In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts is (...) related to the referents of the concept of consciousness4. I then address the latter concept more directly by pursuing for the remainder of the article where the OED's fourm entry leads. Among other things, I am led to consider two competing accounts of consciousness4 that figure prominently in the OED entry, namely the intrinsic, self-intimational account of William Hamilton and the inner-eye, perceptionlike account of John Locke. Both kinds of account are very much with us today. (shrink)

This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists and philosophers can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, suggests that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of (...) mind, clinical psychology, and other related fields ultimately refer to a unified natural process, analysed under four general aspects. The proposed taxonomy will, it is hoped, possess sufficient clarity to serve as a sound theoretical framework for further scientific studies, and to count as a significant step in the direction of a properly formulated unified concept of consciousness. (shrink)

Neuroscientific perspectives on conscience and conscience-related research: Recent years have witnessed a growth in empirical research into the biological correlates of conscience and moral decision-making. The central questions posed and addressed in such neuroscientific investigations concern the role of the emotions in decisions of conscience, and the determining of the particular brain regions that correlate with these decisions. Responding to these, I shall first outline the basic terminology involved and present the neuroethical analyses of Churchland, together with the findings of (...) the empirical studies carried out by Greene, Damasio and others. I then offer a critical assessment of Greene’s thesis claiming that deontology should be denied the status of a moral theory, before addressing the issue of whether it is at all possible to arrive at conclusions about the correctness of any sort of moral theory – be it deontological or consequentialist – on the basis of empirical research. (shrink)