The Reception of Positivism in Whewell, Mill and Brentano

In Ion Tanasescu (ed.), Brentano – Comte – Mill: The Idea of Philosophy and Psychology as Science (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article compares and contrasts the reception of Comte’s positivism in the works of William Whewell, John Stuart Mill and Franz Brentano. It is argued that Whewell’s rejection of positivism derives from his endorsement of a constructivist account of the inductive sciences, while Mill and Brentano’s sympathies for positivism are connected to their endorsement of an empiricist account. The mandate of the article is to spell out the chief differences between these two rival accounts. In the last, conclusive section, Whewell’s anti-positivist argument is briefly assessed, and rebutted.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DEWTRO-19
Revision history
Archival date: 2020-03-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2020-03-06

Total views
40 ( #44,365 of 50,091 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #15,563 of 50,091 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.