This article analyzes the concept of self-constitution in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem. On the one hand, I try to see how self-constitution functions within the framework of reality. I identify the different levels of self-constituted reality, showing that each of these levels is also constituted by the absolute One, which is the cause of all things. Self-constitution is present throughout the process in which the One is slowly in labor towards plurality, starting from the highest level of (...) intelligible being down to the level of the particular soul. On the other hand, I also try to show how self-constitution appears at a discursive level. In this context I discuss its crucial role in Damascius’ interpretation of the second and third hypotheses in Plato’s dialogue Parmenides. (shrink)

This article discusses the problem of the ineffable in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem. I argue that the ineffable—which is the ultimate principle proposed by Damascius—is also the theme that underlies the whole frame of the reality, in his perspective. Each level of reality that he discusses comes into play on the background of the original attempt to suggest the ineffable principle. Each of them—One, unified, soul, material forms, matter and sensible realm—tries to approximate and suggest the previous (...) level and thus, eventually, the ineffable itself. Consequently, each level of reality develops its own degree of ineffability, and therefore presents itself to our mind in an aporetical manner. It is impossible for our mind to reveal in an exhaustive and noncontradictory fashion even the levels closest to us. The aporiai that are specific for every part of reality are eventually consequences of the original aporia of an absolute and unique principle that governs everything. (shrink)

Cet article examine la façon dont Damascius, le dernier diadoque de l’académie platonicienne à Athènes, intègre les principes ontologiques du Philèbe dans son système. A l’opposé de ses prédécesseurs, Damascius refuse d’accepter une opposition des principes de la limite et de l’illimitation immédiatement au-dessous de l’Un (principe de la cause), car une telle opposition briserait l’unité de l’Un. Après une présentation de la doctrine des premiers principes selon Damascius, l’auteur discute la critique de ce dernier vis-à-vis de ses précurseurs, avant (...) de se tourner vers la question complémentaire : étant donné que Damascius n’accepte pas la solution offerte par la tradition, quel rôle attribue-t-il lui-même aux principes tirés du Philèbe? (shrink)

For Damascius, any attempt to grasp the first principle of all things, the Ineffable, implies the rejection of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The reasoning soul, using aporia, is forced to admit contradictory statements as true when it comes to cognising what lies beyond any intelligible being. Damascius shows that it is necessary to postulate a completely transcendent and unknowable Absolute which is the uncoordinated cause of all things beyond the One. This paper examines how Damascius relates the rejection of (...) the PNC and regressive arguments by distinguishing two types of reversal (peritropê) of arguments. This paper begins by analysing: i) Damascius’ first aporia, ii) his characterisation of the first principle as ineffable and iii) its unknowable nature. This leads to some comments about Damascius’ use of predicates and their negations. Finally, the paper distinguishes between regression and reversal to suggest that Damascius’ reversal of the predicates implies that the first principle lies beyond the PNC but does not involve an infinity of first principles. (shrink)

In The First Principle, Jonathan Greig examines the philosophical theology of the two Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius (5th–6th centuries A.D.), on the One as the first cause. Both philosophers address a tension in the Neoplatonic tradition: namely that the One was seen as absolutely transcendent, yet it was also seen as intimately related to other things as the source of their unity and being. Proclus’ solution is to posit intermediate causes after the One, while Damascius posits a distinct principle, the (...) ‘Ineffable’, above the One. This book provides a new, thorough study of the theories of causation that lead each to their respective position and reveals crucial insights involved in a rigorous negative theology employed in metaphysics. (shrink)

This essay represents part of an effort to rewrite the history metaphysics in terms of what philosophy never said, nor could say. It works from the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Plato's Parmenides as the matrix for a distinctively apophatic thinking that takes the truth of metaphysical doctrines as something other than anything that can be logically articulated. It focuses on Damascius in the 5—6th century AD as the culmination of this tradition in the ancient world and emphasizes that Neoplatonism represents (...) the crisis of Greek metaphysics on account of the inability to give a rational account of foundations for knowing and of the ultimate principle of beings. Neoplatonism discovered how all such ultimate principles were necessarily beyond the reach of reason and speech. This apophatic insight is drawn out with the help of contemporary criticism of Neoplatonic philosophy, defining also some points of divergence. The essay then discusses the motives for thinking the unsayable in postmodern times on the basis of this parallel with Neoplatonic thought. Discourse's becoming critical of itself to the point of self-subversion animates them both. However, the tendency in postmodern thought to totally reject theology, including negative theology, is a betrayal of its own deepest motivations. This tendency is debated through an examination of the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. While any traditional discourse can be negated, the negating and self-negating capacity of discourse itself is infinite, and this is where a perennial negative theological philosophy of the unsayable is to be located. Language, eminently the language of philosophy, as infinitely open, points in a direction which becomes equally and ineluctably theological. (shrink)