We argue in this essay that (1) the embryo is an irredeemably ambiguous entity and its ambiguity casts serious doubt on the arguments claiming its full protection or, at least, its protection against its use as a means fo research, (2) those who claim the embryo should be protected as "one of us" are committed to a position even they do not uphold in their practices, (3) views that defend the protection of the embryo in virtue of its potentiality to (...) become a person fail, and (4) the embryo does not have any rights or interests to be protected. Given that many are willing to treat the embryo as a means in other practices, and that human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research holds the potential to benefit many people, one cannot but conclude that hESC research is permissible and, because of its immense promise for alleviating human even obligatory. (shrink)

In his discussion of in vitrogametogenesis, Rob Sparrow claims that an ethical barrier to development of this technology is that many jurisdictions currently prohibit the practice of creating embryos solely for the purpose of research. However, he suggests that this ethical barrier will soon be eroded, in view of the fact that in vitro gametogenesis could serve as a powerful new technology to overcome infertility. In this commentary, I argue that Sparrow is being overly optimistic in his analysis here. I (...) claim that the debate over so-called compromise positions in the human embryonic stem cell debate suggests that the purpose of the research for which a research embryo is created is unlikely to be considered as having any significant bearing on the moral permissibility of the practice for those who oppose it. Even though in vitro gametogenesis could serve as a powerful new technology to overcome infertility, I argue that opponents of the practice of creating embryos solely for research purposes would still view the creation of research embryos that the development of in vitro gametogenesis would require, as being incompatible with affording the embryo proper moral respect. I conclude by suggesting that Sparrow's analysis of the potential benefits of in vitro gametogenesis provides us with further reasons to scrutinise the unconvincing arguments that are often cited in favour of prohibiting the practice of creating embryos solely for research purposes. (shrink)

In the US, stem cell research is at a moral impasse—many see this research as ethically mandated due to its potential for ameliorating major diseases, while others see this research as ethically impermissible because it typically involves the destruction of embryos and use of ova from women. Because their creation does not require embryos or ova, induced pluripotent stem cells offer the most promising path for addressing the main ethical objections to stem cell research; however, this technology is still in (...) development. In order for scientists to advance induced pluripotent stem cell research to a point of translational readiness, they must continue to use ova and embryos in the interim. How then are we to ethically move forward with stem cell research? We argue that there is personal integrity and value in adopting a ‘moral compromise’ as a means for moving past the moral impasse in stem cell research. In a moral compromise, each party concedes part of their desired outcome in order to engage in a process that respects the values and desires of all parties equitably. Whereas some contend that moral compromise in stem cell research necessarily involves self-contradiction or loss of personal integrity, we argue that in the US context, stem cell research satisfies many of the key pre-conditions of an effective moral compromise. To illustrate our point, we offer a model solution wherein eggs and embryos are temporarily used until non-egg and non-embryonic sources of pluripotent stem cells are developed to a state of translational readiness. (shrink)

Savulescu and colleagues propose a distinction between ‘future person embryo research’ and ‘non-future person embryo research’, which they hold can help decision-makers more efficiently discriminate between higher risk and lower risk embryo research.1 The authors’ proposed distinction does point to an ethically significant difference between different forms of embryo research, which they illustrate in an enlightening manner using a series of detailed case studies. In the following, I wish to comment, first, on the substance of the authors’ distinction, and second, (...) on the possibility of looking beyond the relatively narrow scope of their argument. A first point concerns the authors’ characterisation of FPE research as including ‘anything which is done to an embryo that will be or could be implanted into a woman’s uterus’. Insofar as they also emphasise the idea of research that can ‘affect’ a future person, this formulation might suggest that the key distinction here is between research procedures that causally impact the characteristics of a future person, and those that do not. However, this is not how the authors’ distinction between FPE and NFPE research should be understood. Indeed, they describe ‘observational research’, including the first test case they present, as an exception …. (shrink)

ABSTRACTGiven its intimate relationship with the human body and its environment, biotechnology innovation, and more particularly stem cell research innovations as a part thereof, implicate diverse social and moral/ethical issues. This paper explores some of the most important and controversial moral concerns raised by human embryonic stem cell research , focusing on concerns relating to the wellbeing of the embryo and the wellbeing of society . It then considers how and whether these concerns are dealt with in regulatory instruments in (...) Argentina, a southern developing country, examining in particular whether the values underlying these concerns have been translated into practical and effective rules reflective of the primary moral positions advanced. It concludes that Argentina's current state of stem cell research governance fails to consistently reflect the moral positions that have formed and is inadequate given Argentina's activity in this field. (shrink)

The spectacular progress in assisted reproduction technology that has been witnessed for the past thirty years resulted in emerging new ethical dilemmas as well as the revision of some perennial ones. The paper aims at a feminist approach to oocyte and spare embryo donation for research. First, referring to different concepts of autonomy and informed consent, we discuss whether the decision to donate oocyte/embryo can truly be an autonomous choice of a female patient. Secondly, we argue the commonly adopted language (...) of gift is misleading and that calling for altruism could put female patients at risk of exploitation. Finally, we point out that the presence of gender stereotypes in the procreative area casts doubt whether even a more robust notion of informed consent manages to overcome this risk. (shrink)

The sources of embryos for Embryonic Stem Cell Research include surplus embryos from infertility treatments, and research embryos which are created solely for an ESCR purpose. The latter raises more ethical concerns. In a multi-religious country like Malaysia, ethical discussions on the permissibility of ESCR with regard to the use surplus and research embryos are diversified. Malaysia has formulated guidelines influenced by the national fatwa ruling which allows the use of surplus embryos in ESCR. Input from other main religions is (...) yet to be documented. In light of this, this study addresses the ethical viewpoints of Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic leaders on the permissibility of using surplus and research embryos; and the moral standpoints of religious leaders towards attaining a consensus on the practice of ESCR in Malaysia. Responses from the religious leaders were obtained via semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. The findings show that generally the Buddhist and Hindu leaders approve the use of surplus embryos. Their responses on the creation of research embryos for ESCR are varied. Meanwhile, the Catholic leaders distinctively objected to ESCR regardless of the embryo sources, referring to it as the destruction of life. Taking into account the diverse views, this study explores the response of the religious leaders for a general consensus wherever possible. The ethical discourse surrounding ESCR in a multi-religious setting offers new perspective, which needs to be explored in a broader global community. (shrink)