In 1928 Ivan Orlov published a remarkable paper which contains the first formulation of a relevant logic. The paper remained largely unknown to English-speakers until this discovery of relevant log...

This paper explores early Australasian philosophy in some detail. Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of ‘absolute idealists’ such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition (...) and were influential in their communities, but produced relatively little. In Australia, materialism gained prominence through the work of John Anderson, who arrived in Australia in 1927, and continues to be influential. John Anderson had been a student of Henry Jones, who might therefore be said to have influenced both main strands of Australian philosophical thought. (shrink)

Different natural deduction proof systems for intuitionistic and classical logic —and related logical systems—differ in fundamental properties while sharing significant family resemblances. These differences become quite stark when it comes to the structural rules of contraction and weakening. In this paper, I show how Gentzen and Jaśkowski’s natural deduction systems differ in fine structure. I also motivate directed proof nets as another natural deduction system which shares some of the design features of Genzen and Jaśkowski’s systems, but which differs again (...) in its treatment of the structural rules, and has a range of virtues absent from traditional natural deduction systems. (shrink)

Substructural logics are logics obtained from a sequent formulation of intuitionistic or classical logic by rejecting some structural rules. The substructural logics considered here are linear logic, relevant logic and BCK logic. It is proved that first-order variants of these logics with an intuitionistic negation can be embedded by modal translations into S4-type extensions of these logics with a classical, involutive, negation. Related embeddings via translations like the double-negation translation are also considered. Embeddings into analogues of S4 are obtained with (...) the help of cut elimination for sequent formulations of our substructural logics and their modal extensions. These results are proved for systems with equality too. (shrink)

This is a review, with historical and critical comments, of a paper by I. E. Orlov from 1928, which gives the oldest known axiomatization of the implication-negation fragment of the relevant logic R. Orlov's paper also foreshadows the modal translation of systems with an intuitionistic negation into S4-type extensions of systems with a classical, involutive, negation. Orlov introduces the modal postulates of S4 before Becker, Lewis and Gödel. Orlov's work, which seems to be nearly completely ignored, is related to the (...) contemporaneous work on the axiomatization of intuitionistic logic. (shrink)

We collect together some misgivings about the logic R of relevant inplication, and then give support to a weak entailment logic $DJ^{d}$ . The misgivings centre on some recent negative results concerning R, the conceptual vacuousness of relevant implication, and the treatment of classical logic. We then rectify this situation by introducing an entailment logic based on meaning containment, rather than meaning connection, which has a better relationship with classical logic. Soundness and completeness results are proved for $DJ^{d}$ with respect (...) to a content semantics, which embraces the concept of meaning containment. (shrink)

According to the realist, the meaning of a declarative, non-indexical sentence is the condition under which it is true and the truth-condition of an undecidable sentence can obtain or fail to obtain independently of our capacity, even in principle, to recognize that it obtains or that fails to do so.1 In a series of papers, beginning with “Truth” in 1959, Michael Dummett challenged the position that the classical notion of truth-condition occupied as the central notion of a theory of meaning, (...) and proposed that it should be replaced by the anti-realist (and intuitionistic) notion of assertability-condition. Taken together with normalization results obtained by Dag Prawitz, Dummett’s work truly opened up the anti-realist challenge at the level of proof-theoretical semantics.2 There has been since numerous rejoinders from partisans of classical logic, which were at times met with by attempts at watering down the anti-realist challenge, e.g., by arguing that anti-realism does not necessarily entail the adoption of intuitionistic logic. Only a few anti-realists, such as Crispin Wright and Neil Tennant, tried to look instead in the other direction, towards a more radical version of anti-realism which would entail deeper revisions of classical logic than those recommended by intuitionists.3 In this paper, which is largely programmatic, we shall also argue in favour of a radical anti-realism which would be a genuine alternative to the traditional anti-realism of Dummett and Prawitz. The debate about anti-realism has by now more or less run out of breath and we wish to provide it with a new lease on life, by taking into account the profound changes that took place in proof theory during the intervening years. We have in mind in particular the considerable development within Gentzen-style proof theory of non-classical, substructural logics other than intuitionistic logic, which seriously opens up the possibility that anti-realism, when properly understood, might end up justifying another logic, and the development of closer links between proof theory and computational complexity theory that has renewed interest in a radical form of anti-realism, namely strict finitism. (shrink)

This paper introduces the inquisitive extension of R, denoted as InqR, which is a relevant logic of questions based on the logic R as the background logic of declaratives. A semantics for InqR is developed, and it is shown that this semantics is, in a precisely defined sense, dual to Routley-Meyer semantics for R. Moreover, InqR is axiomatized and completeness of the axiomatic system is established. The philosophical interpretation of the duality between Routley-Meyer semantics and the semantics for InqR is (...) also discussed. (shrink)

