Evolutionary, ecological and ethical studies are, at the same time, specific scientific disciplines and, from an historical point of view, structurally linked domains of research. In a context of environmental crisis, the need is increasingly emerging for a connecting epistemological framework able to express a common or convergent tendency of thought and practice aimed at building, among other things, an environmental policy management respectful of the planet’s biodiversity and its evolutionary potential.

Progress in neuroscience – notably, on the dynamic functions of neural networks – has deepened our understanding of decision‐making, acquisition of character and temperament, and the development of moral dispositions. The evolution of our cerebral architecture is both genetic and epigenetic: the nervous system develops in continuous interaction with the immediate physical and socio‐cultural environments. Each individual has a unique cerebral identity even in the relative absence of genetic distinction, and the development of this identity is strongly influenced by social (...) and cultural environments leaving major traces in the connectivity of the brain. This interaction introduces important elements of variability and plasticity. Synaptic epigenetic theories of cultural and social imprinting on our brain architecture suggest the possibility that we can be “epigenetically proactive” and adapt our social structures, in both the short and the long term, to benefit and constructively interact with the ever‐developing neuronal architecture of our brains. Epigenetic proaction can be described as a way to socially steer evolution by influencing the cultural imprints to be stored in our brains. The purpose of this article is to present, in a historical and ideological light, the idea that we may culturally shape the developing brain, and discuss some key risks and benefits of this endeavour. The article is a contribution to neuroethics. (shrink)

This paper aims to reframe disability through John Dewey’s transactional theory of culture to indicate how disability is not located in the biological organization of the individual nor in the organization of culture, but in the transactions between the two. This paper will apply Dewey’s theory of culture to disability studies and philosophy of disability and then to ADHD to make clear the benefits of a transactional model of disability.

The error theory of moral judgment says that moral judgments, though often believed to be objectively true, never are. The tendency to believe in the objectivity of our moral beliefs, like the beliefs themselves, is rooted in objective features of human psychology, and not in objective features of the natural world that might exist apart from human psychology. In naturalized epistemology, it is tempting to take this view as the default hypothesis. It appears to make the fewest assumptions in accounting (...) for the fact that humans not only make moral judgments, but believe them to be, at least some of the time, objectively true. In this paper I argue that from an evolutionary perspective, the error theory is not the most parsimonious alternative. It is simpler to suppose that mental representations with moral content arose as direct cognitive and motivational responses to independent moral facts. (shrink)

This article advocates a naturalist and realist ethics of solidarity. Specifically, it argues that human needs should be met; and that they should be met in harmony with the environment. Realism should include respect for existing cultures and the morals presently being practiced – with reasonable exceptions. Dignity must come in a form understood and appreciated by the person whose dignity is being respected. It is also argued that naturalist ethics are needed to combat liberal ethics, not least because the (...) latter supports today’s inflexible and dysfunctional institutions. In arguing for these positions, reference is made to the naturalist realist ethics of Georges Canguilhem, C.H. Waddington, John Dewey and David Sloan Wilson, all of whom embed the social order in the natural order. (shrink)

John Dewey escreve um de seus primeiros trabalhos sobre ética em resposta às idéias de Thomas Huxley. Huxley, em seu artigo “Evolution and Ethics” , defendia uma oposição entre os processos naturais e os processos éticos. A ética, segundo ele, é contrária aos princípios que se observa na natureza. Para Dewey, por outro lado, não há dualismo entre as regularidades naturais e as regularidades sociais. Dewey pretende, em seu artigo homônimo ao de Huxley , reconstruir o sentido de noções fundamentais (...) ao pensamento evolutivo como “adaptado”, “luta pela vida” e “seleção natural”. Dando início a uma versão evolucionista da reflexão ética, Dewey supõe a continuidade entre o mundo natural e o mundo dos valores. Suas conclusões indicam não só uma abordagem evolutiva das questões éticas, mas a proposição de valores e condutas que estejam em conformidade com o crescimento e a mudança constante nos ambientes e nas funções adaptativas, tais como se observa no mundo natural.John Dewey wrote one of his first works on Ethics in response to Thomas Huxley ideas. Huxley, in his article “Evolution ad Ethics” , argues for an opposition between the natural and the ethic processes. Ethics, according to him, is contrary to the principles observed in nature. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no dualism between natural and social regularities. Dewey intents, in an homonymous article , rebuild the meaning of fundamental notions in the evolutionary thought such as “fitted”, “struggle for life” and “natural selection”. Giving start to an evolutionary version of the ethical reflection, Dewey supposes continuity between the natural world and the world of values. His conclusions not just indicate an evolutionary approach to ethical questions, but also the proposal of values and conducts in conformity with growth and constant change of environments and adaptive functions, as observed in the natural world. (shrink)

This review essay provides an analysis of the context and content of Trevor Pearce’s Pragmatism’s Evolution. The work highlights the bond between organisms and their environments.

This review essay provides an analysis of the context and content of Trevor Pearce’s Pragmatism’s Evolution. The work highlights the bond between organisms and their environments.

Scholars have often considered evolutionary social theories a product of Positivist scientism and the naturalization of ethics. Yet the theistic foundations of many evolutionary theories proposed between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries bolstered the belief that following natural laws was morally desirable, if not vital, to guaranteeing social and moral progress. In the early twentieth century, American paleontologist and leading evolutionist Henry Fairfield Osborn represented one of the most authoritative advocates of this interpretation of natural normativity. Particularly during the (...) last years of his career, Osborn used theological arguments to reinforce his advocacy of evolutionary ethics and social control policies, which led him to challenge his “old master” Thomas Huxley regarding the separation between evolution and moral conduct. This article examines the development of Osborn’s evolutionary ethics, with particular regard to its bearing on the American debate on euthenics. I argue that theistic topics played a major rhetorical role in the attempt to justify normative conclusions drawn from ostensible laws of evolution. (shrink)

En el contexto del debate contemporáneo sobre el ideal de ciencia libre de valores, el propósito general del artículo es recuperar la pregunta por la dimensión valorativa tradicionalmente denominada extra-epistémica de la investigación científica desde el marco teórico del filósofo pragmatista John Dewey. Mediante la reconstrucción de distintos sentidos de continuidad entre investigación científica, valoración y valores, se pretende sostener que el enfoque deweyano da cuenta de la efectiva incidencia de valores sociales, morales y políticos en la investigación, y que (...) bajo ciertas condiciones esa incidencia es legítima pues la consideración del amplio círculo de consecuencias no-científicas de la investigación es parte de su prueba completa, razón por la cual se afirma que dicho tipo de valores son constitutivos de la investigación científica. Finalmente, se sugiere que la perspectiva de Dewey ofrece bases sólidas para una filosofía política de la ciencia. ARK: ark:/s18537960/kiuut6ebr. (shrink)