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A logical approach to the analysis of metaphors

In L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & C. Pizzi (eds.), Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 21--37 (2002)

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  1. Nástin koncepce adaptivních logik [An Outline of the Concept of Adaptive Logics].Tomáš Ondráček & Jan Štěpánek - 2016 - Pro-Fil 17 (1):16-35.
    The aim of the paper is to introduce the concept of adaptive logics (AL) or rather adaptive logical approach. In the introduction, a motivation and an emergence of AL are briefly discussed. In the second part of the paper, specifics of AL are analysed – especially nonmonotonic character, internal and external dynamics, as well as the structure of AL, namely the distinction between upper limit logic and lower limit logic. In this part, the dynamic proof is also described. Applications of (...)
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  • Bart Van Kerkhove.Guido Vanackere - 2001 - Studia Logica 68:1-30.
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  • The use of metaphors in scientific development: A logical approach.Isabel D'Hanis - 2001 - Logique Et Analyse 44:215.
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  • Empirical progress and ampliative adaptive logics.Joke Meheus - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):193-217.
    In this paper, I present two ampliative adaptive logics: LA and LAk. LA is an adaptive logic for abduction that enables one to generate explanatory hypotheses from a set of observational statements and a set of background assumptions. LAk is based on LA and has the peculiar property that it selects those explanatory hypotheses that are empirically most successful. The aim of LAk is to capture the notion of empirical progress as studied by Theo Kuipers.
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  • Inconsistencies and the dynamics of science.Joke Meheus - 2003 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 11:129-148.
    It is generally agreed upon today that scientific reasoning, like everyday reasoning, proceeds in a dynamic way: inferences derived at some stage in the reasoning process may at a later stage be rejected. This dynamics may be extrinsic or intrinsic. I shall call it extrinsic when previously derived conclusions are rejected on non-logical grounds, and intrinsic when their rejection is based on a purely logical analysis.
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