arguing that this relationship is at the very heart of the problem of meaning and its performativity. This thesis is based on the analysis of Derrida’s reading of both Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, as well as Austin’s linguistic performative theory, which allows, at first, to link the question of signification with that of force or violence. Subsequently, we use the analysis of W. Hamacher about Benjamin (...) in order to strengthen that connection and propose a new reading of the question of the event in Derrida. We obtain a philosophy of the event that moves between ethics, politics and linguistics that allows new approaches to the “critique” of violence. (shrink)

This paper proposes an analysis of the European Constitution from the perspective of its conditions of possibility. The focus is on the conditions that subtend the European constitution, the conditions, the premises that make the European Constitution possible. In the present context of discourse “possibility” is understood in the sense of Kantian critique. But here critique is based on Reasonableness rather than on Reason—in fact a thesis orienting this essay is that the human being to survive and to survive well (...) must quickly change from a rational animal into a reasonable animal. Is the European constitution possible? Where must we search for the necessary conditions that support the European constitution (1) in common historical and cultural traditions, in common practices, in common social behaviours or (2) merely in a shared decision, an accord, a contract, a convention? There exists a third possibility: the idea that Europe has no future without a European constitution founded on awareness that all European Nations participate in a common destiny, which in the era of globalization is the destiny the whole world, indeed of life over the whole planet. Such participation must be based on the logic of otherness and reasonableness of which the human being alone as a semiotic animal is capable. As a semiotic animal, that is, an animal capable of metasemiosis, reflection and critical consciousness, the human being is responsible for all of life over the planet. (shrink)

This paper on post-truth politics argues that to the extent that one wants to understand political discourses generally (post-truth political discourses in particular), it is crucial to see them as circulating talk that performs rather than reports. This implies a shift in focus. Many react strongly to ‘post-truth’ assertions by appealing to evidence, objectivity, facts and truth. In this paper, it is suggested that, when analysing political discourses, there is no point asking, ‘Is it true?’ One should rather ask, ‘What (...) happens as a result?’ Understanding political discourses as performative demands that the resulting doing, transforming and changing may transcend established parameters and known patterns. That also means problematising the types of argument allowed, or discourse considered appropriate, in a given situation. What, then, is the force within the performative discourse driving transformation? What role does intention play? And who—if anybody—can be designated as the master of the discourse? One way of answering these questions is to broaden the perspective of what happens in verbal exchanges. The hearer-speaker relation is fundamental, one in which meaning is shaped and the performative force is formed. A political discourse in general, and a post-truth political discourse in particular, cannot do and perform—cannot function—in a vacuum. This evokes serious questions about accountability and responsibility and also about human action and freedom. (shrink)

This text is an examination of the democratic public sphere in relation to the presently dominating crisis discourse. More precisely, we endeavor to expose assumptions, aims and consequences entailed by the discourse of crisis, hereafter considered as a rhetorical apparatus asserting that crisis reveals an unambiguous and mandatory nature of things imposing self-evident and thus non deliberative decisions concerning both singular existence and communities. The crisis discourse serves to endorse indisputable certainty and therefore to blur or even suppress indeterminacy. Nevertheless, (...) and it is our guiding allegation formulated mainly in reference to Claude Lefort’s political thought, the possibility of democracy and of its public sphere depends constitutively on a unique indeterminacy. Our analysis proves that restoring certainty cannot but go along with a naturalist fallacy and an abuse of rhetoric power postponing deliberative-shaped democratic practices. This line of reasoning comes to define public sphere as a rhetorical counter-power strategy meant to reassert democratic indeterminacy. (shrink)

In the wake of the Iraq war of 2003, and in response to the European reaction to the war, a number of prominent European intellectuals launched a new debate on Europe's identity, and in particular the extent to which it differed from American identity. The debate was sparked by a newspaper article by Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, which was circulated to several other intellectuals for comment. The Europe-wide debate which ensued — in which several Americans joined — provides a (...) revealing snap-shot of European opinion on the question of Europe's identity. It illustrates in particular the dangers as well as the seductions of seeing that identity mainly in terms of a contrast with America, putatively to the advantage of the Europeans. This article argues that such a contrast fuels an anti-Americanism that is disabling to Europe and conceals many significant — and less selfflattering — aspects of the European inheritance. (shrink)