The implicational fragment of the logic of relevant implication, $R_{\to}$ is one of the oldest relevance logics and in 1959 was shown by Kripke to be decidable. The proof is based on $LR_{\to}$ , a Gentzen-style calculus. In this paper, we add the truth constant $\mathbf{t}$ to $LR_{\to}$ , but more importantly we show how to reshape the sequent calculus as a consecution calculus containing a binary structural connective, in which permutation is replaced by two structural rules that involve $\mathbf{t}$ (...) . This calculus, $LT_\to^{\text{\textcircled{$\mathbf{t}$}}}$ , extends the consecution calculus $LT_{\to}^{\mathbf{t}}$ formalizing the implicational fragment of ticket entailment . We introduce two other new calculi as alternative formulations of $R_{\to}^{\mathbf{t}}$ . For each new calculus, we prove the cut theorem as well as the equivalence to the original Hilbert-style axiomatization of $R_{\to}^{\mathbf{t}}$ . These results serve as a basis for our positive solution to the long open problem of the decidability of $T_{\to}$ , which we present in another paper. (shrink)

Anderson and Belnap presented indexed Fitch-style natural deduction systems for the relevant logics R, E, and T. This work was extended by Brady to cover a range of relevant logics. In this paper I present indexed tree natural deduction systems for the Anderson–Belnap–Brady systems and show how to translate proofs in one format into proofs in the other, which establishes the adequacy of the tree systems.

This paper is a survey of results concerning embeddings of intuitionistic propositional logic and its extensions into various classical modal systems.

Term Functor Logic is a term logic that recovers some important features of the traditional, Aristotelian logic; however, it turns out that it does not preserve all of the Aristotelian properties a valid inference should have insofar as the class of theorems of Term Functor Logic includes some inferences that may be considered irrelevant (e.g. ex falso, verum ad, and petitio principii). By following an Aristotelian or syllogistic notion of relevance, in this contribution we adapt a tableaux method for Term (...) Functor Logic in order to avoid irrelevance and we offer some sort of intuitive semantics in terms of traditional inferential situations (e.g. propter quid, quia, non causa ut causa, and non sequitur). (shrink)

A variety of modal logics based on the relevant logic R are presented. Models are given for each of these logics and completeness is shown. It is also shown that each of these logics admits Ackermann's rule γ and as a corollary of this it is proved that each logic is a conservative extension of its counterpart based on classical logic, hence we call them “classically complete”. MSC: 03B45, 03B46.

The paper deals with the factors which enabled N. A. Vasiliev to put forward in 1910 - 12 the idea of logics free of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, the idea of metalogic and to construct his imaginary logic as novel non-classical system. It is shown that background of Vasiliev’s ideas lies deeply in Russia’s culture and particular approach to logical discourse. Several Russian scholars expressed ideas similar to Vasiliev’s though not in such explicit form. This period might (...) be called the prehistory of paraconsistency. Real history of paraconsistency starts with N.C.A. da Costa’s works. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j'analyse le problème des significations des constantes logiques. Ces significations sont-elles fixées conventionnellement comme le suggèrent Carnap et Wittgenstein, ou bien doivent-elles s'imposer à tous et ne pas dépendre de décisions préalables? Après avoir examiné le conventionnalisme de Wittgenstein et Carnap et l'anti-conventionnalisme de Peacocke selon lequel les sens des constantes logiques reposent sur des conceptions implicites, je montre que les deux thèses sont également critiquables. La première ne résiste pas à l'incohérence du connecteur « tonk », (...) inventé par Prior, dont les règles montrent que la convention ne peut pas déterminer à elle seule les significations des constantes logiques, la deuxième ne tient pas assez compte des divergences importantes entre les logiques. En me basant sur différents systèmes logiques, je présente de nouveaux arguments pour défendre une position intermédiaire selon laquelle chaque constante logique se déploie en diverses variantes qui forment un spectre allant de la version la plus forte à la version la plus faible. Dans ce cadre, le concept de décision joue un rôle en logique, mais les décisions sont prises en amont, en fonction de certaines conceptions touchant la vérité, la déduction et les critères de logicité adoptés par les logiciens, et tiennent compte des intuitions fondamentales liéesà chaque constante. (shrink)

Sound and complete semantics for classical propositional logic can be obtained by interpreting sentences as sets. Replacing sets with commuting dense binary relations produces an interpretation that turns out to be sound but not complete for R. Adding transitivity yields sound and complete semantics for RM, because all normal Sugihara matrices are representable as algebras of binary relations.