Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Pain (Oxford Bibliographies Online).David Bain - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they seek a general account, and increasingly as a rich and fruitful topic in its own right. Pain raises specific questions: about mentality and consciousness certainly, but also about embodiment, affect, motivation, and value, to name but a few. The growth of philosophical interest in pain has gone hand-in-hand with the growth of pain science, which burgeoned in the 1960s. This is no accident: developments in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Evaluativist Accounts of Pain's Unpleasantness.David Bain - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 40-50.
    Evaluativism is best thought of as a way of enriching a perceptual view of pain to account for pain’s unpleasantness or painfulness. Once it was common for philosophers to contrast pains with perceptual experiences (McGinn 1982; Rorty 1980). It was thought that perceptual experiences were intentional (or content-bearing, or about something), whereas pains were representationally blank. But today many of us reject this contrast. For us, your having a pain in your toe is a matter not of your sensing “pain-ly” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Recent Work on Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):737-753.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Body Ownership: When Feeling and Knowing Diverge.Daniele Romano, Anna Sedda, Peter Brugger & Gabriella Bottini - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 34:140-148.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Pain, Care, and the Body: A Response to de Vignemont.Colin Klein - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):588-593.
    Frédérique de Vignemont argues on the basis of several empirical counterexamples that Bain and Klein are wrong about the relationship between pain and bodily care. I argue that the force of the putative counterexamples is weak. Properly understood, the association between pain and care is preserved in a way that is consistent with both de Vignemont's own views and the empirical facts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations