ABSTRACT Research groups around the world are developing non‐invasive methods of prenatal genetic diagnosis, in which foetal cells are obtained by maternal blood test. Meanwhile, an increasing number of genetic tests are sold directly to the public. I extrapolate from these developments to consider a scenario in which PNGD self‐testing kits are sold directly to the public. Given the opposition to over‐the‐counter genetic tests and the continuing controversy surrounding PNGD, it is reasonable to expect objections to PNGD self‐testing kits. I (...) focus on one potential objection, that PNGD self‐testing kits would undermine the autonomy of potential test subjects. More specifically, that ‘direct to the public’ PNGD would fail to ensure that consumers exercise autonomy in the following PNGD‐related choices: • Should I use PNGD? • Based on the results of the PNGD test, should I continue or terminate my pregnancy? Under the current system, PNGD is provided by health care practitioners, who are required to counsel women both before and after the test. In contrast, ‘direct to the public’ PNGD would allow women to make their PNGD‐related decisions outside the context of the health care system. I compare these two decision‐making contexts, arguing that the health care system is not unequivocally better at promoting the autonomy of potential test subjects. Therefore the promotion of autonomy does not constitute a strong argument against such test kits. Other objections may be more persuasive, so I do not offer an overall assessment of the acceptability of ‘direct to the public’ PNGD. (shrink)

Are sociologists always critical about genetics? Are philosophers always more supportive? This is the impression of many sociologists in the United Kingdom who argue that contemporary British philosophers criticise genetic technologies and applications in ways that scientists and medical doctors can deal with. They emphasise matters like informed consent, but pay less or no attention to the wider social consequences of technologies, practices and policies. Philosophers in their turn may see sociologists as irrationally hostile to science and medical practice. Some (...) of them refuse to criticise genetics, arguing that there is nothing to criticise. Others feel that their criticisms are in fact more accurate than the concerns raised by sociologists. And yet others point out that the impression of uncritical support can only be true of a certain specific group. Philosophers have so many internal disagreements among themselves that the generalisation can hardly be justified. In this paper an attempt is made by a sociologist and a philosopher to understand how sociological and philosophical perspectives on bioethics may differ in discussions about genetics. The paper, which proceeds in dialogue form, is based on our email correspondence on the advantages and disadvantages of genetic technologies and their applications, and on the idea of social consequences as understood by scholars from two different disciplines. (shrink)