New technologies are changing our lives radically and quickly. New biotechnologies are moving to commercial uses faster than government regulators or private citizens can monitor. This tension manifests itself in the current debates over xenotransplantation technologies in medicine. The possibility of removing cells, tissues, and organs from animals and transplanting them into human beings is startling and unnerving. Natural immunesystem barriers between species, and even between individuals within a species, are formidable. Typically, transplantation results in violent rejection and death of (...) the grafted organ. But despite the natural barriers to transplantation, xenotransplantation aims specifically to overcome them.In this paper, I will discuss applications of xenograft technology, which raises clinical risks, ethical concerns, and policy issues. I conclude with a set of specific recommendations. As a recent letter to the journal Nature puts it, there is a “split between those who want to get it right, and those who want to get it right now.” No one knows what all the risks, benefits, and unintended consequences of xenotransplantation will be. (shrink)

Can SRI be a means to make investors both virtuous and prosperous? This paper argues that there can be significant tensions between these goals, and that SRI (and indeed all investment) should not allow the pursuit of maximizing investment returns to prevail over an ethical agenda of promoting social and economic justice and environmental protection. The discourse on SRI has changed dramatically in recent years to the point where its capacity to promote social emancipation, sustainable development and other ethical goals (...) is in jeopardy. Historically, SRI was a boutique sector of the market dominated by religious-based investors who sought to invest in accordance with the tenets of their faith. From the early 1970s, the aspirations of the SRI movement morphed significantly in the context of the divestment campaign against South Africa's apartheid regime. No longer were social investors satisfied with just avoiding profit from immoral activities; instead, they also sought to change the behavior of others. Business case SRI is a problematic SRI benchmark for several reasons: often there is a countervailing business case for financing irresponsible activities, given the failure of markets to capture all social and environmental externalities; secondly, even if investors care about such concerns, there may be no means of financially quantifying their significance for investment purposes; and, thirdly, even if such factors can be financially quantified, they may be deemed to be such long-term financial costs or benefits that they become discounted and ignored. The ethics case for SRI and ethical business practices more generally takes the view that both investors and the companies they fund have ethical responsibilities that trump the pursuit of profit maximization. Ethical investment should be grounded on this foundation. However, it may not be enough. To keep ethical investment ethical will likely require institutionalizing new norms and governance standards, in such domains as reforming fiduciary duties and the internal governance of financial organizations. SRI's own codes of conduct including the UNPRI have yet to demonstrate the robustness to move the financial community beyond business as usual. (shrink)

This essay examines the Brazilian deforestation debate to explicate the beginnings of a post-modern theory of argumentation. Modernist argumentation reflects two distinct approaches, found in the deforestation controversy. The first approach, ‘universal minimilization,’ presumes that the survival of humanity is sufficient grounds upon which to base argument. The alternative, ‘strategic manipulation,’ results in argument being employed as a technical device to advance one's interest. In place of the modernist approach, we offer an ecocentric theory of argumentation. This conception calls for (...) individuals to set aside differences in values to sustain humanity but at the same time to be sensitive to differences in costs and benefits that accrue from common efforts to persons differently situated. Additionally, this view operates with a tacit working assumption that environmental questions are not discrete entities to be evaluated separately. Rather, people must act collectively on a range of interconnected issues to ensure survival. (shrink)

This paper examines an issue that is becoming increasingly relevant as the pressures of a warming planet, changing climate and changing ecosystems ramp up. The broad context for the paper is the intragenerational, intergenerational, and interspecies equity implications of changing the climate and the value orientations of adapting to such change. In addition, the need to stabilize the planetary climate by urgent mitigation of change factors is a foundational ethical assumption. In order to avoid further animal and plant extinctions, or (...) at the very least, their increased vulnerability to becoming rare and endangered; the systematic assisted colonization of “at risk” species is being seriously considered by scientists and managers of biodiversity. The more practical aspects of assisted colonization have been covered in the conservation biology literature; however, the ethical implications of such actions have not been extensively examined. Our discussion of the value issues, using a novel case study approach, will rectify the limited ethical analysis of the issue of assisted colonization of species in the face of climate change pressures. Beyond sustainability ethics, both animal and environmental ethical approaches will be used and intrinsic versus instrumental value orientations in the literature shall form the basis of our discussion. After the application of all the ethical approaches to the case studies, we conclude that without mitigation and the prospect of a future stable climate, assisted colonization will be involved in an inherently unethical process and a “move and lose it” outcome. With mitigation, there is wide-ranging ethical support for assisted colonization. (shrink)

