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  1. Ordinary language semantics: the contribution of Brentano and Marty.Hamid Taieb - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (4):777-796.
    This paper examines the account of ordinary language semantics developed by Franz Brentano and his pupil Anton Marty. Long before the interest in ordinary language in the analytic tradition, Brentanian philosophers were exploring our everyday use of words, as opposed to the scientific use of language. Brentano and Marty were especially interested in the semantics of (common) names in ordinary language. They claimed that these names are vague, and that this is due to the structure of the concepts that constitute (...)
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  • Experiencing the a priori.Denis Seron - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • The Reception of Positivism in Whewell, Mill and Brentano.Arnaud Dewalque - forthcoming - In Ion Tanasescu, Alexandru Bejinariu, Susan Krantz Gabriel & Constantin Stoenescu (eds.), Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill. Berlin, Allemagne: De Gruyter.
    This article compares and contrasts the reception of Comte’s positivism in the works of William Whewell, John Stuart Mill and Franz Brentano. It is argued that Whewell’s rejection of positivism derives from his endorsement of a constructivist account of the inductive sciences, while Mill and Brentano’s sympathies for positivism are connected to their endorsement of an empiricist account. The mandate of the article is to spell out the chief differences between these two rival accounts. In the last, conclusive section, Whewell’s (...)
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  • The Phenomenology of Mentality.Arnaud Dewalque - 2020 - In Denis Fisette, Guillaume Frechette & Hynek Janoušek (eds.), Franz Brentano’s Philosophy after Hundred Years – From History of Philosophy to Reism. New York: Springer. pp. 23-40.
    This chapter offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception. Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section (...)
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