Certainly principles of criminal liability may be understood as rules or norms outlining orders or prohibitions and standing out among other norms with their weight, for legal culture, legal doctrine, etc. In such a classic approach they are norms defining basic rights and obligations in the applicable criminal law. However, is it the only possible and cognitively interesting meaning of the word “principle” in jurisprudence? From the semiotic point of view, they can occur in three forms: special-kind norms, teleological directives, (...) rules which constitute valid performance of conventional activities. In an extra-directival sense these principles may be understood as models-descriptions of shaping the system of criminal law. From a theoretical and practical point of view principles addressed to the legislator are extremely weighty—they can be called rules constructing the system of criminal liability. These all problems are discussed in the article. (shrink)

In an attempt to resolve the problem or the marriage between law and morality, Dr. John Ezenwankwor publishes this book, Law and Morality: An Appraisal of Hart's Concept of Law. In it, he delves into a critical analysis of the works of a British legal philosopher, Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907-1992), who made landmark contributions to the moral and legal questions surrounding human actions or conducts. Incidentally, he surpasses his master, Hart, in this book, by correcting his mistaken and poor (...) consideration of the influence of morality in holding the society together and his dismissal of legal enforcement of morality. (shrink)

This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and problem-free, account of harm, which proponents of the principle can (...) refer to. (shrink)

This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and problem-free, account of harm, which proponents of the principle can (...) refer to. (shrink)

Desde los trabajos de Catriona McKinnon se ha empezado a hablar del crimen de postericidio. Este crimen es entendido como aquella conducta intencional o imprudente capaz de provocar la casi extinción de la humanidad. En este trabajo mostraré por qué el principio de daño (intergeneracional e internacional) puede aportar buenas razones en favor de la justificación moral de la criminalización del postericidio. Argumentaré que ni el problema de la no-identidad ni el de los daños por acumulación hablan en contra de (...) considerar que la criminalización del postericidio está moralmente justificada. -/- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------- -/- The discussion on the crime of postericide has acquired a considerable boost since Catriona McKinnon’s writings. The crime of postericide is understood as an intentional or reckless conduct fit to bring about the near extinction of humanity. In this paper, I will show why the harm principle (intergenerational and international) is able to provide good reasons in favour of the moral justification of the criminalization of the postericide. I will argue that neither the non-identity problem nor the problem of the accumulative harms speak against considering the criminalization of the postericide morally justifiable. (shrink)

Described as the ‘exemplary liberal’, John Stuart Mill is employed to support a dizzying array of different, even competing visions of liberalism. That he has been so widely appropriated is certainly a result of the plural perspectives and tensions embedded in Mill’s political writings. Yet, while Mill scholars have generally been attuned to these tensions, contemporary critics of liberalism have been less careful in their uses of his work. Mill is used as an archetype of liberalism, and is often depicted (...) as a less complex thinker than is justified. He is now a popular target in debates concerning the dilemmas of liberal individualism, and the inadequacies of liberal approaches to culture, harm, and to progress in the context of empire. Such studies present Mill as a thinker driven by ideological certainty, whereas he is more appropriately regarded as someone moved by political uncertainty. Drawing on his Autobiography, I recover Mill’s appreciation for the uncertainties of political thought and action to... (shrink)

. The nature of crime: A synthesis, following the three perspectives offered in the grammar of criminal law. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 91-98.

ACAS reports increasing disciplinary action against employees over expression that employers dislike. Given the prominence of social media in contemporary life, this is a significant current legal issue yet one which has attracted relatively little academic comment. This article examines the compatibility of unfair dismissal doctrine in this context with traditional liberal principle. Arguably, doctrine provides only flimsy protection. Although the common law recognises the importance of individual autonomy generally when determining rights claims, this well-established liberal value appears to have (...) little influence on unfair dismissal doctrine. The dominant academic view on realising greater workplace human rights protection through greater application of the proportionality principle is unlikely to address this problem; reconceptualisation of the substantive free speech right at stake is required. This article offers a strategy on how this might be achieved--and so how differences between practice and principle might be reconciled--through a sympathetic reading of the Strasbourg and UK jurisprudence and potential policy-maker intervention. (shrink)