Free market environmentalists believe that the extension of private property rights and market transactions is sufficient to address environmental difficulties. But there is no invisible hand operating in markets that ensures that environmentally sound practices will be employed just because property rights are in private hands. Also, liability laws and the court systems cannot be relied upon to force polluters to internalize the social costs of pollution. Third, market prices do not provide an objective measure of environmental matters. Finally, there (...) is a right to a livable environment that justifies regulations protecting the public from unreasonable environmental risks. (shrink)

Recent studies in conservation biology have provided the wilderness preservation movement with a spark. Wilderness, we are told, can no longer be seen as a scenic playground for weary humans - it is, rather, an ecological necessity for the conservation of biodiversity. This paper traces the science and political ideologies that inspire and inform this reinvigorated cadre of environmentalists. Through empirical investigations of one prominent conservation group and one conservation campaign, the author finds that this environmentalism offers simplistic and purportedly (...) self-evident solutions to the complex problems of biodiversity and wilderness conservation. (shrink)

I am persuaded both by the theory of evil advanced by Claudia Card in The Atrocity Paradigm and by the idea that there are evils done to the environment; however, I argue that the theory of evil she describes has difficulty living up to her claim that it "can make sense of ecological evils the victims of which include trees and even ecosystems" (2002, 16). In this paper, I argue that Card's account of evil does not accommodate the kinds of (...) harms inflicted on ecosystems and such nonhuman individuals as trees. I consider the possibility that Card intends a much broader version of evils than the language of the atrocity paradigm lets on, with its attention to sentience and dignity. I'm so persuaded by the atrocity paradigm, however, that I retain the centrality of suffering and introduce the idea that atrocities are intuitively massive, that is, done to groups or generations and not an individual person, animal or tree, so that the paradigm encourages us to think of evil as it relates to far more holistic entities which include the sentient. Evil may require the sort of suffering that only sentience can give rise to, which is not to say we let out trees but says rather that it is impossible to identify wrongs to ecosystems and groups that are not also intertwined with the fates of their sentient dependents. I conclude that Card is right to emphasize victims' suffering as a chief component of evil, and that the ontology of what constitutes a victim must be interpreted broadly, not the notion of suffering. (shrink)

هگل از جمله فیلسوفانی است که اخلاق کانت را به صورت‌گرایی متهم کرده و در آثار مختلفش، به ویژه در فلسفۀ حق و پدیدارشناسی روح، تلاش کرده نقد خود را صورت‌بندی کند و از ابعاد مختلف آن را توضیح دهد. مقصود هگل از صورت‌گرایی به عنوان نقدی بر اخلاق کانت آن است که از صورت قانون اخلاقی کانت نمی‌توان ماده‌ای اخلاقی استنتاج کرد. او در نقد خود از مفاهیمی همچون استعلایی بودن مفهوم آزادی، سلب و ایجاب‌های کاذب و یهودیت‌وارگی اخلاق (...) کانتی استفاده کرده و نشان می‌دهد که این نقصان‌ها به ناکارآمدی و تهی‌بودگی اخلاق کانت می‌انجامد. شاید بتوان بر پایۀ تفسیر برخی مفسران کانت همچون کاسیرر، جان هر و جیوانی، از طریق تأکید بر مضامینی که کانت در کتاب دین در چهارچوب عقل صرف به آنها پرداخته، پاسخی برای نقد هگل مهیا ساخت. این پاسخ مدعی است که انسان‌شناسی دینی و دیگر مؤلفه‌های دینی اندیشۀ کانت، با شاکله‌سازی برای اخلاق، موجب می‌شوند تا اخلاق کانت از صورتِ عقلیِ محض خارج شود و بتواند فاعل و فعل اخلاقی را در مسیری انضمامی‌تر شناسایی و صورت‌بندی کند. به نظر می‌رسد که این پاسخ ضمن حل مشکلاتی همچون عقلانیت‌باوری صرف در خصوص اخلاق و انتزاعی کردن بیش از حد سوژۀ اخلاق، همچنان از پاسخ به معضلاتی همچون سلب و ایجاب‌های کاذب و تأکید بر مفهوم ارادۀ نیک ناتوان است. (shrink)

. Book Reviews. Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 57-76.

Agriculture has been recently viewed as the primary destructive force of biodiversity, but the places that produce our food and fiber may also hold the key to saving the richness of life on earth. This argument is based on three fundamental positions. First, it is argued that to value and thereby preserve and restore biodiversity we must begin by employing anthropocentric ethics. While changing our understanding of intrinsic values (i.e., the unconditional values of biodiversity as a state and process in-and-of-itself, (...) without reference to human interests) is often advocated as the means by which our behavior will reflect the importance of biodiversity, a change in how we perceive and conditionally value biodiversity is proposed as a more effective and compelling approach. Second, I suggest that anthropocentric values can be linked to a sense of “Place,” with agriculture playing a vital role in this context. Agriculture forms a powerful basis for personal, experiential development of a profound meaning and connection to a setting or landscape. The agricultural setting has tremendous potential for arational (emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual) values that ultimately compel our actions. The constancy of relationship and mutuality of dependency between humans and agricultural lands, particularly extensive agroecosystems, fosters an intensity of association that transcends our recent affinity to wildlands. Third, a mature understanding of places and their biodiversity must include those organisms that account for many of the ecological processes and the majority of the species richness -- the insects. The importance of these insects in structuring the landscape and the effects of habitat destruction on these organisms both suggest a vital, intimate, and reciprocal link between insects and Places. Finally, it is argued that the most important avenue for future efforts to protect and restore biodiversity on the part of agricultural and other scientists is educational -- the presentation of our research to the public in terms that provoke emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual meaning which lies at the core of human values and actions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper is an interpretive exploration of the figure of the monstrous child as it appears in the experiences of student‐teachers entering the community of teaching. It also considers how interpretive work is itself haunted by this figure and how, therefore, teaching itself might be considered an interpretive activity.

: In "Thinking Like a Mackerel," Susan Power Bratton attempts to develop a sea ethic based on the writings of Rachel Carson. This article critically evaluates Bratton's position using an analysis of a contemporary problem on the high seas as a basis: the theft of the Patagonian tooth fish in the Southern Ocean. Various possibilities for providing philosophical and legal bases for the protection of the sea realm are explored.

We conducted a study of how the metaphysical views of farmers might relate to their choices about how to farm. Our particular focus was on the farming of animals for meat and the environmental impacts of the choices about how to raise the animals. We interviewed farmers at six different operations. We analyzed the farms from the perspectives of ecofeminism, deep ecology, the land ethic, and American Pragmatism. Of the farms that participated in our study, one was a fish farm, (...) three raised cattle, and two raised multiple species of animals. Our questions consisted of the following: “How do you view the human relationship with the rest of nature ?“ and “How do these views affect your choices about how to farm?“. (shrink)

This article examines the possible contributions the existentialist tradition might make to environmentalism. I note, first, that Martin Heidegger is a questionable ally, both because his relationship to technology is ambiguous, while his affiliations with the Nazis were not. But the larger existentialist tradition is valuable for the environmental movement because it opens up a field of possibilities for human creativity. Sartre serves as exemplary for the way he struggled with the dialectic between individual autonomy in his early philosophy of (...) freedom, and the needs of the collective as he confronted them in his later turn toward Marxism. But the demands of the collective are more reasonably confronted in the larger legacy of Hegel than in the more limited form they took in Sartre's Marxism. The article concludes that Sartre's struggles can be enlightening to those of us who now seek the joyful wisdom of existential freedom for the individual even as we confront the demands that environmental degradation will place on the collective. (shrink)

In times of current crisis, the voices of women are needed more than ever. The accumulation of war and environmental catastrophes teaches us that exploitation of people and nature through violent appropriation and enrichment for the sake of short-term self-interest exacts its price. This book presents contributions on the currently most relevant and most urgent issues: reshaping the economy, environmental problems, technology and the re-reading of history from the non-western and western tradition. With an outlook into the problems of class, (...) race and gender in its intersectional framing, the collection offers a unique overview of current research in these fields and contributes to the renewal and contemporary presentation of feminist thought from partly concrete perspectives with regard to factual issues. (shrink)

O trabalho discute os pressupostos metaéticos e normativos para a construçáo de uma nova ética ambiental. Em especial, ele procura mostrar que a metaética realista que está presente nos escritos da assim chamada “ecologia profunda” é problemática. Como alternativa, o trabalho apresenta uma análise conceitual diferente de valor intrínseco e examina as suas implicações normativas e práticas para uma ética ambiental.

دوگانه‌انگاری انسان/طبیعت دیدگاهی است که با تبیین خاصی از ارتباط میان انسان و طبیعت نقشی تعیین‌کننده و سرنوشت‌ساز در اخلاق زیست‌محیطی یافته است. در این دیدگاه، انسان به عنوان وجه برتر این تقسیم‌بندی حق هر گونه استفاده و رفتار با طبیعت را دارد. در نظر جنبش بوم‌شناسی ژرف‌نگر، به دلیل درهم‌تنیدگیِ انسان و طبیعت نمی‌توان این دو را مجزا از یکدیگر دانست. این نگرش به دلیل نقد تفکر دوگانۀ انسان/طبیعت دارای نکات مفید و سودمندی در باب اخلاق زیست‌محیطی است، که (...) از آن جمله است: خیزش علیه روحیۀ سلطه‌گر و انسان‌محورِ فرهنگی و تمدنی در مغرب‌زمین؛ خودشکوفاییِ اصیلِ انسانی از طریق فرارفتن از خود؛ توجه به احیای حقوق ازدست‌رفتۀ موجودات غیرانسانی. این جنبش، به رغم داشتنِ این نقاط قوت، ضعف‌هایی نیز دارد و ما معتقدیم با نگاهی دینی-الهیاتی و از طریق اصلاح و بازاندیشی آرای این جنبش می‌توان به رهیافتی درست در مورد ارتباط انسان/طبیعت دست یافت. این موارد از این قرارند: نداشتن یک فلسفۀ منسجم که نتیجۀ آن مبهم‌اندیشی و کلی‌گویی در خصوص مسائل محیط‌زیستی است؛ نبود برنامه‌ای جامع به منظور ایجاد بستری برای یک سلسله‌مراتب معین حیاتی؛ غفلت از مقام والای انسانی؛ عدم کارآمدی در کشورهای توسعه‌نیافته. هدف از این نوشتار نقد نظریۀ دوگانگی انسان/طبیعت در اخلاق زیست‌محیطی طبقِ هنجارهای بوم‌شناسی ژرف‌نگر و نیز اصلاح و تکمیل نقاط ضعف این جنبش با تکیه بر آموزه‌های الهیاتی در مسئلۀ حاضر است. (shrink)

The search for a worldwide environmental ethic is linked to the increase in environmental concern since (particularly) the 1960s, and the recognition that environmental problems can have a global i...To date, insufficient work has been carried out on how children view living organisms in the environment. In this study a large number of conversations were audio-taped and transcribed while primar...

The discovery of a second genesis of life besides the one on Earth, this time on Mars, would have profound scientific and philosophical implications. Scientifically, it would provide a second example of biochemistry and of evolutionary history. Many important biological questions may be answerable through the comparison of biochemistry between the life forms on the two planets. Philosophically, the discovery of a second genesis of life in our solar system would suggest that the phenomenon of life is distributed throughout the (...) universe. We could finally be confident that we are not alone. To protect a second genesis as we search for it, the robotic and human exploration of Mars should be done in a way that is biologically reversible, i.e., we must be able to undo our contamination of Mars if we discover a second genesis of life there. It is important to note that human exploration can be done in a way that is biologically reversible. Further, the discovery of a second genesis of life on Mars poses new questions in ethics. One question is: what ethical consideration is due to an alien life form when that life is distinctly different from Earth life, and the members of that life are no more advanced than microorganisms? Will we choose to terraform Mars to enhance the richness and diversity of the indigenous life we find there? In considering our answers to these questions, we should note that for most of Earth’s history our ancestors were microscopic. (shrink)

Postmodernism was not launched by the development of Warholesque pop art in the 1960s, nor was it initiated by the explosive destruction of the Pruitt-Igoe modern housing project of St Louis, Missouri in 1972, or by the commissioning of Jean-Francois Lyotard's work on knowledge in advanced societies by the Quebec government in the late 1970s. Postmodernism began with the publication of a paper entitled `The individualistic concept of plant the association' in 1926 by the plant ecologist Henry Gleason. If we (...) dare to characterize postmodernism, emphases on ideas such as heterogeneity, ephemerality, anti-foundationalism, pluralism, fragmentation, indeterminacy, schizophrenia, chaos, antiformalism, discontinuity, absence, playfulness, irony, localism, anarchy and ontological meaninglessness are the ones that tend to abound. The Gleasonian theory of plant associations can be said to reflect such ideas in the ecological arena. Certainly there is room for, and an expanding professional commitment to, a fully-fledged neo-Gleasonian postmodern approach to natural history in which ecological phenomena are examined using non-determinist, pluralist and local perspectives that reject the foundationalism and unifying approach of modernist science and which posits a view of the Earth's biota highlighting fragmentation, anarchism and non-interaction. Community ecology, as opposed to the unifying and totalizing tendencies of ecosystems ecology, might rightly claim to be the intellectual site of such a postmodern natural history. Often, postmodern studies not only attempt to describe a postmodern phenomenon but act to forge new varieties of postmodernism. It is in this vein that this paper seeks to present a non-anthropocentric form of postmodernism; not by dissolving the dualistic barrier that separates humanity from nature (as many environmentalisms would advocate) but by dissolving humanity and nature. (shrink)

A system of environmental ethics recently developed by Lawrence Johnson may be used to analyze the moral implications of biological control. According to this system, entities are morally relevant when they possess well-being interests (i.e., functions or processes that can be better or worse in so far as the entity is concerned). In this formulation of ethical analysis, species and ecosystems are morally relevant because they are not simply aggregates of individuals, so their processes, properties, and well-being interests are not (...) reducible to the sum of their individual members. Following Johnson's thesis, species and ecosystems have morally relevant interests in surviving and maintaining themselves as integrated wholes with particular self-identities. This theoretical structure gives rise to a number of ethical criteria that are particularly relevant to biological control, which apply to the ecosystem (the extent to which it is large, native, unique, and integrated) and to the action being considered (the extent to which it is novel, omnipresent, monitored, reversible, and necessary). In these terms, it is evident that not all biological control efforts are ethically defensible. In general terms, natural biological control is most desirable, followed by augmentative strategies, classical approaches, and finally neoclassical biological control. Two specific cases (neoclassical biological control of rangeland grasshoppers and classical biological control of prickly pear cactus) illustrate the ethical concerns. Finally, it can be shown that formalized restrictions of biological control are necessary, given the unique properties of this technology. (shrink)

Vesilind, P.A. There Is No Such Thing As Environmental Ethics,Science and Engineering Ethics 2:307–318.Peter List is a professor of philosophy at Oregon State University where he teaches classical Western Philosophy, environmental ethics and contemporary social ethics and is a member of the program for Ethics, Science and the Environment.

An investigation of language use in news stories about collisions involving vehicles and nonhuman animals in the wild reveals that reports of bird-airplane collisions tend to focus on the safety of the humans involved, even to the point of constructing the bird as a projectile, rather than a victim. Reports of land vehicles and boats colliding with larger nonhuman animals tend to demonstrate a greater concern for nonhuman participants, attributing greater responsibility to humans for the collisions, although they are more (...) dangerous to humans. Although similar patterns are found in news reports in several languages and in several English-speaking countries, anthropocentrism alone does not fully explain the patterns in journalists’ choice of expressions and structures in these news stories. (shrink)

This is an essay about ethics and environmental responsibility. The thesis is that biologic species qua species--not only as collections of individuals or as elements of ecosystems--deserve moral regard. The argument establishes moral considerability on powers and freedoms of relative self-determination and autonomy. It is argued that species are living beings in their own right with their own projects and interests which deserve special regard. The essay draws from the arguments of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Boethius, Avicenna, Maimonides, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, (...) and others, concerning the moral value of natural beings, but situates itself in the contemporary dialogue of environmental ethics. Lengthy consideration is given to species concepts defended by evolution theorists, biological systematists, and ecologists. ;The argument claims that natural beings, including species, have moral value because they have projects and interests which make a legitimate, but not universal, claim on the moral agent. Beings make moral claims when they are integral and integrating, individual, and concreative--conditions comparable to those with which we describe the moral status of a person. We may call such beings rational by analogy to the integration and singularity of intellect, and confer upon them analogous moral consideration. They are due regard in proportion to their projects in the same sense that moral subjects are due regard for having the projects of moral subjects. (shrink)